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NIETZSCHE AND LEVINAS ON THE ETHICS OF SUBJECTIVITY  
SUMMARY 
My project is an exploration of the ethics of subjectivity as proposed by Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Emmanuel Levinas, and it evolved from the question of whether 
subjectivity is experienced essentially as an unfolding of the will to power from within 
one’s own being to act on the outside, or whether it is primarily a formation based on 
an intrinsically passive exposure to exteriority.  
In the first part I descriptively laid out Nietzsche’s and Levinas’s conceptions of 
subjectivity. I began with portraying Nietzsche’s naturalistic account in which the 
human subject is basically an organism which functions based on its inherent will to 
power to interpret, shape and dominate its environment. Levinas’s interpretation of the 
human subject, on the other hand, is unapologetically anthropocentric and 
fundamentally inter-subjective, according to which the subject gains its identity by 
responding to the Other without expecting reciprocity. Levinas provocatively refers to 
the religiosity of the human soul by emphasizing that it is only through sociality that one 
truly realises one’s moral capacity.  
In the second part, I critiqued the two philosophers’ accounts from each other’s view 
points. I posed a Levinasian criticism of Nietzsche based on the ethical validity of the 
latter’s notion of the subject for being too self-sufficient and hence indifferent to the 
suffering of others. Lastly, I presented a Nietzschean challenge to Levinas by rejecting 
the universalizing aspect of the latter’s philosophy from the former’s notion of 
perspectivism. I suggested that Levinas promotes a notion of subjectivity which has a 
stifling effect upon the creativity and flourishing of the free spirit who wants to cultivate 
her character. 
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INTRODUCTION 
My interest in this project emerged as I sensed a stimulating contrast between the 
philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche and Emmanuel Levinas, as both philosophers 
reveal the same worry about the meaning of the human subject and the constitution of 
agency after the end of theodicy – in the former’s case this notion relates to the death 
of God whereas for the latter, it concerns proposing an ethical response to evil. As this 
project explores the meaning of subjectivity in terms of ethics, my research evolves 
from the question of whether subjectivity is experienced essentially as a manifestation 
of an unfolding of the will to power from within one’s own being to shape and interpret 
the outside; or a formation based primarily on responding to the (human) other, 
accompanied with the primordial sense of inhibition and obsession. After delineating 
the positions of both philosophers, I dispute them from each other’s viewpoints. I argue 
that Levinas would reject Nietzsche’s conception of subjectivity because of its 
uninterruptable self-sufficiency; whereas the latter would criticise the former’s notion of 
the subject for lacking the genuine complexity of a character. 
Nietzsche’s account of subjectivity offers an extraordinary mode of naturalism. On the 
one hand, he asserts humans are wild beasts which basically act on their primal 
instinct to dominate and exploit their environment, according to which any human 
activity leading to civilization grows from this unique source of exerting its innate force 
outwards. The will to power reveals itself most crudely upon human relationships as 
shaping and manipulating social groups: the stronger clan learns to command and 
subjugate the weaker party. In return, based on profound misinterpretations of their 
bodies – diverse inner drives and affects – the weaker party invents morality to exert its 
force upon the stronger party. As language serves as the contract, morality functions to 
maintain order within human society. Thus the invention of the causal correlation 
between guilt and punishment leads to the establishment of the moral subject 
accountable for one’s legal responsibilities.  
Notwithstanding his unromantic outline, which predominantly focuses on the pragmatic 
manipulation of power, Nietzsche strongly argues that there is more to man than the 
mere confused animal that learns to make promises. Nietzsche is captivated by the 
idea of human greatness which can come forth by creating values. In his regard, values 
are continuous with the essential drive of life; the will to power resides within every 
organism, whose aim is not only to adapt to its environment and merely survive via 
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procreation but to affect its surroundings by creating beyond itself: this means to 
shape, change, interpret, renew and reinterpret whatever comes its way.  
Thus, whenever we interpret, we create, at both the conscious and unconscious level – 
at the atomic and subatomic level our cells are physiologically constituted by our inner 
urges and drives over which we have only limited control. Since by essence 
interpretation is evaluative, Nietzsche defends that, among all human endeavours, art 
is the most explicitly evaluative one as it directly stimulates our creative powers. For 
this reason, in spite of being a plain brute, man also seems to have a transcendental 
capacity of overcoming the limiting frame of morality by creating values which signif ies 
moving beyond ressentiment, and thinking beyond good and evil. Man can be a free 
spirit, a self-commanding individual who knows how to organise his drives for an 
overall purpose and attain a remarkable level of self-synthesis. In this respect, the 
Overman can be the justification of mankind. 
On the other side, Levinas’s interpretation of the human subject is fundamentally inter-
subjective according to which the subject gains its identity by responding to the human 
other without expecting reciprocity. Levinas’s notion of responsibility can best be 
understood in terms of the essentially asymmetrical relationship in which the Other is 
always one’s moral superior. In spite of her physical fragility, what endows the Other 
this moral superiority is her relation to the Good beyond Being, which is the trace one 
glimpses in service to the Other.  
In his phenomenological description of the ethical moment, Levinas employs prominent 
expressions such as obsession, persecution and hostage which always connote, 
implicitly or explicitly, a sense of suffering for the Other. Yet it must be noted that, in 
Levinas’s depiction, the obsession by the Other is simultaneously an obsession with 
the Good beyond Being, which is memorably expressed by Levinas as he refers to the 
condition of being a hostage as a “divine discomfort.” Levinas provocatively refers to 
the religiosity of human soul by emphasizing that it is only through sociality that one 
realises her moral capacity and generosity. Thus, prior to being creatures of nature, in 
Levinas’s philosophy humans irrupt into Being with the ethical capacity that no other 
creature has. Contrary to Nietzsche, Levinas’s account of subjectivity is not naturalistic 
but primarily anthropocentric and humanistic.  
It is important to remark that Levinas does not intend to re-introduce another version of 
the “is” versus “ought” dichotomy in a renewed, disguised form. By asserting the 
primordiality of the face as the beginning of ethics, language and peace, he does not 
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convey that one must serve the Other but suggests that one is always already 
obsessed by the Other even if one ignores the Other. Levinas neither provides us with 
any rational arguments to convince us as to why we must serve the Other, nor does he 
tell us to stay away from evil – perhaps such arguments would not convince us after 
the death of God either. There is no divine reward if we are good; and, likewise, no 
punishment if we are bad. The relationship with the Other is a phenomenon beyond 
reward or punishment, and the suffering we undergo along the way will always be 
useless. 
In Levinas’s account, ethics is not a branch of philosophy among others, but is the first 
philosophy. All the other human activities such as sciences, politics or arts gain 
significance only after realising the epiphany of the face. That is why social and political 
philosophies, even theories of justice, can only have meaning as one learns to obey 
the moral authority inscribed on the face. Even language comes forth as a way to 
respond and relate to the Other; so, rather than articulating persuasive theoretical 
statements, it is by acknowledging the humanism of the other person that ethics may 
have significance. 
My project consists of two parts: part one is mainly descriptive and part two is more 
argumentative. Since all of my chapters are quite lengthy, I provide brief introductory 
and concluding parts for each chapter, for guidance. Yet here I would like to also 
succinctly outline the structure of my project.   
In part one, the first chapter is on Nietzsche, called “Nietzsche on the Self.” Its purpose 
is to lay out the ground upon which Nietzsche’s conception of subjectivity emerges. In 
order to best reflect this, it is divided into three sections which deal with Nietzsche’s 
conception of naturalism, his critique of the moral subject, and the emergence of the 
self as the outcome of the will to power, subsequently. Because of the descriptive 
nature of this chapter, I mainly intend to cover the most relevant grounds for 
understanding Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic position on naturalism, morality and the 
situation of the human subject.  
However, this chapter does not include all the controversy pertaining to Nietzsche’s 
thought. The notion of the Nietzschean individual gains further clarity in the coming 
chapters as I explore the significant themes of amor fati, the eternal recurrence of the 
same and perspectivism. These themes are reserved for the later chapters partly for 
the sake of avoiding repetition, and partly because those themes are the most 
controversial ideas to relate to Levinas. 
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The second chapter is entitled “Levinas on the Emergence of Subjectivity” and its main 
purpose is to describe Levinas’s main ideas on the emergence of the subject as 
responding to the Other. It is predominantly based on close readings of primary texts 
and some secondary literature to clarify Levinas’s ideas. Even though my main texts 
are Totality and Infinity and the “Substitution” section of Otherwise than Being, my 
primary sources are not limited to only these two masterpieces. I make use of some 
important essays both in this chapter and in the coming chapters to provide the most 
relevant grounds, partly to challenge Nietzsche and partly to be challenged by him. I 
also use at a very limited scale some of Levinas’s non-philosophical works and 
interviews (in chapter four as well) as I regard Levinas’s position from Nietzsche’s ad 
hominem arguments, such as philosophy as autobiography.  
In this chapter, on the one hand, I explain the key ideas and concepts necessary to 
understand Levinas’s complex thought and, on the other hand, I intend to clarify certain 
aspects of Levinas’s philosophy which are open to misconceptions such as dissociating 
his philosophy from a conventional interpretation of religion and dissociating the notion 
of substitution from altruism. This chapter also introduces certain themes that will be 
examined in more detail in the last chapter, such as Levinas’s ambiguous relation to 
Judaism and his controversial conception of universalism. I clarify Levinas’s notions of 
interiority and exteriority – the face, the Other and the third party – which will all be 
relevant for the coming chapters. I present substitution as the essence of Levinas’s 
conception of subjectivity at the root of which lies the asymmetry between the self and 
the Other. Throughout my dissertation, when referring to words such as the infinite, 
other, desire, good, goodness and being, I capitalise the initial letter when the term is 
used in a strictly Levinasian sense rather than conventional use. 
Part two is the place where I theoretically imagine Nietzsche and Levinas challenging 
and critiquing each other’s accounts of subjectivity. However, I do not imagine them 
face to face; that is, I avoid a straightforwardly symmetric style in which each responds 
to the other’s challenge as self-defence and counterattacks as if in a dialogue. Rather, 
this project is a humble attempt to lay out at least some of the most provocative ideas 
which not only confront the two philosophers’ thoughts, but also touch some important 
issues in the canon of Western philosophy.  
I begin the third chapter, “A Levinasian Challenge to the Nietzschean Notion of the Self 
on Ethical Grounds,” with a hypothetical debate between Nietzsche and Levinas on 
ethics versus naturalism, which is the most apparent difference between their 
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approaches to philosophy and subjectivity. Without rejecting the invaluable insights of 
Nietzsche’s observations pertaining to human psychology, in this section as a 
Levinasian critique I suggest that naturalism cannot provide us any ethical orientation. 
Ethical orientation can only emerge from exteriority which is itself already a breach in 
nature, not an interpretation of nature – no matter how objective or reasonable.  
I continue with remarking the parallels between Nietzsche’s conception of naturalism 
with his captivating theme of the aesthetic justification of life. At this stage I introduce 
Levinas’s approach to arts and artworks and reveal their disturbing relation to the 
Levinasian notion of the il y a. I draw a connection between Nietzsche’s notion of amor 
fati and Levinas’s critique of the self-absorbed individual who cannot be challenged 
from outside.  
I elaborate on the self-sufficiency of the Nietzschean subject who is determined to 
affirm his fate at the expense of a complete disregard of others’ fates and sufferings. It 
is not implausible to argue that the Nietzschean individual affirms himself and his fate 
within a totality very reminiscent of the totality of an artwork – which is already notable 
in Nietzsche’s proclamation that one must be the artist of one’s life. I pursue the 
argument of the clustered individual which is crystallised by the Nietzschean theme of 
the eternal recurrence of the same to the point of suggesting that embodying stoicism, 
the Nietzschean individual is evocative of the ascetic priest.      
The last chapter, titled “A Nietzschean Challenge to the Levinasian Notion of the Self,” 
begins with calling into question the consistency of Levinas’s arguments. Disputing 
Levinas’s implicit convictions on the universalizing influence of his conception of 
subjectivity, I question Levinas’s complacency regarding the Western identity which is 
itself never open to critique from any other (non-Western) direction. Levinas’s 
undoubted belief in the Greek as the language of university; Judaism as the model for 
humanity and Plato as the reference point for philosophy becomes debated from 
Nietzsche’s conception of perspectivism.  
I elucidate that perspectivism refutes universalism because it rejects the idea of a 
single viewpoint. Similar to inner drives, perspectives need to compete with each other 
and promote constant challenge. That is why, Levinas’s universalizing urge causes a 
stifling effect upon the activity of the free spirit who desires to flourish and cultivate her 
character. Lastly, I introduce Nietzsche’s idea which suggests that ethics can best be 
manifest within one’s character. It is not the works nor the words, but the character – 
the ethos – which reveals one’s ethics.  
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Likewise, one’s philosophy is one’s own personification, manifesting one’s character. 
Philosophies can compete only as far as their creators can; as the perspectives of 
diverse philosophers rival with each other akin to the ancient enlightened competitions, 
the agonistic contests. For this reason at least, after all, it can be worth investing some 
effort upon determining the conditions best suitable for one’s own flourishing and 
cultivating one’s character. 
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PART I 
 
TWO DISTINCT APPROACHES TO SUBJECTIVITY 
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CHAPTER ONE 
NIETZSCHE ON THE SELF 
Introduction 
This chapter defends a naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of selfhood, 
central to which is the notion of the will to power.  It will be argued that Nietzsche 
rejects traditional philosophical accounts of the self, especially in ethics, which he 
considers to be mere metaphysical constructs, consolidated through socio-political 
practices.  The chapter consists of three sections; I begin by elucidating Nietzsche’s 
apperception of naturalism and placing it in the context of the relevant current 
scholarship.  Having explored the physiological aspects of the body such as the inner 
drives, instincts, unconscious desires and affects, I seek to show that Nietzsche’s aim 
to “naturalize” man must be understood as a necessary bridge to comprehend his 
essential theme of the will to power.  
In the second section, I present Nietzsche’s critique of moral subjectivity.  This is a 
dominant idea coming up in most of his middle works, but most rigorously examined in 
On the Genealogy of the Morals in the context of Nietzsche’s criticisms of the notion of 
the free will and of the moral subject as inventions of legal and socio-political 
conventions rooted in the traditional and practical creditor-debtor dynamic.  His key 
criticism of the moral subject is that it propagates the concepts of guilt, ressentiment 
and bad conscience.   
In the last section, I explore Nietzsche’s notion of the will through the relationship 
between the self and the will to power.  I suggest that the Nietzschean self is a 
manifestation of the relationship between the will to power and individuation, and this 
process is best exemplified by the Ancient Greek concept agon.  Since the individual is 
a concept that undergoes constant change and individuation, what Nietzsche regards 
as self-overcoming is attained through the growth in activity, reminiscent of the spirit of 
agonic contestation.   
a) Nietzsche’s Naturalism and the Self 
There are no eternally enduring substances; matter is just another error as the God of 
Eleatics.  But when shall we be at an end with our foresight and precaution!  When will 
all these shadows of God cease to obscure us?  When shall we have nature entirely 
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undeified!  When shall we be permitted to naturalise ourselves by means of the pure, 
newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?
1
   
Nietzsche’s conception of naturalism is a highly controversial yet fruitful topic as it 
relates to an ethical realm hosting his notion of selfhood.  This notion alludes to a 
space beyond causality and free will which challenges the convictions of the sciences, 
metaphysics and morality.  In my attempt to clarify these ideas, I will present several 
accounts.  I start with Brian Leiter who argues that Nietzsche must be considered a 
“methods continuity” naturalist.  Keeping that account short, I offer Christopher 
Janaway’s rejection of Leiter’s view, which I regard as acceptable but inadequate as it 
treats naturalism too broadly, without touching the heart of the question about the 
realm of ethics for Nietzsche.   
From the Leiter versus Janaway debate, I move on to Maudemarie Clark and David 
Dudrick who argue that Nietzsche’s notion of naturalism essentially points to the 
conflict between the will to truth and the will to knowledge.  Even though I consider their 
view quite tenable, in my opinion it gains further significance with Christa Davis 
Acampora’s position.  Acampora proposes to resolve that conflict with what she calls 
an “artful appropriation” pointing at an understanding of naturalism which aims to 
overcome causality and teleology.  After laying out these diverse versions of 
naturalisms, I propose that the essential aspect of the Nietzschean naturalism is the 
study of diverse power relations both at micro and macro level, all in relation to one 
another; within self, society, nature, biology and physiology.  Without attempting to 
construct laws and formulations, this study emphasizes that truth lies not in the in-itself 
of nature but in these very relations themselves, and Nietzsche’s notion of selfhood 
must be understood in these terms.     
I start with Brian Leiter as he provides the most common notion of naturalism in general 
and checks whether and to what extent this broad notion applies to Nietzsche. Leiter 
argues that there are two main types of naturalists: “methodological naturalists” and 
“substantive naturalists.”  The former are the philosophers who assert that 
philosophical inquiry should be continuous with the empirical inquiry of the sciences.  
The latter party claims that since the only existing things are natural or physical beings, 
things outside of this substantive realm do not concern philosophy.  He categorizes 
Nietzsche as a methodological naturalist and subcategorizes methodological 
naturalists further into the branches of “results continuity” and “methods continuity.”  In 
                                                             
1
 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Thomas Common, New York: Dover 
Publications, 2006 [GS], III, 109.      
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this case, the former group argues that if a philosophical theory cannot be justified by 
the empirical sciences, it is a bad theory whereas the latter group argues that the result 
does not matter so long as the reasoning and the explanation of the theory are parallel 
to the sciences; which suffices for the theory to be valid.2  Leiter claims that Nietzsche 
is the kind of methodological naturalist who thinks that philosophical reasoning 
emulates empirical sciences, through which we can know facts about human nature.3   
It may be quite tempting to categorize Nietzsche this way when we consider his 
earnest criticisms of the transcendental metaphysical world view accompanied by his 
blatant disgust with the “bad air!” of Platonic-Judaeo-Christian-based Western 
philosophy.  As a reasonable alternative, he embraces natural sciences.  Yet his 
criticism of transcendental metaphysics and his keen interest in natural sciences – in 
particular, physics and biology – do not make him favour sheer scientism either.  
Nietzsche’s reserved attitude towards scientism is evident in his vehement critiques of 
the purely scientific world view.  He is deeply doubtful of a purely scientific attitude 
because he regards the causality-based explanations of the sciences as the 
continuations of metaphysical reasoning.  He rejects causality on the grounds that the 
so-called “laws” of nature actually are a hangover from teleological conditioning.  He 
thinks that it has turned into a “psychological necessity” to explain everything causally, 
from the metaphysically biased scientific perspective.4   
As stated in the opening quote of this section, Nietzsche emphasizes the rigidity of 
scientific reasoning by referring to matter as an error, just like the error in believing in 
God since both get their uncompromising firmness from our false belief in “eternally 
enduring substances.”  Nietzsche refers to the ambition of the purely scientific route as 
“the shadows of God,” which according to him “deifies nature” as well, just like 
metaphysics.  So, it is clear that Nietzsche’s conception of naturalism aims beyond the 
deification of nature regardless of its drive; be it metaphysical, religious or scientific.  
Nietzsche suggests that un-deifying nature will eventually lead to naturalizing man, 
which could be the first step not only to redeem nature but presumably also to attain 
genuine individualism.       
                                                             
2
 Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, London: Routledge, 2002, 2-3. 
3
 For the purposes of my project, this brief account should suffice to lead into the criticism of 
Leiter’s position. 
4
 Nietzsche states: “... the psychological necessity for a belief in causality lies in the 
inconceivability of an event divorced from intent; by which naturally nothing is said concerning 
truth or untruth (the justification of such a belief)!  The belief in causae falls with the belief in 
tele.” (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, New 
York: Vintage, 1968 [WTP], 627: 1885-1886).  
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In addition, Nietzsche regards a purely scientific world as devoid of meaning.  The 
sciences cannot explain everything such as the aesthetic effect or the phenomenal 
experience of a piece of music.  The mathematical formulas behind the notes cannot 
account for the effect.  He expresses his concerns in the quote below:  
But an essentially mechanical world would be an essentially meaningless world!  
Supposing we valued the worth of a music with reference to how much it could be 
counted, calculated, or formulated – how absurd such a “scientific” estimate of music 
would be!  What would one have apprehended, understood, or discerned in it!  Nothing, 
absolutely nothing of what is really “music” in it!
5
   
Converting music into formulations helps writing, circulating and working on it and so 
on but it cannot enable us to “comprehend” it.  Formulations or calculations do not lead 
to understanding, evaluating or appreciating music.  What makes determining the 
ramifications of Nietzsche’s naturalism so complicated is the fact that his worry over 
calculation and measuring is not limited merely to arts or music but also to language, 
morality and to the sciences.6  Moreover, Nietzsche seems to be quite aware of the 
definite dangers of a mechanical world view, especially its tendency to propagate a 
different version of the ascetic ideal.7  Changing its form, in modern times, asceticism 
may not necessarily manifest itself as seeking redemption through enduring severe 
suffering but by indulging in empty and pointless hedonism – as promised by 
technology.   
One can turn away from life and from the ambition to create values by pursuing only 
the things that lead to immediate gratification such as alcohol or drug abuse, internet 
addiction, video games, consumerism and so on.  One can be tempted to measure the 
worth of one’s life with reference solely to how much it can lead to entertainment, 
happiness and pleasure.  This is also nihilism per se.  Hedonism and asceticism have 
in common the drive to turn away from life and nature and losing the drive to create 
“values.”  In my opinion, within Nietzsche’s depiction of the meaninglessness of the 
mechanical world, it is quite plausible to read into that quote this hedonistic world view 
as well.   
Moving on from Nietzsche’s criticism of the mechanical world view, Christopher 
Janaway claims that Nietzsche could be regarded as a naturalist in a very broad sense 
                                                             
5
 Nietzsche GS, V, “We Fearless Ones,” 373. 
6
 This quote exemplifies Nietzsche’s doubtful attitude towards the sciences: “Against the 
physical atom.– To comprehend the world, we have to be able to be able to calculate it; to be 
able to calculate it, we have to have constant causes; because we find no such constant causes 
in actuality, we invent them for ourselves – the atoms.  This is the origin of atomism.” (WTP, 
624: 1883-1888).  
7
 I will elaborate on asceticism in the next section, in my detailed reading of On the Genealogy 
of Morals [GM]. 
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but he disagrees with Leiter’s categorical approach to Nietzsche.  He begins by stating 
that it is reasonable to view Nietzsche as a naturalist considering his opposition to 
transcendental metaphysics – notably of Plato, Christianity, Descartes, Kant and even 
of Schopenhauer.   Janaway remarks that Nietzsche denounces the concepts of 
unities, ego, subject, soul, free will or self-transparent pure intellect.  Instead he 
emphasizes the importance of the body by taking into account the instinctual animal 
nature of human beings and considering various conflicting drives, desires and affects.8  
Janaway also notes that Nietzsche aims to establish a philosophy that welcomes 
senses, passions and extirpations as he thinks that resisting or denying senses (the 
foundation of Western morality) is against life.  
Agreeing with Leiter only in a broad way, on the issue that there are no moral facts or 
values that can be proven scientifically, Janaway disagrees with Leiter’s point that as a 
methodological naturalist, Nietzsche seeks congruency of his ideas with empirical 
sciences.  Janaway comments that the claims Nietzsche makes in the Genealogy 
concerning the oppression of the masters and the ressentiment of the slaves; the 
establishment of the morality of pity which leads to the compassion ideal of Christian 
morality cannot be regarded in continuity with any empirical science.  These ideas or 
historical speculations do not emulate the sciences in any remote way.  Janaway 
argues that even if we push it very far and timidly suggest that Nietzsche might only be 
a methodological naturalist who does not care much about the results, that would still 
be too broad a claim; so broad that it could easily lose its meaning – because 
Nietzsche’s premises do not reveal any signs of seeking justification from any sort of 
scientific reasoning either. 
In addition, Janaway points to the rhetorical language Nietzsche uses in his books.  
Particularly in the Genealogy, his most argumentative work, Nietzsche does not imply 
any sympathetic collaboration with the sciences.  Rather, Janaway contends that 
Nietzsche has always been critical of the cold, detached, impersonal or the so-called 
objective style employed in the scientific discourse.  It is crucial to notice that 
Nietzsche’s denouncement of subjectivity does not advocate impersonality.  He views 
scientific impersonality with disfavour because underneath the detached tone, he 
senses the condescending metaphysical knowledge drive; disguised within the 
impersonal and quasi-religious authority of the allegedly “objective” scientist.  Janaway 
thus suggests that Nietzsche’s own personal tone of writing is the evidence which 
refutes Leiter’s naturalistic reading of Nietzsche.        
                                                             
8
 Christopher Janaway, “Naturalism and Genealogy,” A Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Keith 
Ansell Pearson, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 337. 
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What I regard as misleading or incomplete in Janaway’s account is that he misses 
Nietzsche’s indifference to that very distinction between the serious scientific 
terminology and the flowery rhetoric of literature in the first place.  Nietzsche disregards 
the separation between the rhetorical versus the non-rhetorical uses of language as he 
thinks language essentially is metaphorical; be it used in a scientific or a literary 
context.9  In his view, language is man’s attempt at “grasping” – literarily and 
metaphorically – reality by interpreting the world.  So, in my opinion, Janaway’s point 
that the rhetorical language used in Nietzsche’s books undermines his affinities with 
the sciences is not genuinely valid.    
As for the extraordinary arguments and reasoning of the Genealogy, it must be noted 
that the book essentially lays out a fascinating thought experiment to give an account 
of the birth of our moral psychology, rather than aiming to convey any accurate 
historical or biological information.10  Yet again, I think that the same criticism I brought 
up in relation to the artificial separation between the rhetorical versus the non-rhetorical 
language could be considered here as well.  It is possible that Nietzsche does not see 
a genuine distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities.  He praises 
both as long as they feed on the same “will” and condemns both when they make the 
same mistakes of falling into the trap of theology, teleology or the mechanical and 
deterministic world view.  
Even though Leiter and Janaway raise interesting issues, both accounts fall short of 
giving a reasonable exposition of Nietzsche’s naturalism.  Where they arrive at an 
impasse, I think that Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick offer a solution.  Clark and 
Dudrick also disagree with the idea that Nietzsche is a methodological naturalist 
because methodological naturalism only takes into account the will to truth but 
disregards the will to value.  This is a problem because according to their interpretation 
of Nietzsche, the will to truth isolated from the will to value cannot lead to truth.11  
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 Nietzsche elaborates on the metaphorical nature of language in his influential early essay “On 
Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” (1873) [TLNS], in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from 
Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870s, trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale, New Jersey and 
London: Humanities Press International, 1979 [PT].  Christian J. Emden provides a rich account 
of Nietzsche’s rejection of the rhetorical versus non-rhetorical distinction in his book Nietzsche, 
Language, Consciousness and the Body, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
2005.     
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 I personally think that Nietzsche at times mocks both scientific rationality and philosophical 
reasoning in GM.  It is such a humorous motive that could best explain his quasi-biologism and 
quasi-historicism.  Away with seriousness, Nietzsche does not believe in a god who does not 
understand how to dance (Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1961 [TSZ], I, “Of Reading and Writing”).   
11
 Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, “The Naturalisms of Beyond Good and Evil,” in 
Pearson (ed.), 152.   
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Clark and Dudrick argue that Nietzsche emphasizes two main streams that let 
philosophy flourish: the will to truth and the will to value.  Clark and Dudrick note that 
Nietzsche thinks that most philosophers until Kant followed the second route, the will to 
value – and Plato may be the chief example of such philosophers who aimed to create 
philosophy in their own image.  However, this is what caused Western philosophy to be 
mainly dogmatic; pretending to seek truth in a purely a priori manner, neglecting 
empirical knowledge.  It is this dogmatic attitude which over time fed the ascetic ideal in 
philosophers and turned philosophy into what Nietzsche regards as a quasi-theological 
dusty academic pursuit.  The more objective it aspired to be; the more detached from 
life it became.12  
Moreover, according to Clark and Dudrick’s analysis of Nietzsche, the ascetic vein in 
metaphysics led to a devaluation of nature.  Even if Nietzsche does not think that all 
philosophy or metaphysics devaluates nature, all metaphysics has an issue with 
“valuation” – ascribing value to the natural world.13  Clark and Dudrick remark that 
Nietzsche characterizes the conflict between the will to truth and the will to value in the 
preface of Beyond Good and Evil as “the magnificent tension of the spirit.”  Yet while 
the truth drive tries to capture the truth about the world, the value drive does not aim for 
truth but rather aims to create the world in the philosopher’s image.14  
Overcoming the dogmatic attitude of metaphysics may pave the way for more genuine 
philosophy; the naturalist urge is crucial in terms of leading to empirical inquiry and 
giving an accurate account of the actual experience.  However, Clark and Dudrick 
clearly emphasize that even though the will to truth and the will to value are separate, 
there are thoroughly interdependent.15  They draw attention to an expressive quote 
from Nietzsche from The Gay Science, drawing attention to the diversity of our drives.  
By giving an analogy of a tree as a striking metaphor from nature, Nietzsche suggests 
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 Nietzsche writes: “Formerly, the philosophers were afraid of the senses:  have we, perhaps, 
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that we are both oriented toward the heavens, the value; yet also firmly grounded to the 
earth by our roots – to solid empiricism:16   
Like trees we grow – it’s hard to understand, like all life! – not in one place, but 
everywhere; not in one direction, but upwards and outwards and downwards equally; 
our energy drives trunk, branches, and roots all at once; we are no longer free to do 
anything singly, to be something single.
17
   
The quote above points to our innate forces at work by alluding to the multiple 
dynamics that constitute us; we are not single unities but bits and pieces scattered 
everywhere, striving to grow together.  The expression “upwards” presumably evokes 
the heavens and metaphysics – the will to truth – whereas the expression “downwards” 
implies faithfulness to earth,18 as science intends to bind us to via the will to 
knowledge.  Because of our conflicting yet intricately interdependent drives, we cannot 
be single “unities;” yet according to Nietzsche, any philosophy that grounds itself solely 
on either one of these drives – to truth or to value – is incomplete and misleading.  If a 
philosophy puts heavy emphasis on the value, it loses its connectedness to the earth, 
and inevitably to nature.  It evolves into an ascetic or quasi-religious dogma that 
attempts to revive the already dead God, which is predominantly the narcissistic 
reflection of its philosopher.   
On the other hand, if a philosophy puts all emphasis on the truth drive, paradoxically it 
ends up sharing the common fate of the “value-driven” philosophy.  Its complacent 
empiricism creates its own dogmas, and the “objective” scientists begin to act like 
dogmatic philosophers trying to make brands of their names; only in this case, for the 
sake of “scientific knowledge.”  As it loses its organic connection to the earth and 
nature, within its cult of “objectivity” the blind admiration of scienticism embeds 
asceticism.  It is ironic that even while starting from completely different paths, both the 
truth drive and the value drive end up in the same trap once they disconnect 
themselves from each other. 
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reason, your will, and your love!  And truly, it will be to your happiness, you enlightened men!” 
(TSZ, II, “On the Blissful Islands”).   
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A good example to exemplify the tension between the will to truth and the will to value 
would be the appreciation of art; for instance in music, what is needed is not the 
scientific explanation of how the notes stimulate and satisfy our senses but the 
cultivation of value.  Only someone with a cultivated ear can determine and presumably 
create good art.  What some scientists often ignore in this case is the factor of “value” 
in art.  However, the value needed to evaluate art, music or even morality is needed for 
philosophy as well.  Clark and Dudrick argue that similar to the musicians or music 
critics who have trained their ears; gained knowledge, taste and thereby the authority 
to judge the value of a piece of music, philosophers should also train themselves to be 
more competent in appreciating and performing intellectual activities such as 
reasoning, making claims and drawing conclusions.19  It is important to note that values 
determine the quality and power of such intellectual activities and judgements as well.    
Clark and Dudrick’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s naturalism is quite plausible in terms 
of pointing at the tension and the interdependence between the will to truth and the will 
to knowledge.  They suggest resolving this conflict by introducing the idea of the notion 
of value which is best recognized in art.  However, this recognition does not measure 
or articulate philosophical ideas in a scientific manner but rather points out that any 
explanation, scientific or intuitive is essentially an interpretation or an appropriation.     
We have observed the relevance of art and its role in interpretation and appropriation 
of reality for understanding Nietzsche’s notion of naturalism and truth.  I regard Clark 
and Dudrick’s contributions as significant in terms of clarifying those distinct but parallel 
drives.  I also agree with their intimation of the essential role of art in determining value.  
But now, I would like to turn to another impressive account which elaborates on the 
issue of art – the very issue they hint at but leave out.  I regard Christa Davis 
Acampora’s proposition in a way complementary to their analysis.     
Acampora offers the notion of “artful appropriation” to solve two issues: firstly to resolve 
the tension between the will to truth and the will to knowledge by suggesting that the 
sciences can be made even more rigorous by incorporating the values of art.  
Secondly, she suggests that this way to approach (Nietzsche’s) naturalism also helps 
us see the connection Nietzsche builds between naturalism and selfhood.  Rather than 
retreating to the dead end of having to choose between complete scepticism and 
exclusive humanities, the “artful appropriation” provides us with an alternative of 
emphasizing “the centrality of art in his (Nietzsche’s) critique and appropriation of 
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science.”20  Acampora conveys that according to Nietzsche, integrating the aesthetic 
values and interests of art could actually improve the quality of scientific endeavours.  
While proposing scientific judgments, we often forget that our empirical enquiries are 
always already essentially anthropocentric; because any empirical perception or 
interpretation of information is also eventually the outcome of our (anthropocentric) 
organization of things.21   
Nietzsche does not intend to make the sciences more artful or art-like but to the 
contrary, much more meticulous.  The aesthetic values and interests we need to 
incorporate into the sciences enable us to employ our skills to evaluate, organize, 
reform, shape, in short to interpret and reinterpret much more effectively.  So, in order 
to make science more powerful, rather than taking the more analytic or cognitive 
direction, we could make better use of art instead; as art enables us to make more use 
of our valuation capacity.  Art requires the employment of our interpretation skills at a 
much more advanced level, and since we are nothing other than interpreters of 
phenomena, art can help the sciences understand and relate to reality in a more 
cohesive manner.22    
The artful naturalism Acampora suggests is closely linked to overcoming the 
teleological conception of nature and the idea of causality.  Nietzsche conveys that 
causality is a fallacy that most natural scientists make because they confuse an 
explanation with an interpretation.  He states this idea as he writes: “... one should use 
‘cause’ and ‘effect’ only as pure concepts, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the 
purpose of designation and communication – not for explanation.”23  Clearly, 
Nietzsche’s criticism of causality is similar to his criticism of the free will or the free 
agent since in both situations we isolate the act from the context.  In order to build a 
cause and effect relationship between two separate things, we need to freeze and fix 
the constant flux of the ongoing process of Becoming and presuppose a rigid status of 
the world for the sake of having an “explanation” for something.  Our interpretations are 
determined by the limits of our capacity for perception based on which we interpret and 
label phenomena as truth.24       
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The link between subjectivity and causality and Nietzsche’s criticism of both in terms of 
undermining morality and the scientific world view become evident in “The Four Great 
Errors” of Twilight of the Idols.25  The birth of the subject is intricately connected with 
the conceptions of causality and free will according to which we presuppose that we 
can actively will or act on our wills.  Our notion of agency is strongly associated; 
spiritually and psychologically reinforced with the idea of God and metaphysics.  To 
reinforce the idea of causality, we had to reinforce the idea of the subject as well; it was 
like an equation which depended on the survival of both ends of the premises.  Later 
on we strengthened this false equation by further consolidating and confirming it with 
the justification of the sciences.  And we made this causality the measure of reality.  As 
Nietzsche writes early in his career, in “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,”26 
once we started lying we had to keep on lying; we had no other choice so as not to 
contradict ourselves.  Because if we contradicted our “selves,” our selves would 
collapse – as we still regard our “selves” as substances or organisms we need to 
protect.   
The role of interpretation is also crucial for undermining causality;27 as Acampora puts 
it, “we are the interpretations of these battles which define us.”28  Nietzsche’s 
conception of the subject is that one is a constellation of diverse forces; in a nutshell, 
the self or the consciousness is a “perspective or perspectives of dominant forces.”29  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
The abruptness with which many effects take place leads us into error; it is however only an 
abruptness for us.  There is an infinite multitude of processes in that abrupt moment which 
escape us.  An intellect which could see cause and effect as a continuum, which could see the 
flux of events not according to our mode of perception, as things arbitrarily separated and 
broken – would throw aside the conception of cause and effect, and would deny all 
conditionality.” (GS, III, 112). 
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 Nietzsche summarizes all these points in this striking quote: “The error of a false causality ... 
We believed ourselves to be causal in the act of willing; we thought that here at least we caught 
causality in the act ... The conception of a consciousness (‘spirit’) as a cause, and later also that 
of the ego as cause (the ‘subject’), are only afterbirths: first the causality of the will was firmly 
accepted as given, as empirical ... And what a fine abuse we had perpetrated with this 
‘empirical evidence’; we created the world on this basis as a world of causes, a world of will, a 
world of spirits.  The most ancient and enduring psychology was at work here and did not do 
anything else: all that happened was considered a doing, all doing the effect of a will; the world 
became to it a multiplicity of doers; a doer (a ‘subject’) was slipped under all that happened ... 
The thing itself, to say it once more, the concept of thing is a mere reflex of the faith in the ego 
as cause.  And even your atom, my dear mechanists and physicists – how much error, how 
much rudimentary psychology is still residual in your atom!  Not to mention ‘the-thing-in-itself’, 
the horrendum pudendum of the metaphysicians!  The error of the spirit as cause mistaken for 
reality!  And made the very measure of reality!  And called God!” (Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight 
of the Idols [Twilight], in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings,  
ed. Aaron Ridley and trans. Judith Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 
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Since we are mainly creatures that interpret and appropriate, Acampora argues that the 
Nietzschean subject is beyond the polarity of the free versus the determined agent.  In 
her interpretation, Nietzsche thinks that both Kant and Descartes misunderstood the 
nature of the human subject because trying to define it in terms of either free or 
determined is a false dilemma.30  
As will be clearer below, in Nietzschean thought, both the free subject and the 
determined subject refer to finalized positions.  So regarding the subject within such a 
duality still pertains to thinking likewise in terms of considering an organism as a single 
point; from a single perspective – be it an end point or a starting point.  Rather than 
speculating on the human being in a detached scientific or metaphysical manner, 
Nietzsche re-incorporates the body back into philosophy.  We are bodily; so any 
philosophy which does not indicate our creaturely natures falls short of being genuinely 
valid.  This emphasis on the body is the last issue I will bring up regarding Nietzsche’s 
naturalism. 
In order to illustrate the complexity and the multiplicity of our inner drives, Nietzsche 
mentions the “great reason in the body” which is better than one’s best wisdom.31  
However since we are complicated creatures, what we do may not always serve our 
best interests.  For instance while describing the “pale criminal” in TSZ, Nietzsche 
depicts him as a despicable man who cannot bear the sight of his own deed and 
portrays his mind as “a knot of savage serpents that are seldom at peace with 
themselves,”32 suggesting that his case is an incident of the poor man (mis)interpreting 
the messages of his own body.  
According to Nietzsche, the “self” is basically the arena in which the struggle of various 
drives plays itself out, and one’s actions are the eventual outcome of that struggle.  For 
example, within a body, one drive desires the beloved, yet another drive desires to 
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overcome that desire.  The second drive complains about the first drive whereas a third 
drive desires to evaluate which one of the previous two desires is stronger, trying to 
determine which path to follow.33  This is the drama of the self.  So, the subject 
Nietzsche has in mind is a body which hosts diverse inner drives and conflicts.  And 
when the second or third parties arrive, it becomes only more complicated. 
The self is rather complicated; that is why, in our everyday dealings with the world, we 
intend to get over this complexity by pretending that there is an “I” which unifies all 
these fragmentations and inner diversity.  We often tend to regard the self as a lofty 
term and associate it with the hygienic “mind,” ignoring our own creaturely bodies.  In 
TSZ, Nietzsche expresses this situation thus: “You say ‘I’ and you are proud of this 
word.  But greater than this – although you will not believe in it – is your body and its 
great intelligence, which does not say ‘I’ but performs ‘I.’”34     
In this passage Nietzsche addresses the so-called despisers of the body, who may be 
Platonists, religious people or the Cartesian Dualists.  Nietzsche states that ironically, 
our bodies are actually far “smarter” than our feeble minds can ever be.  Our bodies 
regulate us – rather than the other way around – at non-conscious level.35  The body is 
a microcosmic level of the will to power which Nietzsche thinks is the essence of life.  
Thus it is my contention that Nietzsche’s conception of naturalism is closely linked to 
his “utmost” idea: the will to power. 
However before moving onto the exploration of the will to power, it is crucial to evaluate 
the moral implications of Nietzsche’s naturalism and consider how his conception of 
naturalism challenges our moral conditioning and psychology.  Even though we try 
hard to read our minds, feelings and senses to follow the trace of who or what it is in us 
that pulls the strings, the constant feedback through our senses and feelings does not 
promise that we can be in control of ourselves.  To the contrary, paying close attention 
to our feelings can always delude and mislead us.  Nietzsche is very critical of our 
overrated moral feelings and moral psychology which will be my main focus of inquiry 
in the next section of this paper.  Since it is Nietzsche’s most complete and provocative 
work regarding his critique of morality, now I will probe into the Genealogy.    
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b) Nietzsche’s Rejection of the Moral Subject 
The breeding of an animal which is entitled to make promises – is this not the 
paradoxical task which nature has set itself with respect to man?
36
  
The ramifications of Nietzsche’s naturalism reveal themselves within his account of the 
formation of man’s moral psychology.  The ideas that “man is an animal” and “man is 
wholly nature”37 are dominant themes of Nietzsche’s philosophy which come up in all 
his books; beginning from his early career, throughout his middle and late works.  This 
section’s major focus is to understand the philosophical and ethical implications of 
these assertions which also manifest the core of my argument regarding Nietzsche’s 
conception of selfhood.   
Providing a detailed reading of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, I will attempt 
to give an account of Nietzsche’s rejection of the moral subject which Nietzsche 
regards as the outcome of a certain type of cultural degeneration.  He criticizes 
Western Christian morality because of its life-negating values which detach man from 
nature and turn him into a “sick animal.”  Subjecting him to humiliating customs, social 
practices and traditions, man’s psychology becomes “moralized” and is further 
consolidated with the dynamic of the creditor versus debtor relationship.  As the notion 
of “debt” evolves into “guilt,” its (false) moral implications become crystallized with the 
ascetic ideal – whose hangover Nietzsche thinks we still experience within our 
metaphysical beliefs regarding the sciences and our “virtues.”   
Nietzsche asserts that civilization begins with customs38 which not only help social 
coherence but also propose moral interpretations of the world.  These interpretations 
are largely determined by the power relationships between two dynamic moralities that 
Nietzsche calls as the master morality and the slave morality which have been shaping 
our collective psyches from immemorial times.  In Nietzsche’s thought experiment, 
civilization begins with the emergence of the concepts “good” and “bad;” and “good” 
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and “evil” as introduced by these conflicting social clans – the masters and the slaves.  
Dissatisfied with the conventional (British) theories of his time which suggest that 
“good” evokes the unegoistic, selfless acts and altruism,39 Nietzsche argues that it was 
that distinct noble clan, the masters, who initially determined the meaning of “good.”   
The master’s notion of “good” is based on his self-affirmation, according to which 
“good” denoted “powerful,” “noble” and even “truthful.”  Quite contrary to selflessness, 
in the master’s view, “good” pointed at himself and helped retain his identity through a 
“pathos of distance” from the slave caste.  The slave caste is referred by the master as 
“bad;” meaning the common, the weak, the herd, the plebeian, the deceptive.40  So, 
Nietzsche suggests that rather than altruism, the determining criteria of nobility is the 
pathos of distance which primordially established the difference between the “good” 
and “bad” – as determined by the master clan.41      
On the other side, “good” has a different set of connotations for the slave.  Rather than 
emphasizing self-affirmation and vitality, for him “good” refers to himself as he suffers 
from the cruel deeds of the master.  But since he is weak, he cannot act on his feelings 
or manifest his anger directly at the master; instead, he begins to find peace in a moral 
fantasy, in an “imaginary revenge” as “compensation.”42  Nietzsche describes the moral 
psychology of the slave in the important quote below: 
While all noble morality grows from a triumphant affirmation of itself, the slave morality 
from the outset says no to an ‘outside’, to an ‘other’, to a ‘non-self’:  and this no is its 
creative act. The reversal of the evaluating gaze – this necessary orientation outwards 
rather than inwards to the self – belongs characteristically to ressentiment.  In order to 
exist at all, slave morality from the outset always needs an opposing, outer world; in 
physiological terms, it needs external stimuli in order to act – its action is fundamentally 
reaction.
43
       
Nietzsche theorizes the notion of ressentiment as the slave’s negative affirmation.  
Different from the master who regards himself as the origin of acts and values, the 
slave depends on the external world for the source of any stimulus in order to act at all.  
He does not originate action, but only re-acts to what already is; to what is already 
brought forth by the master.  Even though the master sees the slave as far below 
himself, he does not condescend to hate him.  The slave, by contrast, feeds on his 
hatred towards the master, calls the master “evil,” and projects his frustration and 
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hatred towards everything the master represents; the master himself, his life style, his 
attitude towards life, his joy – interestingly, this “joy” over the course of time evolves 
into joy in general, and as the joy of life it becomes denounced by the ascetic priest.   
Nietzsche’s attitude towards these different clans is ambiguous.  On the one hand, he 
seems in favour of the master clan and regards their exploitative nature as an evil 
necessity.  He suggests in so many contexts what we consider wild or pertaining to 
animal nature may provide the best circumstances upon which immense production of 
work and human flourishing can occur.  So, looking at the big picture, he implies that 
exploitation cannot be good or bad in itself.  On the other hand, Nietzsche is thoroughly 
impressed by the complicated nature of the slave.  He expresses his fascination by the 
slave as he states that “human history would be a much too stupid affair were it not for 
the intelligence introduced by the powerless.”44  He notes that in spite of its remarkable 
confidence and productive virility, the master clan, the “bird of prey,” lacks the rich inner 
complexity of the slave.  The master has only a few drives – the drive to rule, conquer 
and dominate – which makes him eventually a dull animal.       
In a humorous and sarcastic tone, Nietzsche compares the oppression by the master 
of the slave to the relationship between the prey and predator within the animal 
kingdom.  He intimates that the hard feelings the slave feels towards the master are 
just as absurd as the lamb to feel offended by the bird of prey – nothing personal.  
Nietzsche conveys this idea as he writes on behalf of the master about the slaves: “We 
bear them no ill-will at all, these good lambs – indeed, we love them: there is nothing 
tastier than a tender lamb.”45   
Just as the lion cannot be blamed for attacking the lamb as it is only manifesting its 
own nature, by analogy, Nietzsche suggests that the master is merely acting on his 
instincts - without conscious deliberation; intellectual rationalization or moral 
justification.  Similarly, the master does not “choose” to be strong, he just “is” simply 
because he could not have been otherwise.  His “evil” is a necessity; just like a lion, he 
cannot be tamed.  As a result, Nietzsche asserts that it is implausible to moralize 
strength as “good” or “evil.”  Far from representing the agent or the subject, strength 
only manifests itself through action.  Nietzsche touches on this delicate matter in the 
quote below:   
... popular morality distinguishes strength from expressions of strength, as if behind the 
strong individual there were an indifferent substratum which was at liberty to express or 
not to express strength.  But no such substratum exists; there is no “being” behind 
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doing, acting, becoming; “the doer” is merely fiction imposed on the doing – the doing 
itself is everything.
46
  
In Nietzsche’s view, the slave’s confusion arises at the point of looking for an agent or 
a doer responsible for what has been done to him.  Consequently, he associates the 
deed of the master with the master himself.  Rather than seeing the strength itself 
within the act, he blames the master as the actor.  That is how “evil” gets a definite 
target within the slave’s psyche: the master.   
Nietzsche claims that the key aspect determining one’s encounter with another human 
being is the tendency to measure oneself against him, which is presumably a vital 
instinct descending from very early times in evolution.  Nietzsche compares this 
situation to the way animals confronting each other take their guards and develop 
strategies either to attack or to flee.  Just like the animals or the primates who estimate 
the risks of situations; evaluate potential dangers and act accordingly, human animals 
do the same, in arguably more sophisticated manners.  In GM, Nietzsche notes that 
man is the measuring animal and suggests that even etymologically the word “man” 
comes from “manas” (in Veda Sanscrit, consciousness) and implies that it constructs 
our notion of the self as the “proud consciousness.”47     
Nietzsche contends that measuring constitutes our thinking habits; initially in terms of 
producing primitive impulses against wild animals or other hostile human clans.  Over 
the course of time, this instinct to measure and evaluate evolves.  In addition to 
detecting dangers and potential risks that can occur between conflicting parties, it also 
breeds the feeling of superiority.  This pride and the privileged position which was 
previously held against animals - later on as the human groups evolved into clans or 
societies - began to be projected upon other inferior human clans.  This is what 
determines that essential “pathos of distance” that Nietzsche presumes exists between 
the master and the slave – from the perspective of the master.   
In addition to measuring, memory also contributed to the formation of man’s moral 
psychology.  Nietzsche claims that the master is innocent because he is forgetful.  This 
is a crucial difference from the slave caste since memory is a key factor in building the 
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identity of the slave; his character and psychology; which is based on revenge and 
reactivity against the master.  The slave has a strong memory because memory is 
branded on his skin.  As the relationship between the master and the slave evolved into 
a creditor and debtor dynamic, the creditor – the master – began to measure the debt 
in terms of pain that could be inflicted upon the debtor – the slave.  Consequently, 
memory became the most influential factor in slave morality and eventually took over 
the master caste as well with its pervasiveness because it propagated the notion of 
guilt.   
Nietzsche conveys that the habit of measuring consolidated our thinking patterns in 
terms of causality and the free will.  Moreover, our linguistic conventions also led us to 
associate the deed with the doer and overlook the act itself.  As man’s thinking patterns 
became firmly conditioned by the rules of grammar, the idea of the existence of a doer 
behind the deed became firmly established.  Consequently, associating the deed with 
the doer gave way to the idea of the “possibility” of drawing correspondence between 
the deed and the doer.  Thus the “effects” of the deed came to be associated with the 
doer.  So it was thought that since the effects of the deed could be “calculated” or 
“measured” physically and objectively, the doer or the agent could be “measured” or 
“calculated” as well, based on the “effects” of what one “caused.”   
Nietzsche claims that this led to a double misinterpretation: to associate the deed with 
the doer (as its cause) is already one misinterpretation; and to build a correlation 
between the calculability of the effects of the deed and the doer is yet another.  
However no matter how misguided, this equation of the deed with the doer and one’s 
responsibility upon the effects still turned out to establish a more or less coherent 
custom and some sort of group solidarity (and after all, any custom is better than no 
custom because man is a herd animal who wants to adhere to a custom).   
Subsequently, the idea of “calculability” of man in terms of deeds gave way to the 
“culpability” of man in terms of cause and effect.  Nietzsche thinks that this is how the 
notion of responsibility was born and hence, the conception of punishment.  The 
human body was regarded as a means to compensate for the misfortune of a deed.  
Nietzsche indicates that in those prehistoric times, it was important to make a memory 
of the deed upon the human flesh in order to remember things, to maintain “order.”48    
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It is Nietzsche’s contention that the linguistic self fallacy – the idea of the doer behind 
the deed –, the idea of measurability of the damage of the deed in terms of the human 
body as compensation, and the observation that the human psychology remembers 
what hurts; all incorporated into the dynamic of the creditor and debtor relationship, 
which over time gave birth to the legal subject.  In Nietzsche’s regard, this “order” or 
custom prevailed because it had obvious advantages for the society.  As long as one 
promised to pay for the consequences of one’s actions through “I shall”s and “I shall 
not”s, one got protected by the society.  All the dealings and economic activities 
concerning exchange, buying or selling also got arranged accordingly.  In Nietzsche’s 
view, this situation at the same time points to the birth of justice.  The human animal 
learned to make promises as the “word” got its authority and reason established its 
privileged position endowed with seriousness and mastery over emotions.49   
However, another remarkable aspect regarding making promises is its manifestation of 
the nature of language.  In his early work, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense,” 
Nietzsche claims that language functions essentially as an invisible contract.  In that 
respect, he suggests that lying is unacceptable not because it violates ethics but 
because it breaks the contract.  As for Nietzsche, ascribing authority to valid 
statements based on the internal consistency of a socially constructed system is 
groundless.50  Yet this groundlessness is thoroughly transparent as we live within the 
oblivion of it; the human animal has long forgotten the fact that language is essentially 
a contract to regulate the business of human affairs.  Acts such as making promises or 
lying are the situations which clearly reveal this fact.  Fulfilling a promise is rewarded 
and breaking a promise or lying is punished because of the value of keeping one’s 
“word.” On an individual basis, one gains the advantage and protection that comes with 
being part of a social community.  At macro level, the “word” reinforces its power and 
authority, and laws become established.  Nevertheless, the power and the authority 
associated with the “word” and the “law” go beyond the realm of the socio-political and 
extend into realm of the religious.            
In Nietzsche’s account, as the debt became associated with “guilt” and with suffering, 
the human animal began to think that whenever he suffered, he was owed something, 
even when there was no creditor.  Through long ages of deliberate psychological 
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conditioning, he reinforced the association between suffering and debt.  As a result, he 
demanded compensation for his suffering, and announced God the greatest creditor of 
all times.  Keeping his promise, remaining faithful to his word just like a decent legal 
and pious subject, he demanded compensation for his suffering in terms of redemption, 
even if not to be experienced in this world.  From the “beyond” was supposed to arrive 
redemption; hence the meaning for suffering in this cruel and indifferent world.  Thus 
man invented meaning for his worldly suffering, and he was happy.   
Nietzsche conveys that it is not necessarily suffering itself that upsets man – he is 
enduring and strong and can deal with pain – but the uselessness, the 
meaninglessness of suffering that devastates him.51  So what Nietzsche regards as 
revolutionary in values is the fact that man created religion as a compensation for his 
suffering.  This is the moment of the slave revolt and this is how the slave overcomes 
the master by subjugating him to his slave morality. Nietzsche thinks that inventing 
Judaeo-Christianity, the religion based on mixing Platonism with a hint of guilt is the 
genius of slave morality.  Impressively, the slave learned to turn his weakness into 
strength by casting his revengeful spirit into redemption (for himself) or punishment (for 
the master or whoever is powerful or “evil” from the slave perspective) in the other 
world.   
The slave owes his final victory over the master through his morality to his intelligence 
and complex nature.  Because he is weak, his vital drives cannot manifest themselves.  
As his will cannot discharge itself on the external world, his drives turn inward and his 
ressentiment turns into hatred for the master and self-pity toward himself. Nietzsche 
attempts to clarify what is despicable and degenerate about ressentiment below:   
Every instinct which does not vent itself externally turns inwards – this is what I call the 
internalization of man ...  the state organization protected itself against the old instincts 
of freedom – punishment belongs above all to these bulwarks –, caused all the instincts 
of the will, free, nomadic man to turn backwards against man himself ...  the greatest 
and most sinister sickness which still afflicts man even today, man’s suffering from man, 
from himself: this as a result of his violent separation from his animal past ... which 
previously constituted the basis of his strength, pleasure, and fearfulness.
52
   
Even though born out of the spirit of revenge, ressentiment gives birth to the concepts 
of justice and equality and attempts to have a totalizing effect upon the members of a 
society by declaring those concepts as the highest values.  Nietzsche is against the 
ideal of equality because he thinks that as a violent way of suppressing the essential 
                                                             
51
 Nietzsche, GM, II, 7. 
52
 Ibid., II, 16. 
28 
 
differences between individuals, equality is unnatural and sickly.53  In Nietzsche’s view, 
the conception of equality is life-denying because asserting its mediocrity, it hinders 
cultural development and growth which could in fact flourish if only the society could 
tolerate certain exceptional individuals (the free spirits who pave the way to the 
Overman54) rather than suffocating them with petty moral obstacles – the herd’s values.   
Equality requires that the strong lose their power and sacrifice themselves so that the 
masses do not suffer or everyone suffers equally.  However Nietzsche thinks that what 
justifies the suffering of humanity is the eventual emergence of a stronger species of 
man as this is the essential manifestation of the law of life – the will to power – or 
progress.55  He argues that the purpose of the essential will to life is to create larger 
units of power.  In this respect, the legal system’s oppression of this urge reveals its 
futile attempts to settle conflicts by declaring the equality of each will; which is in 
Nietzsche’s view hostile to life.56 
What Nietzsche regards as misguided about morality born out of the spirit of 
ressentiment is that it considers phenomena only from the perspective of “injury” done, 
which is a very limited perspective for determining value by itself.  As long as life 
operates in terms of mastery, overpowering, reinterpretation, manipulation of forces 
and meanings; injury, exploitation, violation, destruction and so on are not major 
worries.57  And of course, the last big problem ressentiment leads to is the promotion of 
the ascetic ideal. 
In a nutshell, Nietzsche summarizes the essence of the ascetic ideal within the slogan 
“man would rather will nothing than not will” which he states in both the first and the last 
pages of the third essay of the Genealogy.  It is important to note the difference 
between willing nothing and not willing.  Willing nothing is still willing whereas not 
willing is the state when the primordial essence of life, the will to power cannot operate.  
For this reason, willing nothing is still living in accordance with the essential operation 
of life, even if indirectly or in a distorted way.  However, it is crucial to realize that willing 
nothing is still a symptom of life and as such, it alludes to an instinct for not mere 
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survival but for maximizing power.  A most convenient way to see how this notion 
operates is the case of the ascetic ideal for the philosopher.  In his comparison of the 
philosopher to the ascetic priest, Nietzsche notes that even while denying existence, 
the ascetic priest still affirms himself.58    
Nietzsche regards man as “the sick animal;” even though he is stronger, more enduring 
and smarter than all the rest of the animals put together, he is also the “great 
experimenter with himself.”59  His stamina has been tested on too many occasions, and 
he has been traumatized too many times in history through wars; epidemic illnesses 
and what not.  Eventually in the end he has grown fatigued, chronically sick and 
frustrated.  Nietzsche suggests that over time this frustration evolved into something 
else; man figured that as he began to deny life, he affirmed himself through his own 
“wound” which bound him to life. So Nietzsche hints that over the course of time, man 
began to interpret his wound as something that made him stronger.  Becoming 
addicted to his sickness, he found within it the very vitality and redemptive power that 
could compel him to carry on.  In that respect, Nietzsche conveys that, contrary to how 
it appears, the ascetic ideal is in fact a cunning “trick” played in order to “preserve” life60 
– even if not to improve or overcome one’s own being.  
However, while exploring the ascetic ideal, although Nietzsche sometimes expresses a 
sense of admiration at the genius lying behind the idea of self-preservation, this should 
by no means indicate that he is in favour of it.  Quite the contrary, Nietzsche exposes 
the ascetic ideal so that one can recognize it and beware of its sirens.  After all, 
Nietzsche’s intention in elaborating the ascetic ideal is once again to draw the line of 
the “pathos of distance” between the sick and the healthy.  He strongly emphasizes 
that “the sick should not infect the healthy with their sickness” and the essential “pathos 
of distance” be maintained.61 
Nietzsche regards the ascetic ideal and man’s suffering in naturalistic terms, by the 
terminology of health whilst comparing human suffering to the organism’s incapacity to 
digest.  In his view, the strong person has the stamina to deal with suffering and does 
not immediately seek to avoid it.  His digestive system works well enough to support 
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him whereas the weak person cannot take the pain and becomes restless at the 
slightest moment of disturbance.  Since the termination of the disease or a permanent 
cure would mean the end of the ascetic priest and render him obsolete, it works to the 
ascetic priest’s advantage that the sickness must be as pervasive as possible.  That is 
why, the healthy individuals who pose the ultimate threat to the ascetic society as bad 
role models must be infected with the sickness as well.  Thus, in Nietzsche’s account, 
the genealogy of moral psychology is ascetic in its core.  Without containing any ethical 
value in itself, as the social manifestation of the will to power, morality is the means 
through which a society maintains itself.  Subsequently, this is the way the moral 
subject affirms himself; because “man would rather will nothingness than not will at 
all...”62   
For the rest of this section I will briefly provide some responses to the Genealogy; 
particularly on the notorious themes of the master and the slave, the conflict between 
egoism versus morality, the constitution of moral psychology and ressentiment.  As 
Nietzsche’s conceptions of the master and the slave are highly controversial, they 
evoke rich associations with diverse interpretations.  Even though Nietzsche often 
refers to them as separate castes of people, many critics argue that it is misleading to 
read the master and the slave at a literal level as if they pertain merely to social classes 
fighting over economic superiority or civil privileges.   
Richard White, for example, in his depiction of the master reads Nietzsche at a slightly 
literal level and associates the master with the sovereign individual.  So even though I 
disagree with White, I briefly lay out his argument in order to correct a common 
misreading of the master.  Contending that “master” and “slave” allude to basic 
modalities of individual existence which still concern us as types,63 White claims that 
with those types Nietzsche attempts to show us “the double origins of value” and 
evokes redemption by the “return of the master,” that is, the emergence of “the 
sovereign individual.”64  White regards the conflict between the master and the slave as 
analogous to the deities Apollo and Dionysus, and he hints at the similarities between 
the master and Dionysus especially by emphasizing the life-affirming attitude in both.65  
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However, in my opinion White’s association of the master with Dionysus does not work 
partly because the master and the slave are much more complicated and ambiguous 
concepts, and partly because Nietzsche does not associate the master with a saviour.   
A deity or a cult symbolizes redemption for the masses.  In his article, – even as the 
title “The Return of the Master” implies – White suggests associating the master with 
some sort of saviour, which I would see as a misunderstanding of Nietzsche’s overall 
philosophy.  Although Nietzsche points to a “philosophy of the future” and speaks to 
“free spirits,” he does not invoke any sense of anticipation for a redeemer.  Even the 
Overman is not a shepherd to lead the herd but is the eventual individual who has 
become himself.  Even Zarathustra addresses his disciples: “‘This - is now my way: 
where is yours?’  Thus I answered those who asked me ‘the way.’  For the way - does 
not exist.”66   
Offering a much more cohesive and plausible account, John Richardson suggests that 
the master and the slave refer to different modes of the “organization as a synthetic will 
to power,” or in short “self-synthesis.”67  He remarks that what distinguishes the master 
from the slave is that the former attains a certain unity of the soul by organizing his 
inner drives in a way creative enough to originate action on his own.  By contrast, the 
latter, mainly because of the diversity of his inner drives and conflicts, fails to 
synthesize himself in a mode to initiate action but remains solely reactive.  Moreover, 
these types could also be understood as temporary behaviours or attitudes.  For 
instance, one can act masterfully on a specific matter in a given situation, but not act 
masterfully in other contexts.68  Nietzsche criticizes vanity by asserting that a vain 
person is wholly dependent upon other people’s opinion of him; and his vulnerability 
and inner weakness is comparable to slaves, as he states: “It is ‘the slave’ in the vain 
man’s blood, the remains of the slave’s craftiness.”69  
Richardson argues that the Overman is somebody who is “synthesized in the right 
way.”70  He suggests a progressive reading of Nietzsche’s types of the slave, the 
master and the Overman which follows a dialectical pattern in evolution.  It is 
Richardson’s contention that having created so many values over the course of time, 
the slave comes closest to attaining the level of the Overman once he undermines his 
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own values.71  That stage points to the moment in which the slave overcomes himself 
by reconsidering his values.  Yet he also needs to acquire the master’s skills in 
organizing his drives and reincorporating them into creative use and toward an active 
overall practice.72        
I agree with Richardson on the issue that the sovereign individual Nietzsche aims to 
theorize is beyond the prototypes of the master and the slave.  Away from the rigidity 
those types imply, the Nietzschean individual is a being that constantly undergoes 
individuation, so her selfhood consists of that very battle between the master and the 
slave urges; aspiring for an ever greater self-synthesis.  It is important to note that the 
vagueness of these terms does not indicate Nietzsche’s internally contradictory or 
flawed thinking but rather reveals the versatility of his philosophy.  It is possible that 
Nietzsche left those concepts ambiguous on purpose.  White notes that even while 
praising the confidence and the robustness of the master, Nietzsche still calls him “the 
blonde beast” in order to prevent easy identification with him.73  Indeed, it should be 
remembered that even when Nietzsche admires Napoleon, he nevertheless considers 
him half-monster by referring to him as a “synthesis of the inhuman and the 
superhuman.”74  Most strikingly, in his longing for the Overman, Nietzsche dreams 
about a type of man who is “the Roman Caesar with Christ’s soul.”75         
Lastly, it is crucial to take into consideration the fluidity of concepts for Nietzsche.  
Nietzsche is brilliantly attentive to the transitory nature of things which on the surface 
may seem like binary oppositions.  Yet he sees through the rigidity of concepts such as 
the Apollonian and the Dionysian; the active and the passive; commanding and 
obeying; sickness and health; misfortune and blessing; the friend and the enemy; love 
and hate; pain and pleasure; obstacle and overcoming; Being and Becoming and so 
on.  Perceiving existence as the will to power; as the constant dynamic forces of 
interpretation and reinterpretation, shaping and reshaping, appropriation and re-
appropriation, Nietzsche recognizes the essential flux inherent in all conceptions.  In 
that respect, it is quite plausible to read the master and the slave as transitory 
psychological stages or conflicting inner drives or attitudes toward life. 
Another controversial topic many philosophers puzzle over is Nietzsche’s conception of 
egoism.  Undeniably, what makes GM so provocative is the fact that Nietzsche praises 
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the self-centred master type at all.  It seems horrendously unacceptable, even 
offensive to our moral standards that he does not sympathize with the slaves but rather 
expresses amusement at the master’s exploitation of the slave by regarding those 
incidents almost as innocent student pranks.  Deeply critical of the egoism Nietzsche 
propagates, in her article “Nietzsche’s Immoralism,” Philippa Foot nevertheless asserts 
that analytic philosophers have to meet the challenge he poses on morality.   
Foot is not convinced by the sympathetic critics of Nietzsche who defend him on the 
basis that regarding egoism, what matters is whose egoism is at stake.  In their 
defence of Nietzsche, if an individual is on the ascending line of life, then her egoism is 
justified; the presumption being that since she is a “high type,” she will not give in to 
petty selfishness but rather will be concerned about spiritual satisfaction and artistic 
creation.  Yet if one is on the descending line of life, she is only a member of the herd 
so her capricious greed, vanity and narcissistic attempts at immediate self-gratification 
are not to be tolerated.76  Foot acknowledges the plausibility of the account that what 
Nietzsche suggests is a certain self-organization teaching self-mastery and disciplining 
the passions.  Just like enemies, passions are not to be extirpated or annihilated but 
can be controlled and be put to creative use or sublimate the self.  For instance, she 
notes that the drive for aggression and cruelty can be canalized into a rigorous and 
ambitious search for truth.77         
However, all those persuasive accounts do not stop Foot from siding with Thomas 
Mann who asks whether Nietzsche is “naive about the wickedness of evil.”78  Even 
though she is impressed by the depth of Nietzsche’s psychological observations and 
fascinated by his rhetoric, she finds his philosophical views regarding morality 
uncreditable and his attack on morality invalid.  She reveals her major worry about 
Nietzsche’s “immoralism” in the end of her article, asking: “His teaching has been sadly 
seductive in the past.  Who can promise that it will never be seductive again?”79       
In symmetry to Foot who claims that (analytic) philosophy should meet the challenge 
Nietzsche poses on morality, I think that just as importantly, the defenders of Nietzsche 
have to be able to confront the worry Foot expresses.  Interestingly, her statement 
quoted above points to the rhetorical power of Nietzsche’s work.  She ends her essay 
with a slight sense of frustration about her own inadequacy to match his rhetorical 
power in writing. She hints that philosophical reasoning can persuade but not “seduce.”  
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So Foot’s main concern seems to be that people will be seduced into enacting their 
egoism rather than restraining their (moral) selves.  In her worry, she therefore reveals 
a very common presumption which points to the insurmountable conflict between 
morality and egoism.     
It is Frithjof Bergmann who explores this conflict between morality and egoism, and I 
think he proposes a reasonable answer to this worry.  He notes that we mistakenly 
think that we need an authoritarian moral law which will protect us from the anarchy of 
our egoism.  He criticizes our presumptuous belief that we are prone to acting 
egoistically.  In his article, he asserts that this is an overstatement.  Bergmann 
contends that a common mistake most (analytic) philosophers make about Nietzsche – 
theoretically Foot is in this category as well – is that they take him to emphasize a 
dichotomy that distinguishes morality on the one side and egoism on the other.  
Bergmann argues that this kind of reading Nietzsche makes it impossible to fully 
understand and appreciate his philosophy.80 
Bergmann observes that most readers are at first attracted to Nietzsche’s works; most 
likely allured by his rhetoric and his gift at integrating provocative ideas into striking 
literary prose, but after a while they feel repulsed by the ideas which they think 
propagate a mode of egoism that prompts a chaotic “rapaciousness.”  Bergmann thinks 
that after a brief period of flirtation with Nietzsche, most readers come to their senses; 
that is after all, if morality did not exist to constrain them, the world would go mad and 
everybody would act in a brutishly coarse way – because this is what we think egoism 
eventually leads to.81     
Bergmann claims that even though we like to think of ourselves as being egoistic in our 
nature, in reality we hardly act as egoists proper.  He notes that in our everyday life for 
the most part we act like marionettes rather than determined agents who are the 
captains of their ships.  We live in a mode in which we are vulnerably open to the 
forces outside of us, and we are constantly manipulated by our social, cultural and 
familial surroundings.82  In that respect, the “self-synthesis” that Richardson inspiringly 
describes and Foot suspiciously mentions is not easy to attain in the first place.  
Pointing to the difficulty and the challenge of genuinely egoistic acts, Bergmann states 
that “the typical, normal action is therefore anything but egoistic.”83   
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I find Bergmann’s ideas quite tenable as a brief exploration of Nietzsche’s criticism of 
moral acts suffices to support his arguments.  In order to understand the psychology of 
ressentiment better, it is important to remember its relation to moral acts or the good 
deeds as well.  As Nietzsche conceptualizes it, ressentiment is the mode of existence 
in which one attunes oneself entirely to the external world and acts in accordance with 
either the fear of punishment or the expectation of a reward.  This psychology is 
prompted by the revengeful spirit who always whispers that “things could and should 
have been otherwise.”  After all, it is the anticipation of reward or a saviour – still, a 
reward – that grounds the idea of the other world.   
Since expecting a reward constitutes the hidden motive behind the seeming altruistic 
acts, Nietzsche is deeply suspicious and critical of them.  As for him, any kind of 
selfless act; doing charity or even making big sacrifices such as sacrificing oneself for a 
political cause or for the other person – out of love, fidelity or companionship etc. – is 
an outcome of fragmentation of the self.  Nietzsche thinks that in such situations, we do 
not necessarily stretch out our hand for the other but rather divide ourselves into two, 
and one part sacrifices or substitutes for the other part of ourselves.   
Nietzsche thinks that there are no genuinely selfless acts because in such so-called 
selfless scenarios – not only a mother sacrificing herself for her child but even 
situations in which courageous strangers put their lives in danger to save someone 
from fire etc. – we mainly see the other person as an extension of our egos.84  So we 
declare a certain aspect of ourselves as an enemy to be annihilated and consequently, 
this approach causes an impoverishment of the instinctive complexity of our organism.  
Fragmentation weakens us by disrupting our self-unity.  Nietzsche writes that in such 
cases: 
... man is loving something of himself, a thought, a longing, an offspring, more than 
something else of himself; that he is thus dividing up his being and sacrificing one part 
for the other... in morality, man treats himself not as an ‘individuum’, but as a 
‘dividuum.’
85
   
This way of fragmenting ourselves leaves us with a very unhealthy way to experience 
our individualities by threatening our sense of wholeness and leaving us with a feeling 
of alienation to ourselves.  That is how selflessness comes up as a dangerous notion 
that we need to be cautious about.  Nietzsche is mistrustful of the notion of 
selflessness also because this overrated “virtue” generally functions as an excuse for 
us to turn away from ourselves and from our responsibilities towards ourselves.   
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As a matter of fact, it is far more difficult for us to find our own ways in life rather than 
following the paths already drawn for us by conventions, morality or culture.  It is much 
more challenging to answer Zarathustra who asks us which way our way is – because 
the healthy egoist does not follow any predetermined religious creed or philosophy 
(other philosophers’ ideas) either.  Yet this is the challenge of egoism that Bergmann 
elaborates above.  It is always easier to be the marionettes rather than originating our 
own purposes, beliefs and actions – in short, being “the artists” of our own lives.  The 
people around us that we feel “responsible” towards are often excuses we create 
ourselves to distract ourselves from our freely chosen commitments or projects.  Under 
the pretext of charity we usually feel the temptation to indulge in the comforts of the 
society.  This is what Nietzsche evokes when he speaks through Zarathustra:  
Your love of your neighbour is your bad love of yourselves.  You flee to your neighbour 
away from yourselves and would like to make a virtue out of it: but I see through your 
selflessness.
86
    
On the other hand, it would be unfair simply to say that Nietzsche is categorically 
against good deeds.  He mainly draws attention to the dubious nature of the 
conventionally good.  So, what matters here is again, how or from whom goodness 
originates; whether it is done out of weakness, performed by the weak who does not 
have the strength, the claws and the fangs to attack or by the strong.  Nietzsche finds it 
insincere when the weak individual tries to gain moral credit by emphasizing her 
goodness.  Yet he regards it as the greatest sign of a high nature when the strong 
individual performs good deeds as the manifestation of her overflowing benevolence.87  
In this case, the individual actually reveals her self-fullness rather than selflessness.           
Even though I regard Bergmann’s ideas on the false conflict between egoism and 
morality quite plausible, I do not think that his account can fully respond to Nietzsche’s 
provocation and resolve Foot’s worry so easily.  Thus lastly, I will turn to Bernard 
Williams who points out several other vital issues about Nietzsche’s naturalistic moral 
psychology.  Williams is aware of the fact that the very conception of a “naturalistic” 
moral psychology is bound to collapse if it reduces moral activity to “physicalistic 
reductionism.”88  We cannot simply read Nietzsche literally and appropriate the natural 
fact that the lion eats the lamb into society as a moral criterion.  Also, another problem 
about the “naturalistic” approach is that since naturalism can include everything, it can 
hardly suggest anything substantial about our moral capacities.  Williams therefore 
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remarks that the vague idea that our moral activities should be compatible with the fact 
that human beings are part of nature does not convey much.89  
Williams suggests that Nietzsche’s assertion that psychological elements are not 
distinctly moral actually points to a realistic rather than naturalistic moral psychology.  
Williams implies that a realistic approach helps us better understand Nietzsche’s claim 
that there are no moral phenomena but only moral interpretations of the phenomena.90  
Williams elucidates his views by elaborating on two vital factors of Nietzsche’s 
conception of moral psychology; willing and ressentiment.  The former is a quite 
baffling concept as Nietzsche emphasizes the phenomenon of willing by indicating how 
it embodies both commanding and obeying; both activity and passivity.91  Yet we are 
only aware of the outcome, the act, which manifests the double nature of willing (the 
thing one does; either intentionally, consciously or not) and the interpretation based on 
the relation between the agent and the cause.  Generally, the latter is a moral 
interpretation because as a natural phenomenon, will does not realize or discriminate 
what is moral or not.   
Williams interprets ressentiment as the peculiar psychology of the will.  He remarks that 
as the foundation of morality, ressentiment cannot be regarded as alluding to the 
ethical realm but is embedded within the category of power and anger.  It is Williams’s 
contention that the harmed person (whom Nietzsche regards as the slave) who feels 
ressentiment does not necessarily fantasize about being in a stronger position so that 
she would not be victimized.  Even if the harmer did not mean to cause any damage 
intentionally, the harmed party resents the fact that the harmer did not acknowledge 
her.  So her fantasy consists of punishing the person who harmed her by not 
acknowledging her.  Thus, ressentiment pertains to retribution rather than to any sort of 
active reform.  It does not propagate a genuine change of things but transfers the 
injured party’s frustration into an authoritative but sanctionless moral law which carries 
no power other than the power of the judgment itself.92   
I think that by elucidating the psychology of ressentiment, Williams remarks on a crucial 
point that the harmed person does not aspire to be stronger herself; but rather desiring 
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compensation for the damage, she wishes the harmer to be weaker.  This may be 
analogous to the camel in TSZ which kneels down and lets itself to be laden and 
presumably prefers everyone else to be burdened by humps also, rather than getting 
rid of its own hump.93  In this respect, Williams’s argument that retribution does not 
prompt any positive reformation makes sense.  I find noteworthy Williams’s views 
referring to the potential dangers of a purely naturalistic morality which could lead to a 
physicalistic reductionism.   
Yet it should also be noted that Nietzsche’s principal concern on that matter is not so 
much about naturalism including everything, but morality excluding so much – so much 
which is human, all too human; like the denigration of the body and this world.  Yet 
considering that Nietzsche’s assertions are mainly observations of how certain actions 
gain moral value through interpretations, I regard Williams’s dissociation of realistic 
moral psychology from naturalistic morality tenable and helpful in terms of clarifying 
Nietzsche’s position.     
However, despite these justificatory attempts, Nietzsche’s critique of morality is still 
open to a great deal of debate.  The most disturbing version of physicalistic 
reductionism would presumably be the scenarios of gross social injustices and fascism, 
such as the seductions Foot warns us against above.  These ideas will become clearer 
in the coming chapters as I explore Nietzsche’s life-affirmative attitude through his 
important themes of amor fati and the eternal recurrence of the same from a 
Levinasian perspective.  The question of whether a cool and resolute approach taken 
towards a variety of personal misfortunes could also apply to cases of societal terror 
remains to be an ambiguous matter.  Foot’s worry over the immoralism of Nietzsche 
will haunt me throughout this project until the conclusion where I will end up partially 
agreeing with her on the issue of Nietzsche’s naivety about the wickedness of evil but 
not sharing her discomfort regarding the seductive power of Nietzsche’s rhetoric. 
c) The Self as the Will to Power 
The victorious concept “force,” by means of which our physicists have created God and 
the world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I 
designate as “will to power,” i.e., as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or as the 
employment and exercise of power, as a creative drive, etc.  Physicists cannot 
eradicate “action at a distance” from their principles; nor can they eradicate a repellent 
force (or an attracting one).  There is nothing for it: one is obliged to understand all 
motion, all “appearances,” all “laws,” only as symptoms of an inner event and to employ 
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man as an analogy to this end.  In the case of an animal, it is possible to trace all its 
drives to the will to power; likewise all the functions of organic life to this one source.
94
 
In the last section of this chapter, I examine Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power 
and explore how it relates to the Nietzschean self.  Firstly, I clarify that with this idea of 
the will to power Nietzsche offers an account to overcome causality by suggesting that 
the will to power is not necessarily an alternative but actually the only plausible account 
to explain the processes of life.  Attempting to defeat the mechanistic, the teleological 
and the theological world view – as propagated by causality –, Nietzsche also intends 
to refute the notion of free will by drawing attention to how the inner drives operate at 
both conscious and unconscious levels.  The aspect of the will to power Nietzsche 
employs here aims at undermining the subject versus object dichotomy by pointing at 
the vagueness of the boundaries between the organic and the mechanic.    
Since all beings strive for the will to power, every organism is a battlefield upon which 
diverse wills play themselves out; the subject is not a unity but a web of power 
relations.  This is the case in every aspect of life and this applies to every organism; 
both to human individuals and societies.  Yet this is the space in which Nietzsche’s 
ethics of individuation dwells.  Towards the end of this section, I suggest that the best 
way to understand how Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will to power can be incorporated 
into ethics is via the exploration of his notion of agon.  This concept which Richardson 
interprets as spiritual or “enlightened competition”95 embodies Nietzsche’s essential 
idea of the will to power and manifests the way a Nietzschean ethics of individuality 
(predominantly, that of self-overcoming and creating values) can reveal itself.    
In order to unravel these claims, it would help to unpack the opening quote.  Nietzsche 
aims to theorize his idea of the will to power by first rejecting the scientific explanation 
of “force;” which he regards as already an extension of the metaphysical idea of God.  
Nietzsche criticizes this idea because of its teleological baggage which propagates 
causality.  In his attempt to correct the misleading belief in the mechanistic world view 
and the misconception of causality, Nietzsche asserts that organic functions can be 
explained or understood not in terms of causality but in terms of the will to power which 
manifests itself as directedness towards power, originating from within.  As 
manifestations of growth in activity, the will to power exhibits itself by way of 
overpowering; which means constantly shaping, assimilating, interpreting and re-
interpreting whatever it comes across.   
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As noted above, because what we see is only what is externalized, it is difficult to 
imagine how willing operates.  Even though it is always elusive, Nietzsche defines 
willing as always willing something; the intentional aspect cannot be disregarded since 
an act or a deed cannot be frozen and dissected into components or motives as 
epistemologists would like to assume.  Willing does not occur in an isolated context, so 
it cannot be associated with thinking96 or confused with “desiring,” “striving” or 
“demanding.”  What differentiates willing from those acts is the fact that willing is 
always accompanied by the affect of commanding.  That is, whenever there is willing, 
there is also commanding and being commanded.97  At microcosmic level, the will to 
power occurs as nourishment; the stronger will directs the weaker will – the leading 
example for this is the body.  At larger scales, it manifests itself as the will to property; 
to tools, to servants, to slaves or even to empires.98    
Going back to the quote above, an important point to note is the emphasis on the 
notion of “interiority” and how Nietzsche presents the will to power as an inner “event” 
unfolding and coming forth.  In a subsequent passage Nietzsche states that “the will to 
power is not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos – the most elemental fact from 
which a becoming and effecting first emerge.”99  Nietzsche’s emphasis on interiority is 
crucial because it is also a significant point about which he criticizes the sciences and 
in particular the (Darwinian) theory of evolution.  He criticizes the evolutionary theory 
for putting all the emphasis on the outside; the external circumstances and the 
environment.  Instead, Nietzsche asserts that “the essential thing in the life process is 
precisely the tremendous shaping, form-creating force working from within which 
utilizes and exploits external circumstances.”100  So he suggests that forces basically 
work from the inside towards the outside, and during this process organisms shape the 
world.   
This criticism by Nietzsche is important in terms of illustrating his denigration of 
evolutionary theory on the grounds that it is merely an extension of the mechanical 
world view which reduces everything to sole causality.  In this respect, Acampora 
regards the will to power as Nietzsche’s alternative to causality.  She notes that 
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Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power is not a causal system but the manifestation of 
the ongoing processes of interpretation and appropriation.101    
Nietzsche also opposes the Darwinian idea according to which organisms struggle for 
the sake of mere adaptation and survival.  He finds this view inaccurate because 
overrating the exteriority and neglecting the inner forces at work within the organism, it 
cannot give a solid account of the emergence of creativity either; which Nietzsche 
thinks is the core of life processes.  In his view, an account which aims to explain the 
emergence of life processes cannot skip the issue of creation and creativity.  He 
regards life as predominantly creative; leading and being led by the creative, 
spontaneous and active processes of constant shaping, reshaping and being shaped.   
Overall, Nietzsche criticizes evolutionary theory mainly because of its inherent 
passivity; as it gives no account of the essential spontaneity that is behind every 
creation.  Nietzsche openly states that at every level of organic life, there is constant 
spontaneity; so adaptation or evolution is actually a matter of appropriation and above 
all, interpretation.  As a matter of fact, he takes all overpowering to be cases of 
interpretation and strongly emphasizes that the relationship between appropriation, 
adaptation, interpretation and creativity cannot be separated from the phases of 
evolution.   
Another aspect showing the plausibility of Nietzsche’s argument is also visible in his 
acknowledgment of the fact that every individual is essentially constituted of various 
parts.  He clearly states that each individual itself is always already a battlefield of 
diverse forces: “The individual itself as a struggle between parts (for food, space, etc.): 
its evolution tied to the victory or predominance of individual parts, to an atrophy, a 
‘becoming an organ’ of other parts.”102  The Darwinian view, on the other hand, seems 
to regard the individual as a starting point or seems to presuppose a unity within the 
organism whose unified aim is to adapt to the surroundings and survive.  As another 
version of teleology, it also leaves the question of free will unchallenged because it 
studies organisms only from the angle of consciousness, which Nietzsche thinks is 
rather misguiding. 
In addition, Nietzsche asserts that regarding an organism as a unity would be a very 
simplistic and superficial way of seeing it and ignoring what lies beneath the “skin.”  It is 
important to notice that Nietzsche and the evolutionary theorists could disagree on 
where the “externality” begins.  Nietzsche would not consider the externality to begin 
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where the outer skin ends.  Underneath the skin, there are cells and atoms and 
subatomic particles and what not; a Nietzschean externality would begin at the atomic 
or subatomic level, not where the individual body of the organism appears.    
Elaine P. Miller argues that by the notion of the will to power, Nietzsche offers an 
alternative middle way to the conflict between the mechanical world view and the 
organismic view.103  Also, by emphasizing that there are no enduring substances or 
“unities,” Nietzsche vehemently focuses on the significance of the “relationships of 
power.”  This idea leads Miller to suggest that Nietzsche’s conception of the will to 
power is at the same time an attempt to overcome the subject versus object 
dichotomy.104     
The subject versus object dichotomy stems largely from our habitual way of regarding 
the subject as a substance.  In his writings, Nietzsche profoundly indicates that our 
belief in causality is intricately connected to our belief in free will, and both gain their 
credibility from our attachment to metaphysical thinking – the sciences and morality still 
cannot detach themselves from the notion of God; or “authority” or the “unity of will.”  
As mentioned above, Nietzsche is already sceptical of associating the deed with a 
doer; yet in addition to that, he also proposes that the “doer” is not necessarily a unity 
either.  When we do something, we think that we act out of a unified will because we 
always regard ourselves as a unity; we think that our actions originate from us because 
thinking this way consolidates our egos as a unity.105  Yet Nietzsche explicitly states 
that “the subject is not something given, it is something added and invented and 
projected behind what there is.”106  
Since it is rather complicated to give an account of that “what there is,” we comfortably 
take the subject as a “given;” something easily distinguishable as an individual or a 
body – which can be punished, rewarded or manipulated if necessary.  Nietzsche 
touches on the implausibility of regarding the subject as a single being.  He notes that 
as a matter of fact, it would be much more plausible to think of the subject as a 
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multiplicity which hosts constant interaction and contest and thereby grounds our 
thoughts, feelings and consciousness as a whole.107  
Having clarified the multiplicity that constructs the (Nietzschean) self and the disunity of 
the will(s), it is just as important to emphasize that apart from being neutral in 
determining any epistemological moral value, the will is not the simple explanation 
regarding human acts either.  In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche makes it quite clear 
that it is one of “The Four Great Errors” to associate the will as the motive in acts.  The 
will by itself does not determine action:   
The ‘inner world’ is full of illusions and phantasms: will is one of them.  The will does not 
do anything anymore, and so it does not explain anything anymore either – it just 
accompanies processes, but it can be absent as well ... People projected their three 
‘inner facts’ out of themselves and onto the world – the facts they believed in most 
fervently, the will, the mind and the I.  They took the concept of being from the concept 
of the I, they posited ‘things’ as beings in their own image, on the basis of their concept 
of I as cause.  Is it any wonder that what they rediscovered in things later is only what 
they had put into them in the first place?
108
  
Since our human, all too human urge is to build narratives that satisfy our need for 
intelligibility, we point to the will or the mind or the “I” (free will) to be accountable to our 
acts.  Rationalizing our existence through concept-making or inventing the “I,” we 
reserve ourselves a primordially metaphysical position, the V.I.P. seat from which we 
name everything else around us and call it reality – which insinuates the ancient pathos 
of distance.   
In the passage above, Nietzsche also notes how people confuse the “three inner facts;” 
the will, the mind and the I, and criticizes the Cartesian dualism mainly because it 
straightforwardly detaches the mind from the body.  Yet in detail, another major reason 
why he finds that duality implausible is because it is not possible to distinguish thinking 
from other mind activities such as feeling, sensing, willing, desiring, or any other mental 
states.  Thus, even when trying to justify the solidity of the I, thinking does not 
completely cover all the grounds because we cannot easily distinguish our mental 
states which are often in flux; undergoing constant change and renewal.   
Richardson elaborates on how Nietzsche depicts the will as something we are not 
directly in control of.  The will to power operates through the drives in us as a sort of 
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“non-conscious intentionality.”109  Within the notion of the will to power, we tend to 
visualize a unitary force, however, according to Nietzsche that is not the case.  
Richardson suggests that the term “the will to power” denotes “a potency for 
something, a directedness toward some end.”110  He claims that a “drive” manifests this 
directedness; this “will.”  So, at this point the relationship between the self and the will 
gets a bit clearer in the sense that the drives in us enact this will, which is an always 
already directed, intentional will towards growth and progress.  Nietzsche’s basic claim 
is that the will is oriented towards “power.”  It is thereby the self; the individual, the 
body, the organism which is prompted by the drives that manifests the will to power.   
All individuals strive for growth; for power.  Drives within an individual do not 
necessarily work in cooperation and collaboration with each other, and they mostly 
operate at a non-conscious level.  And since they are often in conflict with each other, 
before we are conscious of the experience of a feeling or an idea, that sensation is 
already the outcome of a remarkable battle among the drives.111  According to 
Nietzsche, there are only power relationships which are beyond the criteria of morality.  
When a strong will assimilates the weaker will, they form a bond and together strive 
further;112 or over time they perish together.113  The weak will does not “hate” the strong 
will – the way the slave feels ressentiment towards the master.   
Yet it is this genuinely amoral nature of the power relations that prompts so much 
controversy about Nietzsche’s philosophy.  Does Nietzsche eventually suggest an 
amoral world view in which ethical concerns can easily be neglected for the sake of 
“the big picture,” which in Nietzsche’s case could easily mean the sacrifice of the 
masses – “men are not equal!”114 – for the sake of breeding the Overman?   
It is important to respond to this question by primarily noting that although power 
relationships may lead to cruelty, power itself is a neutral term.  Even though it is 
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crucial to present Nietzsche’s conception of power accurately, the challenge arises 
from the beginning:  power is not a representable phenomenon.  Yet since the term 
“power” is heavily loaded with socio-political connotations, it is difficult to consider it in 
an ethically detached manner.  As a matter of fact, the question above arises because 
we are prone to regarding power in these terms; as a representable thing.   
Gilles Deleuze clarifies that the idea of associating power with representation is the 
most common misinterpretation and distortion of Nietzsche’s notion of power.  It is 
crucial to note that the will to power is not to be associated with conformism or 
conventional physical representations of resources such as money, fame, reputation, 
socio-political or military force or the like.  There is no direct relationship between the 
will to power and the struggle to dominate others.  Nietzsche does not disregard the 
phenomenon of struggle, but it depends on its motive.  In Deleuze’s interpretation, 
above all, Nietzsche advocates creating values; and the only kind of struggle that can 
relate to the will to power is that which leads to creating values.115   
In Nietzsche’s view, struggle for the sake of accumulating political power is consistent 
with mere survival and adaptation, which has no value in itself.  Nietzsche would 
indubitably reject the outrageous cases of social Darwinism because they basically 
promote greed – the constant paranoia of losing resources – rather than creating 
values.  As mentioned above, Nietzsche criticizes Darwin’s theory because it explains 
evolution mainly in terms of maintenance through passively conforming to physical 
environment without acknowledging the creativity and the constant self-overcoming of 
the human being.   
That is why it would be inaccurate to think that Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power 
propagates or justifies brutal manifestations of power such as the military, the 
economic or socio-political ruthlessness.  As will be clearer below, Nietzsche’s 
conception of struggle can be best understood metaphorically; through contesting of 
values in which one respects one’s “enemy” (or opponent) rather than fears her – as 
fear stems from one’s own insecurity and leads to the wish to eliminate the enemy.  In 
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this respect, struggle in the sense of self-overcoming; of promoting growth for attaining 
human greatness; for “living the great life”116 is of utmost significance.   
For this reason, it is crucial to note that Nietzsche has ethical considerations, and these 
considerations regarding ethical subjectivity particularly reveal themselves within his 
idea of “individuation” through agon.  I will argue that the Nietzschean individual is a 
subject that emerges partly from Nietzsche’s conception of power and partly from the 
Ancient Greek concept agon, which he mentions in “Homer’s Contest.”  “Agon” means 
“contest;” yet the Latin root of “compete” also means “to meet;” “to be fitting” and “to 
strive together toward.”117    
Nietzsche argues that a remarkable difference between the Homeric Greeks and us 
moderns is that the former regarded life as something that could be justified through 
“struggle” and the “joy for victory;” and thus developed the individual ethical concepts of 
Eris118 and “envy.”119  However these concepts had different connotations from what we 
think today.  Rather than suppressing ambition and competitiveness, the Homeric 
Greeks encouraged challenge as they regarded it as the chief stimulant for growth and 
development.120  Those values openly manifested themselves at the Homeric contests.  
In the essay Nietzsche mentions that in Homeric times there are two Eris goddesses.  
One drives people to feel a certain desire to annihilate the opposition whereas the 
other one drives people to strengthen their opposition in fights of contest.    
Acampora argues that agon creates a specific context in which the participants gain the 
meaning of their performance from the conditions of their opponents.  This is also a 
situation in which the participants are mutually dependent on each other for bringing 
out the best performance in each other since what comes forth is each one’s own 
unique power.  She gives the example of two runners; when one runner runs faster, the 
other regards this as a stimulus to run faster.  She does not wish the other to stop or 
slow down, but rather tries harder to maximize her capabilities.121   
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In Acampora’s view, what makes those contests so remarkable is that at some level 
they function as the sublimation of letting the striving impulses out.  Encouraging 
contestants to out-perform one another, these contests enable them to overcome their 
own previous performances as well.  She notes that this contesting spirit later on 
reflects upon their (the ancient Greeks’) institutions and overall culture.122  In that 
respect, from a Nietzschean perspective agon precipitates the revaluation of values 
and aims to emanate cultural transformation.  That is why, while on the one hand agon 
individuates the individual from the rest of the community, on the other hand it enables 
the culture to benefit from it in the long run.  So, agon clearly is a certain use of power 
that can be put to creative use.     
Richardson regards agon as a means through which my power individuates me from 
others by revealing my active powers and the drives that constitute me alone.  In this 
way, a remarkable aspect Richardson sees in Nietzsche’s “agon argument” is that it 
points to a space untainted by the slavish ressentiment – in which whatever I do is only 
a conscious reaction to the other’s action.  Richardson conveys that via agon, I can not 
only overcome ressentiment but also get in touch with my real self; that is, I can fully 
realize my true power and my true “distinctiveness” from others.123    
Nietzsche suggests that my power is my virtue which I share with no one else.  
According to him, my virtue is so personal that I do injustice to it if I attempt to put it in 
words because translating it into linguistic terms or communicating it in any way to 
people - using (the herd’s) language – would make it common.  Nietzsche strongly 
emphasizes the significance of battle, conflict and envy as being stimulating factors for 
the growth of power and writes that virtues manifest themselves through the 
“necessary evils” of battle and war; envy and mistrust.  Similar to the battle of drives 
fighting with each other to purify the will and dominate the organism, virtues are also in 
constant battle with each other; as Nietzsche puts it: “each virtue is jealous of each 
other.”124   
In his elaboration of the Hellenic popular pedagogy, Nietzsche states that “every talent 
must unfold itself in fighting.”125  This agonistic model is a prevalent theme in 
Nietzsche’s thinking; and he writes about the productive uses of the feelings of envy 
and jealousy because without such feelings, one would not have a chance to improve 
oneself and be a rival worthy of one’s opponent.  Having opponents or enemies is 
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important in life for testing one’s limits against them and bringing out the best of 
oneself.  But even more importantly, one can bring forth one’s individuality; one’s 
uniqueness from the rest of the community or herd.  As noted above, power only 
realizes itself and comes to the fore at the moment of contest.  For one’s personal 
growth, one needs enemies; even needs to seek them, if necessary.  Rather than 
feeling ashamed of the feelings of hatred and envy, one should project those feelings 
onto a worthy enemy who can challenge one’s values and thoughts.126    
As Acampora notes, what irritates Nietzsche most about slave morality is that in it, the 
agonistic drive is degenerated into self-annihilation and asceticism.  The main fallacy 
regarding this slavish reaction is that the slave mentality – just like the Church, its 
continuation –necessarily wants to annihilate the opponent rather than excel itself to 
match the strength of the masterly.  The desire to annihilate the opponent is the wish to 
prevent struggle, which is unnatural and against life.  So, what gets misleadingly 
labelled as “evil” is this agonistic drive which would correspond to “self-interest, 
jealousy, the desire to legislate values.”127 
For instance, in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche criticizes the Church as it always has 
the instinct to annihilate its enemies whereas the free-spirits never feel the urge to 
annihilate their opponents.  Rather, respecting the enemy or the opponent is a very 
noble feeling that descends from ancient times: 
The Church has always wanted to destroy its enemies:  but we, on the other hand, we 
immoralists and anti-Christians, think that we benefit from the existence of the Church.  
Even in politics, hostility is becoming much more spiritual, – much cleverer, much more 
thoughtful, much more careful.  Almost every party knows that its self-preservation 
depends on its opposition not losing too much strength: and the same is true in power 
politics ... We act the same way towards the ‘inner enemy’: we have spiritualized 
hostility there too, and have come to appreciate its value.  The price of fertility is to be 
rich in contradictions; people stay young only if their souls do not stretch out languidly 
and long for peace ... Nothing is more foreign to us than that one-time desideratum of 
‘peacefulness of the soul’, the Christian desideratum; there is nothing we envy less than 
the moral cow and the fat happiness of good conscience.  You give up the great life 
when you give up war...
128
  
The quote above seems to summarize the most important aspects of Nietzsche’s 
politics and ethics; both at social and individual levels.  Pointing at the significance of 
having obstacles, Nietzsche suggests not terminating them but overcoming them.  
Since he regards struggle and conflict as the most stimulating factors in life, it is not 
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living that he is concerned about; but living the great life which comes at the expense of 
a great contest.     
Wanting to end struggle is already a degenerate feeling as it negates the vital energy 
and dynamism of life.  At an individual level, this Nietzschean self is someone who 
does not lead an ascetic life as that would eradicate the richness of her drives and 
impoverish her selfhood.  She does not seek constant pleasure either, because that 
would lead to a nihilistic lifestyle as well; consisting of mere consumption of “things.”  
She does not seek peace or conventional happiness either; because that would mean 
suppressing her vital instincts for the sake of conforming to the society and investing 
her skills on mere adaptation to conventions at the cost of losing her individuality; her 
uniqueness or her potential virtue – the only genuine thing that needs cultivation.   
The Nietzschean individual would be someone who affirms her individuality not by 
trying to annihilate that which tries to overpower her.  These factors could be the 
society or even her own self – her hazardous psychological habits could also pull her 
down by self-pity, ressentiment or what not.  Self-overcoming would require 
recognizing these inner conflicts; interpreting them and noting how they change and 
evolve.  Resolving the conflicts could even mean the demolition of the self.  In 
“Homer’s Contest,” Nietzsche remarks that the Ephesians used to “ostracize” the “best 
among them” because that would mean the end of the contest.  He comments that 
those ancients did not make a “cult of the genius” so as to keep the stimulation of the 
contest going.  Being a winner was actually not necessarily a desirable state because 
“without a rival, unopposed, on a solitary peak of fame, the winner would perish.”129 
Conflicts do not end but change and evolve because life consists of the constant 
interpretations and reinterpretations of power; both in nature and within an organism.  
Life is the will to power, and it involves endless striving and the drives that constitute us 
undergo constant struggling as well.  Our bodies are the battlefields of diverse drives 
and desires; some of which we are aware of and others, we do not even sense 
consciously.  In that respect, it is crucial to realize that Nietzsche’s conception of the 
will to power is not a cult of narcissism or rapacious egoism but a delicate 
manifestation of the agonistic contest. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has served its basic descriptive purpose by presenting Nietzsche’s notion 
of selfhood and some of the major criticisms posed to him.  I tried to clarify Nietzsche’s 
ideas pertaining to subjectivity as a rejection of the subject as a socio-political invention 
and emphasized Nietzsche’s conception of selfhood as a naturalistic manifestation of 
the will to power.  I suggested that as a person the Nietzschean individual is someone 
who is on the ascending line of life; meaning that she affirms life to the fullest.  Since 
there is no other possible world – elsewhere or in the future –, she does not fantasize 
about how things could have been otherwise. Hosting so many conflicting drives within 
herself enables her to experience a variety of perspectives which makes her capable of 
regarding phenomena as beyond good and evil.       
Yet even if these ideas sound plausible, stirring rich associations, I think that the 
tenability of Nietzsche’s views cannot be properly tested without bringing in the 
challenge Levinas poses in his approach to ethics and subjectivity.  From the 
Levinasian angle, Nietzsche’s virtuous self-affirmation nevertheless appears as the 
narcissism of the same.  So, despite the allure of Nietzsche’s ideas, we must suspend 
our enchantment and question the ethical ramifications of the naturalistic individual who 
emerges from Nietzsche’s power ontology.  The ethical aspects of the Nietzschean 
individual will be best evaluated in the following chapters, as I examine them in greater 
detail in relation to Levinas’s ethics and his notion of the subject.  In my view, this 
Levinasian confrontation is crucial, not necessarily to undermine Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, but rather to understand him better and appreciate the depth of his thought.          
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CHAPTER TWO 
LEVINAS ON THE EMERGENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine Levinas’s notion of subjectivity and its relation to ethics, 
mainly as presented in his two masterpieces Totality and Infinity and Otherwise Than 
Being or Beyond Essence.  I argue that Levinas’s conception of subjectivity is 
grounded upon the idea of relating to the Infinite through sociality, via the asymmetrical 
relationship with the Other.  However, since both works are immensely rich, for the 
sake of keeping my project focused, I limit my scope basically to the themes that 
directly relate to subjectivity; and avoid detailed discussions on the erotic relationship; 
the feminine; fecundity; the state; politics or language.   
In the introductory section, I begin by giving a brief account of what Levinas indicates 
by the “same” and the “Other” and what separation means in his philosophy, and 
analyse the relevance of the idea of the Infinite for ethics.  In order to clarify the 
ambiguity of the Infinite, I elucidate not only its rapport with religiosity but also its 
divergence from religion.  In the second section, I probe into what Levinas calls the 
“interiority” and show how this private realm has significance for the potential of the 
ethical life for the subject.  I briefly touch on the phenomenology of everyday life, which 
Levinas depicts in his notion of “enjoyment” and the “elemental.”  This mode of 
existence is egoistic proper based on the fulfilment of needs; yet since it does not host 
Desire, it is bound to be conceptually and ethically dubious.  In spite of its misleading 
temporal or spatial associations, interiority is never a pure state consisting of the ego’s 
blissful solitude because the ego is always already obsessed with the Other.      
In the following section, I explain what Levinas conveys with his conception of the face 
and the nature of the subject’s interaction with the Other and the others.  In this part, it 
becomes clear that it is only the Other who can teach the subject by expanding one’s 
capacity for goodness.  In this respect, the subject’s endless responsibilities for the 
Other do not prompt one to deny oneself, but actually broaden and enrich one’s ethical 
potential; which is not only concerned with the Other but also affected by the 
obligations signified by the third party.  In the last section I delve into Levinas’s 
provocative notion of substitution. Even though this section is the most central place for 
Levinas’s account of ethical subjectivity, I leave it until the end because without the 
conceptual clarifications and introductory ideas in Totality and Infinity, it would be 
impossible to follow Levinas’s complex thought pattern.  Having explored the impurity 
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of the ego’s existence, this concluding section looks into the ethical constitution of the 
self which realizes itself only through the essential passivity before the Other.   
a) The Infinite, Ethics and Levinas’s Conception of Religiosity 
This book (Totality and Infinity) then does present itself as a defence of subjectivity, but 
it will apprehend the subjectivity not at the level of its purely egoist protestation against 
totality, nor in its anguish before death, but as founded in the idea of infinity...  Infinity is 
produced in the relationship of the same with the other.
1
 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas begins his account by elaborating on two key concepts 
and emphasizing the separation between them: the “same” and the “Other.”  With the 
former concept, Levinas implies a predominantly narcissistic and totalitarian mode of 
human existence, called totality.  The “Other,” on the other hand, points to a non-
representational realm which evokes transcendence and the ethical, regarded as 
“infinity.”  This section intends to explain why the idea of the Infinite matters to Levinas; 
how he relates it to ethics, and clarify its association with and dissociation from religion.   
According to Levinas, it is the essential separation between the same and the Other 
that makes the experience of ethics possible.  Any attempt to undo that separation 
means nothing other than reducing the Other to the self-same in a mode of assimilation 
as there is an absolute difference between what is me and what is not me; what is 
otherwise than me.  Because the Other and I are uniquely different from one another, 
the insurmountable separation between the same and the Other makes it impossible 
for me and the Other to engage with each other in a dialectical manner.  The Other is 
simply the “absolute other,” but definitely not “the opposing party” of the same.   
While contemplating the relationship between the same and the Other, it is misleading 
to regard the two parties as “opposites” because regarding the Other as the opposing 
party would always already mean re-construing the same “system” – which Levinas is 
attempting to overcome or “transcend.”  For this reason, Levinas proposes that 
transcendence is not negativity; the relationship with the Other is not to be understood 
in terms of mutual resistance.  Far from it, associating infinity with perfection, Levinas 
ascribes a sense of height and nobility to transcendence; and thereby calls it 
transascendence.2   
Even though “I” is the point of departure from the Other, it is not a fixity: “it does not 
remain the same but identifies itself throughout its existence no matter what happens to 
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it.”3  The I is still identical in all of its alterations even when it “thinks;” “understands;” 
“merges together;” “appropriates;” “objectifies” and so on because all of these are 
eventually the “plays of the same.”4  Our way of being in the world; or in short, “I”’s way 
is “the way of the same,” which means reducing every alterity to the self-same; by 
conquering any heterogeneity and transferring all into the concreteness of egoism.5   
Since the system of the same becomes constructed and told as history, that is how 
history identifies itself.6  In that respect, if there is any concept of resistance, rather than 
the “I,” it is the Other resisting the system by defying the categories the same tries to 
impose on it.  As for Levinas, ethics begins at the very recognition of this essential 
separation which illustrates that the Other can never be assimilated into a version of 
the narcissistic self-same.  It is actually the failure of not realizing the impossibility of 
the irreducible alterity of the Other that paves the way to violent deeds. 
The recognition that the insurmountable separation between the same and the Other is 
the first step to relate to the Infinite nevertheless needs further clarification.  Levinas 
argues that all philosophy aims for truth; and in aiming for truth one has to explore, 
which by nature requires venturing into the territory of the unknown, or the Other.  He 
notes that truth has two dimensions; freedom, which manifests itself as the inquiry 
through appropriation, and experience.  In his contention, Western philosophy has 
mainly emphasized the former aspect, to the extent of promoting violence by neglecting 
the latter which alludes to the exteriority or alterity of what is encountered.    
According to Levinas, the traditional notion of truth comes from Socrates, whose 
teaching consists of midwifery, conveying that everything I can learn is already 
embedded in me; and the outsider, the interlocutor can only be a midwife who helps 
me recollect knowledge and wisdom.7  Based on this approach, I get nothing 
                                                             
3
 Ibid., 36. 
4
 Ibid., 37. 
5
 Ibid., 38. 
6
 Ibid., 40. 
7
 Tanja Staehler elaborates on the (often misunderstood) midwifery aspect of Socratic teaching 
and emphasizes that Socratic teaching is not as simplistic as it seems.  That is, the Socratic 
method relies heavily on the conversation with the Other; the immediacy of speech is the most 
important factor (73-74).  I find Staehler’s argument plausible especially in the sense that, after 
all, at the end of the conversations Socrates makes the interlocutor realize that he does not 
know what he previously thought he knew – which is always the case with Socrates as well, 
who only ever knows that he knows nothing.  The way Socrates eventually puts the 
interlocutor’s beliefs and convictions in question during the conversations is indeed very similar 
to the way Levinas argues the Other puts me (my being) in question and suspends my 
spontaneity (my powers) with her mere presence (or face).  However, my focus is not so much 
on Socratic teaching itself but the Socratic notion of “reason as self-sufficency.”  In this respect, 
I hope it is clear that even though I regard Staehler’s observations convincing, I do not 
contradict myself by presenting Socrates’s reasoning – based on “maieutics” in a critical 
54 
 
worthwhile from the Other as I innately possess everything I ever need to know.8  
Levinas criticizes the Socratic notion of truth because it depends on the self-sufficiency 
of the same, which prompts Levinas to refer to traditional Western philosophy as 
“egology.”9  
Levinas regards reason as the permanence of the same as it operates in neutralizing 
the Other by way of stripping off the elements of shock, surprise and alterity. All these 
elements go through the processes of cognition and come out as concepts; ready-
mades for grasping and “comprehending” (Levinas notes that the French word for 
comprehending comes from com-prendre; “prendre” meaning to take, grasp or fetch by 
the hand).  Denying the Other leads ontology to presume that the same already 
possesses all the knowledge available without the necessity of developing a critical 
viewpoint towards itself - which can only be provided by the Other.  Immersed in the 
panoramic view of totality, since it cannot properly question itself, ontology is bound to 
be a philosophy of injustice; a philosophy of power.  It is this perspective from which 
Levinas criticizes ontology’s notion of freedom:   
Such is the definition of freedom: to maintain oneself against the other, despite every 
relation with the other to ensure the autarchy of an I.  Thematization and 
conceptualization, which moreover are inseparable, are not peace with the other but 
suppression or possession of the other.  For possession affirms the other, but within a 
negation of its independence.  “I think” comes down to “I can” – to an appropriation of 
what is, to an exploitation of reality.  Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of 
power.
10
 
Levinas’s criticism of the conventional notion of freedom points to the dominating 
instinct of the same to “sink its teeth” into the Other, which is very similar to Levinas’s 
depiction of enjoyment as alimentation.  It seems that there is a notable parallel 
between the alimentation of the ego through food and its invigoration by 
conceptualizing the Other – all within the realm of “freedom.”  The movement from “I 
think” – symbolizing the intentional conscious Cartesian subject – to “I can” implies the 
thrusting of the self into the Other.  Levinas says that possession still affirms the Other, 
but by negating its independence, which evokes murder.  That is how he associates 
the essence of power with annihilation and murder.11 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
manner.  For an in-depth analysis of Levinas’s relation to Plato, see Tanja Staehler, Plato and 
Levinas: The Ambiguous Out-Side of Ethics, New York and London: Routledge, 2010.     
8
 Levinas, TI, 43. 
9
 Ibid., 44. 
10
 Ibid., 46. 
11
 Ibid., 47. 
55 
 
Levinas criticizes the appropriative aspect of truth-seeking because appropriation 
always eventually leads to “fusion”12 through “participation”13 and eliminates the 
separation between the same and the Other, in which case truth ceases to be truth or 
loses its meaning by losing its otherness from the same.  Eventually what is 
consolidated is only the self-affirmation of the same, which has been the mainstream 
mode of Western philosophy.  The freedom aspect of seeking truth also makes it clear 
that the one searching for truth must be a free, independent agent who cannot lose 
herself on the way to truth.  One cannot fulfil one’s destiny if one becomes immersed in 
human collectivism, religion or any mode of fusion.  Between the truth and the ego, 
there has to remain an essential separation.  
Levinas intends to revise the foundation of Western philosophy by bringing up two 
essential ideas from the two key figures of philosophy, Descartes and Plato.  From the 
latter he borrows the idea of the metaphysical as the Good beyond Being (emerging 
from beyond, from “up there”); and from the former he takes the idea of the Infinite.  
Both themes contribute to Levinas’s conception of ethics which arises from non-
philosophical, non-representational experiences.  Leaving the exploration of the latter 
concept to the later sections of this chapter, this section proceeds first to unravel the 
former one.   
Levinas proposes a completely different approach to ontology by re-introducing the 
idea of the Infinite.  Even the most rational ego can never comprehend the Infinite 
because of its elusive exterior essence.  The notion of the Infinite is not an alternative 
to ontology but rather is an instance that exposes its limitations; hence undermining the 
philosophy of power.  The proud cogito gets stuck when it comes to thinking about or 
grasping the Infinite.  Levinas borrows the idea of Descartes who infers that God must 
have put the idea of the Infinite in me since as a finite being I could not possibly have 
contained that idea myself.  And since the Infinite is overwhelmingly more primordial 
than the finite, the latter must have gained its meaning and significance from the 
former.   
When I desire14 the Other, I necessarily measure myself against the Other; only to 
realize that I am far too imperfect to match the Other’s transcendental moral 
superiority.  In order to apprehend my inferiority, I must try to think about the Infinite or 
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compare myself to the perfect15 – only, to drastically fail in my effort to do so.  The 
ultimate role of the Other is to remind me of what is not-me; what is outside of me; that 
which I only have a vague hint of but completely lack: the Infinite.  I only have the idea 
of the Infinite without ever being able to think about or contain it in a thought, which 
inevitably consolidates the essential separation between me and the Infinite.  In 
Levinas’s mindset, what is most dreadful for humanity is to be within the oblivion of the 
Infinite (rather than the Heideggerian Being) – which can only be evoked within my 
Desire for the Other.  Levinas argues that we can think about, contemplate and 
meditate on all ideas, except for infinity; because the Infinite is the absolute Other:      
The idea of infinity is the mind before it lends itself to the distinction between what it 
discovers by itself and what it receives from opinion.  The relation with infinity cannot, to 
be sure, be stated in terms of experience, for infinity overflows the thought that thinks it.  
Its very infinition is produced precisely in this overflowing.
16
  
The important quote above lays out several themes of Levinas’s philosophy which are 
significantly relevant for this chapter.  In the first sentence, by referring to the idea of 
infinity as the “mind before it lends itself to the distinction between what it discovers by 
itself and what it receives from opinion,” Levinas alludes to the sentient, the pre-
perceptive and pre-evaluative moment of experience.  This exposure to infinity is an 
essentially pre-conscious stage in which there is no cognitive discovery or judgment; or 
any opinions emerging from meditative reasoning.  For this reason, it is impossible to 
express infinity in terms of conscious experience as it cannot be articulated.  In the last 
sentence, Levinas suggests that, as a matter of fact, infinity occurs – or is produced – 
in this exact moment of inarticulacy.  Its overflowing overwhelms the mind or the 
thought that tries to think it, and it is essentially this overflowing that prompts Levinas to 
link it to highness and exteriority; or the Other.       
However, this impossibility of representation is not to be associated with theology but 
with the transcendence of the Infinite.  Levinas is deeply impressed by Descartes’s 
Third Meditation not because the latter accurately proves the existence of God17 but 
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because he evokes the existence of the Infinite as “the breakup of consciousness;” that 
the Beyond wakes the subject from his otherwise “dogmatic slumber.”  In this respect, 
the experience of ethics is associated with “awakening,” which is sensed as sensibility.  
One awakens without solidly knowing what woke one up.  Yet Levinas parts ways with 
Descartes and onto-theology by emphasizing that the “surplus,” the idea of the Infinite 
“does not come from within” as modern philosophers adopting the Socratic midwifery of 
truth would like to believe.18  These philosophers assert that the subject can surpass 
himself by creating;19 by working from what is always already embedded within him, 
waiting to be unconcealed; to be brought forth.  It is clear to see that this mode of 
regarding truth is nevertheless the crystallization of the assimilative, appropriative 
solipsistic ego which needs nothing from exteriority.      
However, Levinas is cautious about not misleading us to associate infinity with the awe 
or the sublime mood before God or religious mysticism; or the anxiety before death; or 
the sheer romanticism of the unique individual.  Levinas distances himself from 
theology20 or the revival of any sort of dogma that celebrates the idea of “fusion” or 
“mystical union” or (the Heideggerian) “pagan enthusiasm”21 as he elaborates on 
infinity.  Even though he talks about God and God’s trace a great deal, in his 
philosophy God has different connotations.  His notion of infinity does not correspond 
to conventional religions because according to him, religion essentially pertains to the 
realm of need rather than Desire – I will elaborate on this distinction in the following 
section.   
Religions function to help societies cohere and celebrate societal solidarity, which is a 
factor that reinforces totality rather than welcoming alterity.  Levinas mentions God not 
as the Creator but as the Infinite Other whose only guiding sign is the trace that is 
visible upon the face of the (human) Other.22  When Levinas states that “The Other 
must be closer to God than I,”23 his reasoning seems to be that I am not Infinite, and 
that is the one thing I am certain of; but since the Other is otherwise than me, it must 
be the Other who has the closer connection to God or ethics.  Levinas’s proposition 
continues by noting that God never appears whereas the (human) Other appears, 
paradoxically as the visible invisible.   
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So, the conclusion Levinas draws is not the existence of a dogmatic God but 
transcendence; beyond Being; exteriority or the Other.  Levinas argues that the idea of 
infinity is produced in sociality24 via the same’s relation with the human other.  He 
defends a subjectivity that founds itself in the relation with the Other; a subjectivity that 
aspires to fulfil its infinite responsibilities for the Other; because underneath this 
relationship lies infinity.  Since it is the human other that bears the trace of exteriority, it 
is only by responding to her that I can relate to the Infinite.  It can be suggested that 
what also strikes Levinas is not only the benevolence of what is out or up there – 
infinity – but also my own inability at containing even that thought.  Presumably, the 
hospitality Levinas theorizes is an attempt to get a glimpse of what I desire.  He builds 
a firm relation between subjectivity, hospitality and the idea of infinity, which can be 
clearly seen in his attempt to “present subjectivity as welcoming the Other, as 
hospitality; in it the idea of infinity is consummated.”25   
Even though I cannot perceive or measure the moral authority of the Other with my 
cognitive powers, according to Levinas, this is not a major concern.  He asserts that 
where moral consciousness – and hence, justice – begins is already primordial to 
philosophy or rational thought, and states that ethics does not rely on cognition.  As a 
matter of fact, he notes that cognition pertains to the ego; the finite whereas infinity, as 
the exceptional idea, overflows ego’s cognition and marks its finitude.  That is why 
Levinas contends that “the idea of the infinite is more cognitive that cognition itself.”26  
In his view, ethics is primordial to the distinction between the theoretical and the 
practical (the “is” versus the “ought”) or description and evaluation.  Consequently, he 
proposes that ethics is not a category among others in philosophy but actually is the 
first philosophy.   
As the Infinite does not have a representational quality, Adriaan Peperzak suggests 
that with this idea Levinas also intends to refute Husserl’s notion of intentionality.27  
Since the Infinite overwhelms cognition, the presupposed relation between the intention 
and the thought (or “noema” and “noesis”) fails.  The Infinite reveals itself in the 
impossibility of the materialization of the ethical;28 so the ethical responsibility is not 
understandable in ontological terms.29  Even though ethical responsibility is non-
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representable, this ambiguity is best realized within proximity to the Other who bears 
the trace of the Infinite.  Owing to its non-representational nature, it can be suggested 
that the notion of the Infinite is at the same time the most accurate concept to relate to 
Levinas’s idea of asymmetry.  The Infinite is the unique concept which would reject any 
attempt for reciprocation by evincing the ethical relationship with the Other at whose 
core lies the idea of the essential asymmetry.30 
For the remaining part of this section, I will clarify Levinas’s affinity with religion and 
religiosity which is a rather controversial issue, so I keep it brief and only emphasize 
the aspects relevant to Levinas’s conception of subjectivity.  What I aim to elucidate 
nevertheless is that Levinas rejects religion as it coincides with the ontological realm of 
need (such as ritual or prayer) but most importantly with theodicy; yet he embraces 
religiosity as it evokes the Good beyond Being and signifies an elevation of the human 
soul when the latter obeys the primordial ethical response of being for the Other.  
Levinas argues that divinity signifies not otherworldliness or redemption but immediacy, 
proximity and sociality through responsibility towards the Other. 
Levinas rejects the dogmatic understanding of God and religion mainly because it 
promotes the notion of symmetry.  An afterlife or reward as compensation for suffering 
still propagates the belief in symmetry; therefore suggests an order or balance between 
the ontological (book-keeping) account of harm versus benefit, which maintains the key 
egological aspect of Western philosophy.  Theodicy is equivalent to symmetry which is 
contrary to Levinas’s major provocation of the essential asymmetry between the 
subject and the Other.  The idea of infinity secures asymmetry and thereby refutes 
theodicy.  However, Levinas’s relation with religion and God needs further clarification.   
According to Hillary Putnam’s interpretation, Levinas notes that whilst discovering or 
confronting the Infinite, rather than proving the existence of God, Descartes is having a 
profoundly religious experience that disrupts all his mental categories.31  Yet does 
having a religious experience necessarily mean that one devotes one’s entire life to 
God through religious contemplation?  For Levinas, not at all; he comments that there 
can be divinity only by means of sociality; through service to humanity where God 
reveals His trace.  But, is not God already dead, as Nietzsche allegedly declared?  
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Levinas is far from denying the death of God – He was certainly dead when the 
Holocaust took place.  Levinas rigorously opposes the dogmatic idea of God when 
believers try to justify the suffering of others by theodicy.  So even when we regard 
Levinas as a religious thinker, we must think of him as elaborating on the religiosity of 
the human soul rather than practising religion. 
In Levinas’s thought, religion in the conventional sense does not attempt to overcome 
theodicy but rather functions as a mechanism to propagate it.  Disguising it under 
another form of theodicy, religion fails to relate to the problem of evil.   As it is also 
beyond our capacity of cognition and interpretation, evil evokes transcendence which 
Richard Bernstein interprets as a “malignant sublime”32 and defines theodicy as the 
attempt for “integrating evil into a coherent economy of good and evil.”33  In order to 
make our suffering bearable, we ascribe meaning to it, which can function as a selfish 
consolation.  Although our suffering is useless, we console ourselves by justifying it. 
Yet an even more immoral aspect arises when we justify the suffering of others; either 
by the promise of compensation in the afterlife or by the belief that they deserve it or 
that God will hopefully do something about it.  All these rationales serve as easy 
escape routes enabling us to shrug off responsibility for the suffering of others.       
It is plausible that by emphasizing non-belief, Levinas intends to reject theodicy, for the 
reason that theodicy cannot respond to the horror of evil even in the remotest sense.  
The problem of evil cannot be resolved by any neat symmetrical solution such as the 
goodness of God overcoming evil; good does not beat evil because of the transcendent 
nature of evil which also defies one’s categories for thinking.  The phenomenon of evil 
cannot be brushed aside with such a proposition which still presupposes symmetry.  
Even though it is too tempting and easy to regard evil simply as the negation of good; 
Levinas warns us against such a possibility; signifying excess, evil refuses any 
possibility of synthesis.34  
In “Transcendence and Evil,” Levinas refers to evil as “an excess in malignancy;” the 
“ex” of “excess” signifies that evil is beyond any category of order, logic and reason as 
it evokes the “non-integratability of the non-integratable;” in other words, it is 
transcendence “in monstrosity.”35  Evil is intricately related to suffering in the sense of 
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seeking me out; picking me and singling me out in my pain.36  Evil can be neither 
rationalized through rigorous argument nor justified by intellectual reasoning.  For this 
reason, Paul Davies suggests that rather than attempting to “refute” evil on rational 
grounds, we could “refuse” evil acts such as hatred and murder.37  Yet this refusal is 
never a passive rejection but an active orientation for the ethical; a call to take action 
by responding to the Other without expecting reciprocity.  In order to be able to do this, 
it is a prerequisite that we overcome the temptation of theodicy.      
Davies remarks that rather than succumbing to religious consolations to explain away 
suffering, Levinas proposes that what is required is a philosophical critique of 
theodicy.38  Davies’s observation is significant in terms of offering a sound response to 
common criticisms posed to Levinas regarding his curious affinity with religion and his 
frequent employment of religious terminology.  Some philosophers, such as Alain 
Badiou39 and Miguel de Beistegui, accuse Levinas of sacrificing philosophy for 
religion.40  I regard this as an overstatement because that line of criticism ignores not 
only Levinas’s rejection of theodicy on philosophical grounds but also the fact that 
Levinas appropriates religion based on his own interpretation – for example, he argues 
that even when praying, one prays without making demands; one prays never for one’s 
own needs, but for the salvation of the Other(s).41   
In Levinas’s thought, far from being counter-intuitive to reason or contradictory to 
rigorous argument, religiosity provides the essential categories required to study or 
exercise rationality,42 which is evident in his reference to monotheism as the “eternal 
anteriority of wisdom with respect to science or history.”43  Theophany (the visual 
manifestation of God to human beings) occurs when we recognize the prescriptive 
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rather than descriptive value of the Good.44  There is no punishment if we do not dignify 
our souls through obedience; but it nonetheless signifies a break with the Good.45   
Even though Levinas’s position on religion is somewhat clear, his relation to Judaism 
remains contentious and ambiguous.  To conclude, for the sake of giving as complete 
an account of Levinas as possible, I would like very briefly to touch on the issue of 
Judaism in his thought, which raises a considerable amount of controversy surrounding 
his philosophy.  Although Levinas mainly elaborates on these ideas in his non-
philosophical writings, it is impossible to ignore the compelling continuity between his 
philosophical themes and his interpretation of Judaism, which will also enable us to 
understand his perspective more clearly.   
Levinas is undeniably affected by Judaism. Throughout his philosophy, he employs 
themes of religion and Judaism46 in a very selective and idiosyncratic manner; so much 
that Putnam suggests that to a conservative Jew, he may even appear as an atheist.47  
Yet Levinas’s idiosyncrasy does not stop him from universalizing the particularity of 
Judaism.  Most strikingly, there is an obvious continuity between Levinas’s subject of 
substitution and the Judaist conception of the Jewish identity as the one who is more 
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responsible than everyone, which is symbolized as “a stiff neck that supports the 
universe.”  Interpreting Rabbi Hayyim Volozhiner in agreement, Levinas writes:  
... he (Volozhiner) wrote that a Jew is accountable and responsible for the whole edifice 
of creation.  There is something that binds and commits (engage) man still more than 
the salvation of his soul.  The act, word and thought of a Jew have the formidable 
privilege of being able to destroy and restore whole worlds.  Far from being a serene 
self-presence, therefore, Jewish identity is rather the patience, fatigue and numbness of 
a responsibility – a stiff neck that supports the universe.
48
 
Levinas explicitly asserts that Judaism is not a religion among others, and Jews are not 
the people of a specific race sharing a definite history or geography.  He endows it with 
“anachronism;” attributing to it a value of timelessness; signifying eternity.  He 
associates the obligations of a Jew with “uncomfortable privileges”49 towards humanity.  
Even though Levinas is well aware of the possibility that he may appear as a pro-
assimilation nationalist, he dismissively rejects this criticism by emphasizing that the 
message of Judaism is open to all, and rhetorically asks: which singularity after all, has 
the capacity to move beyond universality while at the same time incorporating the 
irrefutable core values of the West and even going beyond it?50  
All in all, Levinas argues that it is the responsibility of the Jew to contribute further to 
the universalization of Judaism by translating its essential values into Greek.51  I will 
leave this debate here, and return to the issue of Levinas’s universalization of Judaism 
in a more critical manner in the final chapter.  Hopefully, having clarified Levinas’s 
puzzling relation to religion for the moment, it is time to get back to his 
phenomenological account of subjectivity, which begins with the unique experience of 
interiority, to be discussed in the next section.    
b) Interiority 
Truth is sought in the other, but by (her/) him who lacks nothing... The separated being 
is satisfied, autonomous, and nonetheless searches after the other with a search that is 
not incited by the lack proper to need nor by the memory of a lost good.
52
   
In Levinas’s philosophy, the prerequisite of the ethical relationship with the Other is the 
ego as the subject of enjoyment which pertains to what Levinas refers to as “interiority,” 
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and calls the section devoted to explain it in Totality and Infinity as “economy.”53  As a 
complicated concept, at first, interiority evokes an amoral mode of human existence; a 
happy self-dependence that appears at odds with Levinas’s overall philosophy.  
However, it must be noted that Levinas never portrays interiority as a pure state which 
is temporally or spatially prior to exteriority.  Rather, there is not a clean-cut separation 
between the two modes because the Levinasian subject is always already obsessed 
with the Other.      
In spite of its egoistic associations, interiority constitutes the possibility of an ethical life 
because only a being who is aware of interiority can realize the significance of making 
the ethical choice of responding to the Other.  So, Levinas’s emphasis on interiority is a 
starting point for ethical subjectivity because only a subject that enjoys life can suffer; 
can sacrifice its comfort for the Other; and thereby gain ethical meaning – or, in a 
similar pattern, only a being that dwells can offer its home to receive the Other.  At 
some level, interiority can be regarded primarily as an ethical preparation to express 
hospitality to the Other, which is visible in Levinas’s words “no face can be approached 
with empty hands and closed home.”54 
In addition, Levinas’s notion of enjoyment has philosophically crucial implications in 
terms of suggesting a fundamentally non-equipmental account of being-in-the-world.  
He argues that rather than based on empirical evaluation or practicality, our way of 
being-in-the-world is thoroughly sensible and primordially corporeal.  In this respect, 
Levinas’s account of our corporeal experience of life appears to undermine both (the 
Husserlian conception of) intentionality and the Heideggerian instrumental notion of 
being-in-the-world.  In its “service” to the Other, the self necessarily needs to remain as 
an “individual” which conceptually signifies hedonism and selfishness.  The subject, 
prior to finding itself in a net of relations and dealings with the world or using tools to 
attain its ends, “enjoys” itself.  Through work, labour, eating, sleeping, feeling the wind 
and the sun on the skin, and so on, one enjoys the world, anterior to functioning in the 
practical everyday relations.  So, one’s mode of existence in the world is not 
necessarily instrumental, but primordially sensible.   
However, an important point is that Levinas does not dismiss our everyday dealings 
with the world as mundane and trivial.  Rather, the fulfilment of personal needs like 
eating and sleeping reveals one’s sentient relation with life, as one’s “sincere 
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intentions.”55  Far from enslaving me, my corporeal needs satisfy me and make me 
happy within a happy dependence.  The particularity of my enjoyment is called “the 
ipseity of the I,”56 which designates the privation of the particularity of joy; suffering; 
need; lack or satisfaction.  In Levinas’s philosophy, signifying the separation between 
the same and the Other, the ipseity of the “I” points to the fact that no one but I can 
enjoy my pleasure or undergo my pain; nobody can replace or substitute for me.57  By 
claiming that “subjectivity originates in the independence and sovereignty of 
enjoyment,”58 Levinas emphasizes the non-transferable nature of subjectivity in terms 
of the ipseity.     
Levinas labels our way of being in the world as “living from,” which illustrates that our 
relation to life is not theoretical or intentional.  Rather, by bringing up concepts such as 
enjoyment, elemental and sensibility, Levinas attempts to show that our way of being in 
the world is prior to reason; beyond instinct; and sensibility evokes the pure naivety of 
the “unreflected I.”59  The term “living from” points to both dependence and 
independence simultaneously.  The dependence on the world – such as of the joy of 
breathing, pain of walking, looking, working, sleeping and so on – at the same time 
evinces a sense of self-sufficiency; as if detached from sociality.  Levinas gives the 
lucid example of nourishment to illustrate our dependence on the world as we 
assimilate our environment into our self-same: 
Nourishment, as a means of invigoration, is the transmutation of the other into the 
same, which is in the essence of enjoyment: an energy that is other, recognized as 
other, recognized, we will see, as sustaining the very act that is directed upon it, 
becomes, in enjoyment, my own energy, my strength, me.  All enjoyment is in this 
sense alimentation.
60
  
What I live from; what I enjoy, at the same time constitutes me.  As the passage above 
states, physically and physiologically I depend on the other – be it the oxygen, food, the 
flesh of an animal or a plant.  The things I consume from the world make me strong, 
indulgent and happy, which is an egocentric, hedonistic yet nevertheless innocent 
state.  That is why Levinas writes that “life is love of life,”61 and that “enjoyment is not a 
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psychological state among others, the affective tonality of empiricist psychology, but 
the very pulsation of the I.”62   
It becomes clear with this statement that what Levinas means by “enjoyment” is a 
much more comprehensive notion than “having a pleasant experience of any sort” but 
actually, the way of relating to life; the mode of human existence in the world.  
Enjoyment cannot literally be reduced to “having fun” but actually emphasizes the 
receptivity of our sentient capacities in diverse ways.  Also, it is important to note that 
the pulsation of the I cannot be limited only to pleasant experiences but includes bitter 
memories, pain, suffering, nausea, shame or such unpleasant experiences as well.  
Even the gratification of any need always presupposes the pain pertaining to the need. 
But how do we enjoy things? Levinas argues that our enjoyment of things does not 
follow a representational second order.  Levinas claims: “In enjoyment the things are 
not absorbed in the technical finality that organizes them into a system.  They take form 
within a medium (milieu) in which we can take hold of them.”63  Yet it is important to 
see the difference between these two sentences.  Could we say that Levinas is still 
refuting Heidegger’s equipmentality while proposing that things take form as a medium 
in which we operate?   
Arguably what distinguishes Levinas’s approach from Heidegger’s is the former’s 
rejection of the mechanical associations the latter’s system would suggest.  
Heidegger’s Dasein always operates within a “totality of equipment;” already oriented 
towards projections and task-fulfilments, the Dasein acts in accordance with an “in-
order-to;” consequently, its relation to the world is predominantly in terms of service, 
manipulation, conduction and use.64  The Levinasian subject, on the other hand, is a 
primordially sentient creature that feels hunger,65 cold, pleasure, pain, trauma and so 
on.  Her most defining trait is the capacity for enjoyment and suffering, which also 
signifies her capacity for ethics.  Another notable difference between the two modes of 
being is that Levinas’s subject is not so much “in control” of situations as Heidegger’s 
Dasein seems to be.  The former “bathes in” 66 the elements whereas the latter 
possesses tools and gains its factical significance out of the system in which it 
operates.  Levinas states: “Every relation or possession is situated within the non-
possessable which envelopes or contains without being able to be contained or 
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enveloped.”67  Levinas calls it the elemental - which refers to water, space, the wind, 
the street, soil; the field; the sea; the sky and so on.68   
The elemental is formless, anonymous and intermediary; that is why it cannot be 
possessed or represented.  Since Levinas identifies intelligibility as reason’s ambition 
to erase the exteriority, objectification would mean the elimination of the separation 
between the same and the Other.  Yet, in spite of the separation, I am always already 
constantly immersed in it; surrounded by it; “bathed” in it.  Levinas describes enjoyment 
in a vivid and zestful intensity by noting how “things revert to their elemental 
qualities,”69 and elaborates on our experience of sensible qualities which we do not 
“know” but “live” – such as the green of the grass or the taste of wine.  Far from being a 
matter of representation, the moment of enjoyment70 is even prior to conscious 
articulation.  
An important aspect of Levinas’s notion of the elemental is its allusion to the transitory 
stage between absolute otherness and non-absolute otherness.  Peperzak indicates 
that the elemental pertains to the relative, integratable otherness71 as the elements are 
too formless and indeterminate to be possessed or integrated into any sort of 
“knowledge.”72  Since we “bathe” in the elements, they are neither interior nor 
exterior.73  For this reason, Peperzak argues that through his emphasis on sensibility, 
Levinas suggests undoing the body and spirit duality.74  Levinas’s emphasis on the 
elemental and enjoyment aims to refute the traditional notion of the individual as either 
a socio-political subject or a biological (naturalistic) member of a specific genus.  
Rather, Levinas offers a genuinely phenomenological account of being human and 
relating to one’s (human) environment. 
However, this virtually blissful and joyful mode of existence is not the full account of 
Levinas’s conception of interiority.  Presumably, because of the way Levinas structures 
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Totality and Infinity by starting with interiority, to be followed by exteriority (I follow the 
same pattern in this chapter as well), one can easily misconstrue and assume that 
subjectivity emerges out of a joyous mode of self-sufficiency and later on becomes 
disturbed when the Other arrives at the subject’s door to ruin its peaceful state.  
Rather, the subject is always already obsessed with the Other and is responsible for 
the Other even before it can recognize in itself a right to choose.  That is why it is 
important not to read any temporal dimension into the emergence of the Other.  
Moreover, the ego already knows that its harmonious tranquillity can never be secured 
as the Other can disrupt this state at any time.    
Partly because the ego is not self-begotten but is always already obsessed with the 
Other, even in solitude; and partly because the Other does not emerge “after” the ego 
establishes its self-sustained habitat – but can knock at its door at any moment –, 
interiority is never a pure state.  Levinas argues that it is the Other who introduces 
temporality into the ego’s world by questioning its being and suspending its 
spontaneity.  However, as this experience of temporality is not linear, while causing 
restlessness on the one side, on the other side it makes ethics possible. 
Since we can distinguish interiority from exteriority not based on temporality but on 
ethics, perhaps the clearest way to understand the separation is to recall the myth of 
the ring of Gyges.75  Levinas states that “Gyges’s ring symbolizes separation,”76 and 
argues that the myth of Gyges exemplifies the human condition concerning the attitude 
towards interiority versus exteriority.  It alludes to the possibility of shutting oneself off 
from the responsibilities for the Other or to become visible; that is, exposed and 
vulnerable and ready to suffer if necessary, in service to the Other.  One can choose to 
be visible and take responsibility; or cheat and be invisible and deny responsibility 
which is always already there, requesting one’s attention at a sentient, pre-rational 
level; before one cognitively formulates a response.  But how one uses one’s reasoning 
and eventually respond, by way of either shutting oneself in privacy or making oneself 
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available for attending to the Other, is up to the individual.77  Such is the distinction 
between interiority and exteriority.  
According to Levinas, what makes injustice so powerful is the fact that interiority does 
not have any apparent “internal contradiction” to convince us to leave that state.78 The 
myth is so compelling because the condition is so familiar: why should I care about the 
Other if I could just “get by” with anything?  Levinas points out that what makes 
separation so radical is the fact that it can be done without any “internal contradiction” 
or conflict.  However, when we read Levinas closely, we observe that in spite of the 
seeming absence of internal contradictions, what prompts me to leave interiority and be 
visible to the Other is not even the call of conscience but something much more 
primordial – it seems that even “conscience” comes too late as an outcome of rational 
contemplation.  It is evoked that there might be some disguised internal contradiction 
about remaining in the interior mode as a choice.     
It can be suggested that the internal contradiction pertaining to the realm of interiority is 
the factor of Desire which is always already in me whether I acknowledge it (by the 
transition into the exterior) or deny it.  Relating to the realm of need, the elemental 
mediates enjoyment and thereby satisfies my needs such as food, music, religion, 
prayer, philosophy, love making and so on.  Yet since the elemental realm is devoid of 
genuine alterity, it cannot enable transcendence; in other words it can fulfil my needs 
but never satisfy my Desire.  Levinas argues that the structure of the Infinite is not 
cognition or contemplation but Desire, which is eventually Desire for Goodness that 
cannot be compared with any sort of need or hunger.  Desire is moral consciousness; 
pointing at a realm beyond the economy of needs, Desire evokes transcendence by 
pertaining to the exterior, to the Other.  
Surpassing my capacity of understanding, transcendence relates me to the Infinite and 
makes the ethical relationship possible by exposing my essential passivity before the 
Other which evinces the fact that I am not nor have ever been in a position to choose 
my responsibilities for the Other.  This passivity can be associated with a certain mode 
of suffering which is humanizing in essence by promoting peace and justice. As a non-
violent way of suffering, it elevates humanity – as opposed to violence which is 
basically a loss of human dignity.79      
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To conclude this section, I will touch on one last aspect of suffering in relation to 
interiority.  Apart from the uneasiness of the Other’s potential interruption into my 
peaceful world and the absence of Desire and ethics, there is also the fact that within 
my private world I am deprived of sociality.  This is suggested by Rudi Visker who 
conveys that the etymological meaning of the word “private” comes from the Latin root 
privare, which means “to rob,” “to withhold,” similar to the word “deprivation.”  What is 
notable about deprivation is that there is something lacking; which was supposed to be 
there; and its absence is thus a defect.80   
So, it can be inferred that Levinas’s notion of the private realm still evokes a feeling of 
deprivation, that of “sociality.” Visker implies that in a Levinasian sense, privacy could 
point to “a shortcoming or failure to be responsible”81 and explains that since 
responsibility is a natural component of being human – similar to birds having wings 
and fish breathing in water –, such a shortcoming is also visible in privacy.  Even 
though any sort of robbery is unacceptable, privacy is romanticized.  But it is this 
tension that Levinas hints at, as he associates the essential egoism with the hypocrisy 
and indecency of playing with the ring of Gyges.  One can talk but not signify, look at 
the Other’s face but only notice the eye colour.  Worst of all, one cannot even be aware 
of this utter contradiction if one is not challenged by the face of the Other.   
However, the lack of internal contradiction continues to be an ambiguous issue as it 
suggests a crack in the separation between need and Desire.  Even though Levinas 
argues otherwise, it is never too certain whether the orientation towards the Other is 
only Desire.  Or, can my Desire for the Other – which is not solely the erotic 
relationship but any form of basic sociality with any human other – constitute some part 
of my cluster of needs as well?82   
If I am always already obsessed with the Other even before gaining my “self 
consciousness,” then it looks plausible that Desire is always already embedded in me 
before I even know it.  And if it is part of me, then it can be regarded as pertaining to 
my realm of needs as well – at the very least, let alone family, friendship or erotic 
relationships; as a human being, I will always feel the need of the primary sociality with 
the Other.  However, it is crucial to note that Desire cannot be regarded as any other 
need which can be fulfilled within the existential structure of interiority.   
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Perhaps we could regard Desire as analogous to the idea of the Infinite according to 
which Desire is put in me; but unlike my needs which I can satisfy without reference to 
exteriority, Desire always prompts me to venture out by responding to the Other.  The 
bare fact that Desire has been put in me does not convey that it can be assimilated into 
my bundle of needs, like any other need.  Desire challenges and overflows all my other 
needs.  For this reason, noting the ambiguity concerning the separation between need 
and Desire does not refute Levinas’s basic argument that Desire is exteriority and that 
interiority mainly refers to the gratification of self-interests.   
c) Exteriority: the Face of the Other and the Third Party 
A calling into question of the same – which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of 
the same – is brought about by the other.  We name this calling into question of my 
spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics.  The strangeness of the Other, his 
irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as 
a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics.
83
 
Levinas intimates that it is only via the Other, whose reference point is exteriority, that 
my freedom can be called in question, where the justification of my being is put in 
suspension.  This rupture I experience within my self is consolidated by language 
which is prompted by the face of the Other signifying an interruption rather than 
continuity.  This section intends to illuminate these core ideas Levinas develops in 
Totality and Infinity.  While unpacking these thoughts, I also explain the nature of 
conversation as “apology” and the essence of the face as peace.   
Levinas argues that ethics is experienced in the sensibility of exposedness and 
vulnerability before the Other.  I am not only called into question but corporeally 
exposed to the Other; which prompts me to respond to the Other.  This mode of bodily 
exposure emphasizes the fact that ethics is a matter of performance and experience 
rather than a list of theoretical statements or cultivation of personal values.  Levinas 
claims that ethics begins primordially at the dyadic relationship I have to the Other.  
The face to face encounter makes me aware of my spontaneity by judging it and 
making me feel embarrassed and ashamed, which can only be ethically justified by 
being for the Other.   
However, the phenomenon of the “face to face” is not to be taken literally; although it 
could include a physical concrete confrontation with another person, it cannot be 
reduced to only that situation.  Levinas writes that “face to face” does not mean “along 
side of;”84 the latter signifies union and fusion whereas the former points to the 
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essential separation.  Yet even if the phrase suggests confrontation, it does not mean 
mutual resistance but emphasizes the primordial separation and the insurmountable 
distance, which is nevertheless a distance in proximity:  
The relationship with the Other does not move (as does cognition) into enjoyment and 
possession, into freedom; the Other imposes himself as an exigency that dominates this 
freedom, and hence as more primordial than everything that takes place in me.  The 
Other, whose exceptional presence is inscribed in the ethical impossibility of killing him 
in which I stand, marks the end of powers.  If I can no longer have power over him it is 
because he overflows absolutely every idea I can have of him.
85
       
Similar to the case of the Infinite, the face also resists my powers to comprehend or 
contain it in my finite thought.  Just like the Infinite overflowing my rationality, the face 
overwhelms and overpowers me in the ethical sense.  It is the site where the idea of 
infinition reveals itself, which Levinas states in his words as “the way in which the other 
presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face.”86  The 
Other has infinite authority which is manifest in the “ethical resistance” revealed upon 
the face making it impossible for me to kill the Other.  As the face commands me “Do 
not kill me,” it points to the difference between "authority" and "force."  Levinas 
distinguishes between authority and force by noting that the former refers to the 
primordial moral command that is beyond rationality – and which is itself, without force 
- whereas the latter indicates the mere naturalistic “effort to exist.”87   
The face changes my power (to kill) into powerlessness88 and turns it into passivity 
before the Other.  Of course I can always physically murder the Other, but I can never 
annihilate the moral authority, the ethical imposition the Other has upon me.  Moreover, 
the more vulnerable the Other is, the greater is the ethical resistance.89  That is why it 
is impossible to murder the Other.  The irony related to this impossibility becomes even 
more obvious when we consider the fragility and vulnerability of the human face or skin 
and the ease of killing a person – especially with today’s weapon technology. 
However it is crucial to note that ethical resistance does not imply dialectical 
opposition.  Even when the face says “Do not kill me!” it does not mean to oppose me.  
The Other is not rejecting me or confronting me; nor does she expect me to deny 
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myself for her sake because my relation to her is not a matter of oppositional 
confrontation but of proximity.  Being-for-the-Other does not mean self-denial but 
realizing one’s capacity for generosity.  As a matter of fact, if I deny myself or consume 
my own being, then I would end up having nothing to offer to the Other.90  Thus the 
resistance implied upon the face does not signify violence but ethics, which is always a 
positive structure.91   
From Levinas’s perspective, what makes killing a person ethically impossible is related 
to the idea of associating murder with power and ontology.  As mentioned above, 
Levinas thinks that ontology, being predominantly a philosophy of power, has the urge 
to reduce everything to the self-same and consider any difference or anything 
unforeseeable as an opposition that requires immediate oppression.  Ontology 
operates through taking possession which, to repeat, is based on negating its 
independence and evoking murder.  That is how Levinas associates the essence of 
power with murder.92  The Other can be killed technically, or labelled as an enemy, for 
instance.  But at the ethical level, the otherness of the Other can never be annihilated, 
because the physical power I have over the Other at the moment of killing her cannot 
be compared to the ethical power she exerts over me through her elusive alterity.     
Levinas’s emphasis on the face-to-face encounter with the Other is significant in terms 
of turning the relationship with the Other into a concrete immediate experience.  First of 
all, by the term “face,” what Levinas refers to is beyond the plastic oval shape; for 
instance even the side of the shoulder seen from behind – or any part of human body -
could count as face.93  The face judges me94 as it is the phenomenon through which I 
realize the impossibility of denying the presence of the Other and acknowledging the 
immediacy of my responsibilities for the Other.  As the epiphany of the face reveals 
infinity, Levinas associates face with language by stating that: “The face speaks.  The 
manifestation of the face is already discourse.”95  In Levinas’s view, language does not 
imply a consolidation of logic or a unity of rationality but rather it is the realm in which 
absolute alterity is realized.  And since language is essentially employed for the Other 
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and to be practised with the Other, it denotes exteriority.  Thus in its core, language 
signifies a disruption of the same by the Other.96   
The face is a linguistic phenomenon before being a visual phenomenon of perception 
as it says “Do not kill me;” conveying that language is an ethical signification prior to 
being a neutral sign system for communication.  The emergence of language consists 
in my laying my world out and offering it to the Other.  Via language, my world is at the 
disposal of the human other; so it is a matter of ethical sincerity.  Levinas emphasizes 
that speaking is essentially one’s attempt to present oneself by signifying which cannot 
be reduced to its discursive content, but rather reveals the presence of exteriority.  In 
this respect, discourse is not about exchanging ideas but getting into a relationship with 
the originally exterior being, and meaning is determined by the immediacy of what is 
said and taught by presence. 
In Levinas’s philosophy, language is grounded upon conversation, whose essence is 
“apology.”  At a Platonic level apology denotes “defence” (as in Socrates’s Apology, 
which is not apologetic as we conventionally understand it), and at a commonsensical 
level it means to accept our mistake and claim responsibility for our deed, often 
accompanied with a feeling of inhibition and humiliation.  Yet the Levinasian conception 
of apology embodies not only these meanings but also the sense that I was 
responsible for the Other even before I did anything wrong or committed any offence.   
Staehler offers an interpretation of Levinas’s notion of apology in which she regards his 
position as analogous to a myth mentioned in Plato’s Gorgias which is about ensuring 
justice without the possibility of deceit.  The myth depicts judgment in the other world 
where human beings are stripped bare of their flesh so that they can be judged purely 
as souls.  This is done in order to dismiss prejudice based on the beauty or ugliness of 
their bodies; devoid of skins, the naked souls can be judged without any chance of 
deception.97   
The notion of nudity is important for understanding the nature of apology.  Even when 
one literally apologizes, she always feels shame and self-consciousness which is 
phenomenologically very similar to being stripped bare.  While it requires a lot of 
courage to apologize, at the same time it is an extreme form of sincerity; because 
accompanied with the actual words said, there is always an underlying sense which is 
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unuttered but intimates that “I hereby give an account of myself and I am at your 
disposal.”  It implies that I recognize the Other as my master since it is the Other to 
whom I offer my apology.         
Levinas regards conversation as a relationship where the parties do not form a totality 
in which the same leaves itself and proceeds from the “I” to the Other.98  Instead, what 
is intrinsic to language is the possibility to “recognize in the Other a right over my 
egoism.”99  For Levinas, this is how I can justify myself, and it is this way that “apology 
belongs to the essence of conversation.”100  Language does not emanate from my 
consciousness manifesting my reason but functions by putting me in question.101  Even 
though the idea of the Other judging me and calling my spontaneity in question sounds 
intimidating and alienating, Levinas suggests that this judgment does not aim to 
alienate but, to the contrary, deepens my subjectivity as he argues that “the call to 
infinite responsibility confirms the subjectivity in its apologetic position.”102  So, apology 
is the moment of the subject being singled out in its singularity.103   
Giving an account of myself enables me to justify my existence; far from belittling me, 
apology consolidates and confirms me in my subjectivity because it is only me who can 
apologize and thereby justify myself before the Other.  So, in the Levinasian sense, 
apology is a non-violent mode of humility as it is offered to the Other whose face 
signifies peace and whose discourse signifies teaching.  In this respect, my apology is 
a precondition for speech and a willingness to learn from the Other.  The Other’s face 
marks the beginning of language by “speaking” not by words or symbols but by merely 
addressing me.  The face also “teaches;”104 we learn from the Other what we cannot 
learn by ourselves; which is mainly our responsibilities and our realization of our will to 
transascendance.      
It is also important to note that the face-to-face relationship does not have a dialectical 
nature even when Levinas explicitly calls the Other my master.  We cannot consider 
this case in terms of a cliché master-slave relationship, which in Levinas’s thought, 
does not even qualify as a relationship because such a situation arises from an always 
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already established totality.  This presupposed dialectical encounter is entirely 
indifferent to the essential separation between the same and the Other, which protects 
the alterity of the Other.  The master and the slave only play roles without the 
possibility of a relationship in between.  It is only through the relationship that the same 
and the Other come into each other’s presence; so Levinas regards a relationship as 
the “not disinterestedness” between the same and the Other.  Even if one can 
consciously or purposely ignore the Other, she can never be disinterested in the 
Other’s existence.   
Also, it must be noted that far from servitude, in Levinas’s conception, in order to obey 
the Other, I must be a master myself; when the Other commands me, s/he commands 
me to command; the Other’s command is primordially “a command that commands 
commanding.”105  Thus, when saying that “the Other is my master,” rather than implying 
a dialectical relationship, Levinas emphasizes the moral height the Other evokes in me.  
Yet when Levinas discloses the Other as my master, he does not indicate that I am 
necessarily the weaker party.  Rather, he suggests that it is the Other who is 
necessarily in the vulnerable position.  When referring to the Other, Levinas states that: 
“He is so weak that he demands.”106  In Otherwise Than Being, he frequently refers to 
the Other as “the orphan;” “the widow;” “the refugee.”  That is why I can always have 
something to offer to the Other.  Yet I do not do it out of the fear of punishment in the 
after-world; nor with a forced and pretentious altruism but out of my potential 
benevolence which I realize only through my encounter with the Other.  The face that 
commands me teaches me by expanding my capacity for Goodness, and it expresses 
itself by imposing itself not in a violent way but by emphasizing its destitution.  Since I 
cannot turn a blind eye to the Other’s hunger and needs, the Other “promotes my 
freedom, by arousing my goodness.”107  Rather than violating my freedom, the Other 
bestows meaning on it by founding my responsibilities.108   
It is Levinas’s contention that truth comes from the experience of the exterior.  The 
absolutely Other is beyond the physical and thereby “metaphysical,” as inspired by 
Plato.  In Peperzak’s interpretation of Levinas, “the true is not only other than she/he 
who has an experience of it and exterior to the nature wherein the human subject has 
settled but is also more than exterior, it is ‘over there’ (la-bas) and ‘up there.’”109  As 
noted above in relation to transascendence, Levinas associates alterity with an 
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ascription of “highness.”  Whatever the absolutely Other is; whenever it comes to 
surprise and shake me, it always comes from a height110 and takes me over to the point 
of seizure, which can be regarded as an enlightened enslavement:     
There is no enslavement more complete than this seizure by the good, this election.  
But the enslaving character of responsibility that overflows choice –- of obedience prior 
to the presentation or representation of the commandment that obliges to responsibility 
– is cancelled by the bounty of the Good that commands...  to be dominated by the 
Good is precisely to exclude for oneself the very possibility of choice, of coexistence in 
the present.
111
  
As this provocative passage conveys, Levinas argues that to be seized and 
commanded by the Good is the most dignifying privilege which can be obtained only by 
the proximity to the Other.  Since this seizure of the Good is overwhelmingly 
transcendental, its enslaving character cannot be a genuine worry.  Even though my 
primordial responsibilities overflow my ontological freedom, to be elected, commanded 
by the Good is incomparably more profound.       
Even if it sounds paradoxical when regarded from the ontological plane, Levinas 
suggests that there is a closely knitted relationship between the Other and my freedom 
which is always already embedded within my relation to exteriority, through the event of 
separation.  The separation secures and maintains both my ipseity and the illeity112 of 
the Other.  It constitutes my subjectivity by separating me from the exteriority; without 
separation, I would not be able to relate to the exteriority – in other words, no 
separation would mean no relationship; hence no subjectivity.  Separation thus grants 
freedom without which there would only be totality, or the narcissism of the same:  
The relation with the face is produced as goodness.  The exteriority of being is morality 
itself.  Freedom, the event of separation in arbitrariness which constitutes the I, at the 
same time maintains the relation with the exteriority that morally resists every 
appropriation and every totalization in being.
113
   
In Levinas’s account, it is misleading to associate freedom with an ontological mode of 
independence from the exteriority.  It does not have the nature of certitude or self-
assurance pertaining to the consciousness self-coinciding with itself in its closed circuit.  
Rather, my freedom points to my moral self-improvement by way of movement from the 
interiority to the exteriority; in other words, the transition from the self-righteous ego to 
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the undergoing self.  This self-overcoming suspends my powers by putting me forth for 
being judged by the Other.  For this reason Levinas conveys that it is only when I am 
judged that I am free and vice versa – the relationship between freedom and being 
judged will become clearer below.   
Thus I must respond to the face, and my response manifests my responsibilities. In 
Levinas’s account responsibility is not a moral choice “added” to the human condition 
but rather is pre-rational and precedes any mode of reasoning, logic or theory.  The 
fact that I am not and have never been in a position to choose my responsibilities 
reveals my essential passivity before the Other; because I am not only responsible for 
the Other but also for the others.  In addition, I am simultaneously responsible for the 
Other’s responsibilities for the others; the third party, and even their responsibilities for 
myself.  Since my responsibilities are infinite, the third party is the essential frame of 
reference for securing justice for everyone, even for me.   
My responsibilities await me from immemorial times; I am not only responsible to my 
concrete surroundings and the people physically around me at any given context but 
also to the people who lived before me and the people who will live after me.  That is 
why, in Levinas’s philosophy, the third party is the crucial term conveying justice as it 
evokes an abstract notion of humanity within sociality.  As a matter of fact, what the 
third party represents is as ambiguous as the connotation of the Other; the third party 
may be the third person; the interruption of the face-to-face relationship through justice; 
universal reason; shared humanity; fraternity or the trace of God.   
The third party is both an enigmatic and embracing theme; yet as a concept it is an 
indispensable constituent of Levinas’s philosophy.  Even while I am fulfilling my 
endless responsibilities for the Other, the only factor that has the moral authority to limit 
my services to the Other is the third party.  The third party does not reside in isolation 
from the Other but always already dwells in the Other; it looks at me from the eyes of 
the Other.114  The Other suspends my powers and questions my spontaneity, and 
moreover judges me because it is at the same time the third party.   
An instance clarifying Levinas’s emphasis on the third party as the sign of justice 
reveals itself in his dubious attitude towards the erotic relationship.  Levinas thinks that 
couplehood excludes the third party and thus leaves me devoid of that special feeling 
of shared humanity or fraternity which I can only feel when exposed to the Other.115  In 
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other words, love cannot lead to justice.  Levinas also seems to be critical of the 
contemporary fetish of the institutionalized romantic relationship and comments that 
“the couple is a closed society”116 and trivializes it by regarding it as a “negation of 
society.”117   
So, it is not the couple that exemplifies justice but the third party that signifies 
judgment.  When I am judged, I am no longer isolated; whereas when I am loved, my 
being as a substance (body) is confirmed but not judged.  However, far from being an 
undesirable situation, being judged is a liberating moment because in this condition I 
feel that I am not alone; I experience the privilege of the “primary sociality”118 which 
cannot be compared with anything spatio-temporal or representational (such as a 
courtroom).  Even if it sounds paradoxical to be socialized when judged, Levinas 
explicitly states that “what is inhuman is to be judged without there being anyone that 
judges:”   
For me to know my injustice, for me to catch sight of the possibility of justice, a new 
situation is required: someone has to call me to account.  Justice does not result from 
the normal play of injustice.  It comes from the outside, “through the door,” above the 
fray; it appears like a principle external to history.  Even in the theories of justice which 
are forged in social conflicts, in which moral ideas seem to convey the needs of a 
society or a class, appeal is nonetheless made to an ideal conscience, an ideal justice, 
in which an ideal justification, and the right to elevate these quite relative needs to the 
status of an access to the absolute, is sought.  As an expression of the objective 
relationships in society, these ideas must also satisfy a living consciousness which 
passes judgement on those objective relationships.  The human world is a world in 
which one can judge history.  It is not a necessarily rational world, but it is one where 
one can pass judgement.  What is inhuman is to be judged without there being anyone 
that judges.
119
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
on the face-to-face, he does not have in mind the image of a couple in love.  My relationship to 
my beloved is complicated and ambiguous because even as I respond to him on the one side, 
at the same time I enjoy him by objectifying him.  Erotic relationship has the dimension that 
pleases my interior “needs;” while serving him, I also serve myself, so this reciprocity still hosts 
egoism. 
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The difference between the ontological version of justice and the Levinasian notion of 
justice would be that the former would make laws to secure the legal rights of each 
individual so that one could be civil to one another without causing harm.  However, in 
Levinas’s view, the epiphany of the face disrupts the system, and this very interruption 
of totality makes justice possible in the first place.120  Levinas’s notion of justice 
precedes the juridical justice which always already owes its existence to the face.  
What makes justice possible is the face of the Other which evokes non-violence and 
bears the trace of the Good beyond Being, and transcendence can only be introduced 
by the rupture of the face.   
For this reason, in spite of its misleading otherworldly allusions, the notion of the “ideal” 
is the concrete point of reference for this world.  The ideal makes the experience of 
justice possible and familiar – as it bears the familiarity of human fraternity – and acts 
as a guiding sign for judicial justice.  The former makes the emergence of the latter 
possible.  What is relieving about being judged is that when I know my wrong, I have 
the possibility to correct it.  This is a notable Platonic moment for Levinas as it evokes 
the Socratic idea that what is more miserable than being a victim is being a victimizer 
without being punished.121  If I am punished, I have the chance to correct it whereas if 
my mistake goes unnoticed or excused – as happens in the case of the erotic 
relationship –, I do not even have the chance to improve myself.   
The intervention of the Other can eventually redirect me onto the way of the Good and 
enable me to dignify my existence by devoting myself to sociality.  All in all, it is only 
when I am accused and judged by the third party that I am able to breathe and escape 
my barren existence.  I am for the Other; I am with the others; I am part of humanity.  
Through my obsession by the Other; through my responsibility, I maintain my kinship 
with humanity.  So the accusative is simultaneously that which heals my isolation 
because “language is fraternity.”122       
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Bernasconi suggests that Levinas’s notion of the third party reveals the intersection 
between the ethical and the political.  Through this argument, Bernasconi conveys that 
contrary to the common perception, Levinas is not only an ethical thinker because he 
also makes significant contributions to revising our political thought.123  By intersection, 
Bernasconi indicates that the face-to-face evokes a correction or an ethical questioning 
of the socio-political order.124  The Other interrupts the political; and the third party 
interrupts the Other; “the Other serves the third party and commands me to join with 
him or her in this service.”125  Bernasconi notes that even though separation is the 
precondition of the face to face relationship, it is through the third party that I am joined 
with the Other:126   
In the measure that the face of the Other relates us with the third party, the 
metaphysical relation of the I with the Other moves in the form of the We, aspires to a 
State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality.
127
  
On the one hand, we are always already with the others; there is not an instance 
without the third party, or the ethical without the political.  This is how the third party 
interrupts the face to face.  As mentioned above, the third party is the only factor that 
limits my infinite responsibilities for the Other by signifying that the world does not 
consist of her alone; but of others also, including even me.  In OTB, Levinas states that 
the third party at the same time signifies a “Thank God!” moment; meaning that the 
others also embody myself; and through the third party, I am reminded that I have 
rights too.128       
Additionally, with the conception of the face, Levinas also wants to ensure the vice 
versa; that the consideration of the ethical shall not be absent from the political either.  
There is always an impending threat of the tyranny of the impersonal universality; the 
universal reason129 which can operate in a totalizing system if the primordial 
relationship of the face-to-face is forgotten.  Levinas seems quite aware of the tyranny 
of the impersonal operation of the political, disguised as the “universal,” which in this 
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case would mean not the common father of monotheism or fraternity but the inhuman 
condition in which “one is judged without there being anyone that judges.”  So, by 
emphasizing the notion of fraternity, Bernasconi suggests that Levinas secures the 
separation yet also maintains the passage from the ethical to the political and vice 
versa without leading them into fusion; or reducing them to units of totality130 because 
fraternity is primordial to the unity of human race or biology.   
Is man man’s brother or his wolf?  This question appears to haunt Levinas as he 
theorizes on the interrelation between the same and the Other and the third party.  Do 
we respond to another’s call because it is our primordial orientation toward the Other; 
or out of our fear of punishment if we do not?  Even with the best intentions, is it 
enough to secure the safety of our neighbour through law enforcement and sanctions; 
or would it make any difference if we transformed our values and political convictions 
bearing in mind the epiphany of the face?  Levinas claims that the latter makes all the 
difference:    
...it is very important to know whether the state, society, law, and power are required 
because man is a beast to his neighbour (homo homini lupus) or because I am 
responsible for my fellow.  It is very important to know whether the political order 
defines man’s responsibility or merely restricts his bestiality.  It is very important, even if 
the conclusion is that all of us exist for the sake of the state, the society, the law.
131
  
The important quote above summarizes the gist of Levinas’s position on the transition 
between the ethical and the political according to which the state law will always be 
inadequate if it is not inspired by the primordial ethical responsibility before the Other.  
It is only owing to this inspiration or the ethical command that the law can move beyond 
the superficial technicality of determining harm versus damage to maintain order – the 
security of the citizens’ rights – at the ontological level.  Of course, Levinas would not 
reject the significance of legal rights and their further improvement; however what is at 
issue is that the material improvement of the rights of the legal subjects will never be 
good enough to respond to the needs of the Other(s).  For this reason, our inherently 
self-sufficient laws are doomed to moral inadequacy because they solely indicate 
limiting one’s cruelty towards others – which is good enough neither for the individual 
nor for the society.  There is always more to be considered, to be done, to be sacrificed 
by the self-same as the ethical obligations are infinite. 
In order to conclude this discussion pertaining to the intermediation between the ethical 
and the political, we may recall the Levinasian notion of diachrony and synchrony.  In 
Levinas’s philosophy, diachrony refers to the primordial relationship with the Other; 
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which is spatio-temporally nonrepresentable as it evokes transcendence.132  Synchrony 
on the other hand, alludes to the birth of consciousness and the synchronized order; 
such as institutions to maintain equality among subjects; hence stability.133  As 
opposed to diachrony, synchrony signifies representation because one is already 
surrounded by others from birth through constant physical interaction.  The third party 
conveys the transition from diachrony to synchrony which implies not causality but 
interrelation.134  So, what Levinas implies with the memorable quote above can also be 
interpreted as the conjunction between diachrony and synchrony exemplified as the 
third party, which ensures justice and goodness in the world, as the latter is interrupted 
by the former.  
d) Substitution and Asymmetry as the Grounds of Subjectivity 
Persecution is not something added to the subjectivity of the subject and his 
vulnerability; it is the very movement of recurrence.  The subjectivity as the other in the 
same, as an inspiration, is the putting into question of all affirmation for-oneself, all 
egoism born again in this very recurrence.  (This putting into question is not a 
preventing!)  The subjectivity of a subject is responsibility of being-in-question in the 
form of the total exposure to offense in the cheek offered to the smiter.  This 
responsibility is prior to dialogue, to the exchange of questions and answers, to the 
thematization of the said, which is superposed on my being put into question by the 
other in proximity, and in the saying proper to responsibility is produced as a 
digression.
135
       
Presumably the most baffling and provocative aspect of Levinas’s philosophy is the 
theme of substitution which signifies the most drastic expression of ethical subjectivity 
based on asymmetry.  Levinas’s second and final masterpiece, Otherwise Than Being, 
is devoted to explaining this theme.  Substitution is the key concept for the Levinasian 
ethics because owing to this notion, Levinas elaborates on his theory of subjectivity by 
employing concepts such as proximity and being a hostage which according to him, 
signify the foundations of goodness in the world; be it in grand scales such as keeping 
peace in the world; or in small, everyday human interactions.   
Substitution crystallizes Levinas’s ethics which is grounded on the essential asymmetry 
between the subject and the Other(s) by presupposing that the subject not only 
responds to the Other but also suffers for the sufferings of the Other(s).  Rather than 
implying putting oneself in the Other’s shoes, evoking empathy136 or building sympathy, 
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substitution in the Levinasian sense points to the extremity of my infinite responsibilities 
which extend to the limit of substituting myself for the Other’s responsibilities as well.  
In Levinas’s philosophy, the subject is singled out as being-for-the-Other, and this is 
the way substitution grounds the conditions of ethics.   
Levinas’s notion of substitution is in large part a critique of the Western philosophical 
tradition’s concept of subjectivity as “substance;” as pure consciousness or the 
“sovereign identity” that coincides with itself.  Levinas conveys that subjectivity as 
consciousness is mainly an ontological event; that is, a project of ontology to justify its 
always already established notion of rigid knowledge and spirituality.  Throughout the 
Western philosophical tradition, the subject is always regarded as a consciousness that 
goes on an expedition, but only to be able to come back to where it started.  The 
problem with this idea – or ideology – is that all those arrogant adventures are not 
genuine undertakings at all if the subject never interacts with true alterity; exteriority or 
the Other.137 
Likewise, while critiquing consciousness, Levinas points out that the seemingly 
alternative approach of the unconscious is still playing the same game of ontology, only 
this time, with the ambition of finding deep meanings for the search of the self.138  For 
instance, Levinas criticizes psychoanalysis139 for its inherent motive of consolidating 
the self as substance and crystallizing the myth of the ego.  Levinas’s radical claim is 
the existence of a far more primordial realm that is irreducible to consciousness, which 
he refers to as obsession, persecution, proximity to the Other; the passivity beyond 
passivity.140  Levinas expresses these ideas vividly by stating that “the ego is in itself 
like a sound that would resound in its echo;”141 followed by another provocative claim: 
“the oneself cannot form itself; it is already formed with absolute passivity.”142  Levinas 
expresses his disagreement with the notion of the subject as “substance” with the 
remarkable statement below:  
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The ego is in itself not like the matter is in itself, which, perfectly wedded to its form, is 
what it is.  The ego is in itself like one is in its skin, that is to say, cramped, ill at ease in 
one’s skin...   The ego is an irritability, a susceptibility, or an exposure to wounding and 
outrage, delineating a passivity more passive still than any passivity relating to an 
effect.
143
 
What Levinas regards as crucial about passivity in this context is that substitution is not 
to be associated with or “converted into” any kind of act.144  Under the influence of our 
ontological thinking patterns, we consider passivity as the opposition of activity.  
However, Levinas theorizes another mode of passivity which is much more passive 
than the receptivity of our senses; emphasizing exposedness, susceptibility and being 
a “hostage,” which implies that one can escape neither from oneself, nor from one’s 
responsibilities.  Additionally, with this concept Levinas intends to refute the idea of the 
subject that goes on a spiritual or cognitive journey, returns and reflects back on itself, 
because  the Levinasian self is too passive to move anywhere in the first place.   
Paradoxically, the Levinasian subject is at the same time both the host and the 
hostage: the host in the sense that it welcomes the Other as the condition for ethics; as 
hospitality. Owing to the idea of the Infinite embedded within the subject, it primordially 
contains the Other, which is expressed by Levinas as “the-other-in-the-same,” and this 
situation enables it to be a creature capable of having ethical significance.  On the 
other side, the subject is also a hostage; since as the condition for the possibility of 
ethics, its spontaneity is suspended, and its freedom is granted.  In order to apprehend 
this idea better, it is crucial to revisit Levinas’s notion of freedom – above, I already 
indicated the essential separation being its precondition, so now we must explore the 
condition of my freedom, which is the Other.   
Levinas’s notion of freedom is granted by the Other,  which is impossible to 
comprehend from an ontological viewpoint as it associates freedom with a strict mode 
of “book-keeping;”145 a calculation of one’s rights against another’s.  Yet since 
Levinas’s critique of the ontological conception of freedom (for merely pointing at legal 
rights) is in line with his criticism of totality, if we are to understand freedom we need to 
interrupt the “essence” where “nothing gets lost or gained.”146  In this respect, it is clear 
that Levinas’s conception of freedom signifies the breach in totality which marks my 
infinite responsibilities inscribed in my finite freedom: 
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This finite freedom is not primary, is not initial; but it lies in an infinite responsibility 
where the other is not other because he strikes up against and limits my freedom, but 
where he can accuse me to the point of persecution, because the other, absolutely 
other, is another one (autrui).  That is why finite freedom is not simply an infinite 
freedom operating on a limited field.  The will which it animates wills in a passivity it 
does not assume.  And the proximity of the neighbour in its trauma does not only strike 
up against me, but exalts and elevates me, and, in the literal sense of the word, inspires 
me.  Inspiration, heteronomy, is the very pneuma of the psyche.  Freedom is born by 
the responsibility it could not shoulder, an elevation and inspiration without 
complacency.  The for-the-other characteristic of the subject can be interpreted neither 
as a guilt complex (which presupposes an initial freedom), nor as a natural benevolence 
or divine ‘instinct,’ nor as some love or some tendency to sacrifice.
147
  
The exquisite quote above summarizes Levinas’s core ideas pertaining to his notions 
of the subject’s finite freedom, infinite responsibilities and the elevation inspired by the 
Other.  I will unpack the quote further below as I unravel the idea of the Good before 
Being.  I will begin by noting Levinas’s link between substitution and freedom as he 
asserts that the Other frees the subject of substitution.  Without substitution, the subject 
suffocates in “ennui”148 which is the natural outcome of the same anchored in totality; 
within its finite freedom.  The Other (my neighbour) both accuses me and elevates me. 
The humanity of the Levinasian subject brings to mind Levinas’s emphasis upon 
sociality, which is explicit in his notorious statement “I am in ‘myself’ through others.”149  
Even though it looks paradoxical; considering the terrifying notions of obsession, 
trauma, being a hostage and persecution, Levinas suggests that substitution is 
nevertheless the phenomenon that liberates the subject from itself.150  He claims that 
persecution is significant because “without persecution the ego raises its head and 
covers over the self.”151  What he implies by this statement is that, without my ethical 
concern for the Other, I become the sole ego which exhausts itself and presumably 
suffocates in its own “interiority.”  According to Levinas, in spite of the distress of being 
a hostage and undergoing persecution, serving the Other is nonetheless a “divine 
discomfort.”152  Visker suggests that while paralysing and persecuting me, the Other 
nevertheless heals me.153    
On the one side, the Levinasian subject is guilty, paralysed, obsessed, persecuted and 
held hostage, as depicted in a negative and chillingly terrorizing imagery; yet on the 
other side, Levinas undeniably hints at freedom, elevation and escape from the ennui.  
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Since the Other frees me, elevates me and relates me to the Good, the Levinasian 
subject is a voluntary hostage; enjoying and indulging in her finite freedom.  That is 
because the Other haunts me and is already in possession of me before I even know 
myself.  By the notion of the-other-in-the-same, Levinas suggests that my relationship 
with the Other(s) is always prior to my relationship with my own self; moreover, the 
former constitutes the latter: “In expiation, the responsibility for the others, the 
relationship with the non-ego, precedes any relationship of the ego with itself.”154 
Another remarkable idea Levinas conveys is that expiation unites identity and alterity, 
by which he indicates that the subject of substitution is not an entity of self alienation 
but rather evokes a sense of human fraternity.  Expiation unites the other and me, 
which is already a directedness towards the Good beyond Being,155 and as such it 
marks an unavowed and un-thematizable innocence.  Through persecution, the 
Levinasian self senses the touch of the “original goodness of creation,”156 which is a 
pure relation to the logos.  For this reason, Levinas envisions persecution not only as 
an aggravating experience but also as a blissful state, and by calling it a “divine 
discomfort,” he illustrates the paradoxical situation of the subject: on the one hand it 
suffers intensely, paralysed in a disturbing passivity, and on the other hand, it feels that 
the responsibilities it never chose secure its elevation.  So, the fact that it is responsible 
before it is free is the proof that the Good is beyond and before Being: 
This antecedence of responsibility to freedom would signify the Goodness of the Good: 
the necessity that the Good choose me before I can be in a position to choose, that is, 
welcome its choice.  That is my pre-originary susceptiveness.  It is a passivity prior to all 
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receptivity, it is transcendent.  It is an antecedence prior to all representable 
antecedence: immemorial.  The Good is before being.
157
   
The enigmatic theme of substitution also suggests that the Good survives the death of 
God.158  In relation to this, it must be noted that Levinas’s notion of being a hostage 
does not signify a loss of integrity or humility but quite the contrary, it alludes to a state 
of “innocence,”159 presumably because it does not stem from me; I am not the starting 
point of being held hostage; it is the Other that grants me this status; thus it is good 
(and innocent).  Substitution is the way of subjectivity for Levinas because it is only by 
substitution that communication with the Other becomes possible, which is the 
condition of ethics as the openness to the exterior, the Infinite.    
That which determines the finitude of my freedom is the notion of substitution which 
singles me out because “no one can substitute himself for me, who substitutes myself 
for all.”160  The crucial aspect of this concept is its essential asymmetry which is clearly 
indicated in the lengthy quote from Levinas above, highlighting the fact that I respond 
to the Other neither based on any sort of guilt complex (which would wrongly presume 
that I was free before encountering the Other); nor out of natural kind-heartedness; nor 
based on any religious dogma which innately presupposes theodicy.   
Rather I substitute myself for the Other without expecting reciprocity, since anticipating 
any kind of reciprocity not only makes my substitution insincere but is also against 
Levinas’s conception of ethics.  Since my asymmetrical relation to the Other secures 
her alterity, any symmetrical expectation would be a disguised attempt of the ego to 
assimilate the Other into the same – and in this case, the Other would no longer be 
Other but devoid of its alterity, it would eventually be another version of the same.  That 
is why, in Levinas’s philosophy, it is irrelevant to ask: “How about the Other’s 
responsibilities for me?”  When Philippe Nemo asks this question to Levinas in an 
interview, Levinas responds by stating succinctly that reciprocity is “his affair.”161     
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However, another reason why the Levinasian subject cannot expect reciprocity is 
because Levinas does not aim to outline a practical manual of human interaction but 
rather to explore the conditions for the possibility of ethics.  Proposing a handbook 
based on asymmetry accompanied by the literal illustrations of substitution could go as 
far as preaching human sacrifice, which would be absurd.162  The very idea of 
reciprocity is counter to the idea of substitution because expecting reciprocity is 
basically reversing places rather than breaching totality; which opens the possibility for 
communication and the relationship with the Other.  Reciprocity diminishes the 
possibility of communication with the Other by merely consolidating the ego in terms of 
placing the self and the Other side by side rather than face to face.      
So, reciprocity not only corrupts the possibility of communication and revelation, but 
also degenerates the structure of one’s responsibilities towards the Other.  According 
to Levinas, our responsibilities do not arise from our decisions or choices; 
contemplation always arrives too late.  Yet the subject is accused of things it did not do; 
it is accused for others’ actions and is even responsible on their behalf.  In this respect, 
Levinas argues that everything concerning the self “begins in the accusative.”163  We 
do not intentionally “choose” our responsibilities because responsibilities do not stem 
from our “free commitments.”  Our responsibilities cannot be explained or determined 
in rational terms because in Levinas’s thought rationality pertains to the realm of Being 
whereas the Good, evoking the Infinite, comes from beyond Being.   Goodness cannot 
be explained by reason.  In order to understand this idea precisely, we could turn to 
Levinas’s criticism of altruism as an outcome of rationality.             
Levinas is not convinced by arguments that give accounts of egoism leading to 
altruism, according to which man as a free agent can be capable of compassion and 
pity owing to its capacity of rationality.  He thinks that the evolutionary or biological 
accounts do not disclose the motive behind goodness either.  Such an account could 
argue that altruism stems from the social benefits of group solidarity which has helped 
the species to survive in the long run.  By establishing cohesion within the group, 
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supporting one another may have proven more advantageous than every individual 
looking out for themselves, in an evolutionary biological perspective.  However, this 
argument assumes equality between the members of the species without explaining 
dramatic situations such as sacrifice because for Levinas, sacrifice is not a matter of 
backing one another up.  It is asymmetrical and not done for another fellow “soul 
identical to my own.”164   
Levinas notes that if this notion of subjectivity in Western thought as pure ego were 
correct, we could explain the situations where individuals endanger their own lives and 
sacrifice themselves for others; even for complete strangers.  He suggests that what 
makes sacrifice possible is the condition of the essential inequality between the same 
and the Other as he writes that it is the “passage of the identical to the other in 
substitution which makes possible sacrifice.”165  Levinas argues that when we consider 
the subject from the viewpoint of ego, sacrifice is not possible because the ego, as a 
substance, is not capable of “expiating for others.”  Yet a grand task like sacrifice can 
only be done involuntarily.166   
For this reason, it is very important to dissociate Levinas’s being-for-the-other from 
altruism.  Levinas would reject the idea of altruism because presupposing a clean-cut 
separation, altruism also depends on a dialectical understanding of the self versus the 
Other where the two parties are regarded as opposites – as in totality.  However, we 
must note that from a Levinasian angle, not only cruel deeds but also altruistic acts 
have their motives in a dialectical way of understanding human interaction.  Since he 
proposes an ethics that is outside of that dialectic, it would be misleading to regard 
Levinas’s thought as a revised version of altruism. 
In addition, Levinas is probing into the conditions of altruism, which already precedes 
ego or free consciousness.  Driven from “non-philosophical experiences,” primordial to 
theory or rationality or phenomenon,167 substitution points to the possibility of an ethical 
language in which one is unable to defend oneself because in persecution, where the 
logos cannot touch the subject,168 apology is not acceptable.  Signifying human contact 
and proximity, language is to open oneself to the Other without expecting 
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recognition.169  As a matter of fact, Levinas distinguishes between the pronouns “le 
moi” and “le soi;” the former referring to the ego or the intentional I whereas the latter, 
indicating the “me;” the “self” – the reflexive “se,” which announces “me voici” or “here I 
am! Now and here!  At your disposal!”170  The distinction between these pronouns 
points to the exposure and the orientation of the self.  The subject is subjected not 
directly to the Other – that could lead to servitude – but to the responsibility for the 
Other.    
What is absent from ontology’s account of subjectivity is the notion of proximity, which 
Levinas takes to be a relationship that cannot be thematized or represented as it is 
basically a relationship with a singularity.171  A typical example Levinas gives of 
proximity is my relationship with my neighbour whom I do not know; who has no kinship 
with me.  Yet proximity172 is not a spatial concept but signifies extreme exigency.  The 
neighbour is also a lucid image because, as Bernasconi remarks, Levinas strongly 
emphasizes that we cannot know from where or “from whom the summons comes.”173  
This is an aspect of proximity showing that ontology can never provide an 
epistemological explanation; one cannot “know” about the summons but hears it.  One 
cannot point one’s finger at where the demand comes from, but it is clear that the 
summons calls for the one.    
Bernasconi notes that the Western philosophical tradition cannot make the notion of 
substitution intelligible the way Levinas does, because the subjectivity propagated by 
ontology is too self-sufficient to be able to be “challenged from the outside,”174 and this 
overt complacency is exaggerated as a pretentious uniqueness.  In order to explore the 
Levinasian subject who is nothing but the challenged from the outside, we need to 
examine ipseity and persecution in more detail.    
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As for Levinas, what make me unique are my responsibilities for the Other.  No one 
can fulfil them but me; my responsibilities cannot be transferred or handed over to 
anyone else; that is, no one can substitute for me.  Levinas clarifies that the ego is not 
endowed with moral qualities or attributes but rather “its (ego) exceptional unicity in the 
passivity of the Passion of the self is the incessant event of substitution, the fact of 
being emptied of its being, of being turned inside out, the fact of nonbeing.”175  The fact 
of nonbeing must be interpreted not as the annihilation of the self but rather as “the 
outside of essence” which can only be realized through the essential passivity before 
the Other.  Levinas emphasizes the uniqueness of the subject with the term “ipseity”176 
which evinces that I am “chosen,” “elected” for my responsibilities.  Ipseity, in this 
sense, grants me my uniqueness; yet not in an ego-centric way, but by the way of “me-
ity.”         
Nevertheless my uniqueness cannot be compared to the Other’s uniqueness because 
of the essential asymmetry between the Other and me.  I can never compare myself to 
the Other because such a comparison would put the same and the Other in the same 
totalizing category.  The Other is endowed with uniqueness owing to her relation to 
exteriority and the Infinite.  That said, it is however noteworthy to say that my Desire for 
the Other is unique of me - in addition, my enjoyment of the world in my private realm is 
also unique. 
At this point, a question may arise regarding my responsibilities for my own self.  For 
Levinas, the question of my responsibilities for myself is irrelevant because it 
misunderstands the nature of both “responsibility” and “self.”  Firstly, the question 
presupposes the idea of self as substance; as a container of responsibilities.  However, 
responsibilities are not inherently static rigid fixed “things” but to the contrary; they take 
form coming from exteriority.  We realize them as we respond to the Other not in terms 
of fulfilling daily chores but by responding to the ethical call.  Thus in the Levinasian 
sense, this question seems not only necessarily unethical but even impossible because 
I can never build a relationship with myself and respond to my own self the way I 
respond and relate to the Other.  Besides, being responsible “for” the others always 
evokes a surplus; involving people I know and do not know; from the past immemorial 
to the future.  In order to emphasize this surplus of responsibilities stretching all the 
way to include everyone, Levinas uses a quote from Dostoevsky whose meaning he 
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has apparently internalized and fed into his philosophy: “every one of us is guilty before 
all, for everyone and everything, and I more than others.”177    
Bernasconi suggests that even if this view of being obsessed with the Other to the 
extent of experiencing the limitless responsibilities and guilt on behalf of every Other 
seems a bit odd or “obsessive,” as a matter of fact, it is only owing to this kind of 
obsession that one can avoid indifference to the Other. Only a subject that obsessed 
with the Other can be capable of fulfilling its responsibilities properly, in the Levinasian 
sense.178  With this interpretation it becomes clear that the subject as free will, pure 
consciousness or ego is not profoundly capable of suffering or being overwhelmed by 
the Other’s suffering.   The rational ego proud of its spontaneity and knowledge is 
devoid of ethical sensibilities as it cannot relate to the Other. Unable to sense the 
weight of its responsibilities, its experience of this world mainly consists of reducing it to 
the narcissistic self-same.  Indeed, we could stop fixating about accounting our self-
interests and calculating what the Other owes us only when we overcome our 
fundamental egoisms:    
Why does the other concern me?  What is Hecuba to me?  Am I my brother’s keeper?  
These questions have meaning only if one has already supposed that the ego is 
concerned only with itself, is only a concern for itself.  In this hypothesis it remains 
incomprehensible that the absolute outside-of-me, the other, would concern me.  But in 
the “prehistory” of the ego posited for itself speaks a responsibility.  The self is through 
and through a hostage, older than the ego, prior to principles.  What is at stake for the 
self, in its being, is not to be.  Beyond egoism and altruism it is the religiosity of the self.  
It is through the condition of being hostage that there can be in the world pity, 
compassion, pardon and proximity – even the little there is, even the simple “After you, 
sir.”
179
   
It is impossible to ignore the call of the Other at the pre-rational level because 
subjectivity emerges at the moment of persecution which is a moment “before 
freedom.”  By the claim that to be a self is to be responsible before doing anything, 
Levinas seems to point out that selfhood as emerged in the accusative is primordial to 
freedom.  To repeat, this primordiality is not to be understood in a spatio-temporal way; 
as a matter of fact, persecution is the extreme phenomenon through which my whole 
identity – my conception of temporality, spatiality or consciousness – is suspended 
because it is the mode of “non-being;” the primordial passivity which cannot be 
converted into any act.180  
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Undeniably, “persecution” is a multilayered – perhaps even personal – concept for 
Levinas.  Having suffered most evils of the Holocaust era, the term must have not only 
metaphorical but also a literal significance for him.  Bernstein argues that the core of 
Levinas’s philosophy is to be understood as his response to the events that took place 
in the twentieth century.  Even though the Holocaust is only an example, the general 
and pervasive phenomenon of evil181 is universal and timeless: “...Levinas’s entire 
philosophic project can be best understood as an ethical response to evil – and to the 
problem of evil which we must confront after the ‘end of theodicy.’”182   
Suffering is a huge theme for Levinas which he associates with evil. He sees in 
suffering an evil transcendence which overwhelms the subject and takes over its 
agency, leaving it in a desperate, inhuman passivity.  Even though there is no 
possibility of compensation for suffering, Levinas nevertheless emphasizes that 
suffering for the suffering of the Other elevates the subject; that beyond suffering, an 
exit resides in the inter-human.183  Accompanied by a tremendous amount of suffering, 
Levinas argues that persecution suspends the subject’s being; leaving her without 
speech, temporality or logos, it shatters the core of her conscious identity.  
Elisabeth Weber suggests that Levinas’s notion of persecution manifests his own 
condition when he was literally persecuted and hence evokes a sense of the “survivor 
syndrome” that was quite common after World War II.184  Not only the dedication 
Levinas writes at the beginning of OTB185 but also his confessions about feeling guilty 
for surviving makes Weber’s observation appear quite accurate.  She suggests that 
Levinas might be experiencing the “deep guilt of having survived.”  However, in 
acknowledging this possibility, I do not mean to reduce the profound insights of his 
philosophy to a mere subjective account.   
To the contrary, the factor of personal experience in his account means that we can 
attribute to his ideas a much deeper sense of sincerity, and it makes his idea about the 
primacy of ethics much more genuine.  Levinas’s subject is a deeply traumatized 
subject; its memory is haunted both by the immemorial past and contemporary political 
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events.  Referring to the Holocaust, he remarks that “it is impossible to forget things 
which belong to the most immediate and the most personal memory of every one of us, 
pertaining to those closest to us, who sometimes make us feel guilty for surviving.”186  
Yet regarding memory, Levinas also employs a curious continuity between connecting 
the personal and the anonymous.  The subject’s memory is obsessed not only with the 
most immediate, but also with the most distant events; notably, Levinas comments that 
“the traumatism of my enslavement in Egypt constitutes my very humanity, that which 
draws me closer to the problems of the wretched of the earth, to all persecuted 
people.”187   
All in all, Levinas implies that the personal is not only political, but also universal 
because it is those traumas that constitute the humanity of the Levinasian subject.  In 
my opinion, what makes Levinas’s philosophy so provocative is that, apart from its 
originality, he is a unique philosopher who manifests the intersection of the political and 
the ethical at the point of subjectivity.   
Conclusion 
Hilary Putnam refers to Stanley Cavell who conceptualizes basically two types of moral 
philosophers; the ones who theorize about legislators seeking detailed analysis of 
politics and moral norms, and the others he calls “moral perfectionists;” Emerson, 
Nietzsche and Mill being the prime examples.  Moral perfectionists are philosophers 
obsessed with the ancient questions such as “Am I living the right or the just life?” or 
“Am I doing the best effort I can to reach my unattained but attainable self?”188 
Inspired by Cavell, Putnam regards Levinas as a “moral perfectionist” as well; 
considering the latter’s proposal that prior to formal rules and regulations, we need to 
account for a very basic commitment to be able to relate to moral principles in the first 
place.  If one follows moral laws just for the sake of conformity, it is not good enough.  
Putnam thus argues that it is crucial to see the perfectionist dimension of Levinas’s 
thought, which enables us to realize that it is only by keeping an eye on the impossible 
commitments that the subject can strive for her “unattained but attainable self.”189   
This idea is compatible with the notion that only an overwhelmed and obsessed subject 
can substitute herself for the Other.  The perfectionist obligation is neither a certain 
code of behaviour nor a theory of justice.  Yet it is only by keeping the perfectionist 
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obligation in mind that any theory of justice or moral or socio-political law can have any 
meaning.190  After the end of theodicy, the perfectionist obligation as the basis of ethics 
can be our only possibility to secure the non-indifference to the human other and 
promise an elevation of the condition of humanity.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
A LEVINASIAN CRITIQUE OF THE NIETZSCHEAN NOTION OF THE SELF ON 
ETHICAL GROUNDS 
Introduction 
A striking point concerning the difference between Levinas and Nietzsche reveals itself 
as we contrast the former’s ethics with the latter’s naturalism.  This chapter argues that 
from a Levinasian angle, Nietzsche’s naturalistic account of subjectivity and ethics is 
implausible mainly because under its naturalistic pretext it does not accommodate 
ethics, and the reason for this is because nature – even when Nietzsche attempts to 
substitute Being with Becoming – still pertains to the realm of ontological totality.  
Levinas’s contention however, is that ethics can only emerge from beyond Being.  
It might be suggested that Levinas does not necessarily reject or deny the crucial 
insights that a naturalistic account entails.1  However, Levinas’s rapport with such a 
mode of naturalism could only go as far as what Bernard Williams describes as 
“realistic moral psychology;”2 the plausibility of which nevertheless cannot simply lead 
to the promotion of those depictions.  Levinas is already well aware of the essentially 
egocentric nature of the human subject.  Yet this approach is unacceptable for Levinas 
because he thinks that any philosophy that does not prioritize the essential uniqueness 
of the Other is violent.  For Levinas, ethics begins at this recognition of the priority of 
exteriority over the self; and as such, it is primordial to philosophy.           
The first section of this chapter explores a Levinasian critique of Nietzsche’s central 
ideas pertaining to subjectivity and ethics.  In Levinas’s view, just like any other 
naturalistic account, Nietzsche’s naturalism fails as an ethical proposal; blind to the 
Good beyond Being, the subject of naturalism is not capable of self-critique, and thus is 
not eligible for being an ethical subject.  The possibility of ethics is only feasible with 
the critique of the subject whose reference point is the recognition of the Good beyond 
Being – which can only be introduced with the alterity present within the face of the 
human other.  So I present a critique of Nietzsche’s naturalism from a Levinasian 
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angle, drawing from a conclusion of the previous chapter, that “ethics cannot be 
materialized.”3   
Having touched on the parallel between Nietzsche’s naturalism and aesthetics, the 
second section of the chapter looks into Nietzsche’s notions of amor fati and life 
affirmation and questions the ethical validity of an aesthetically justified life.  This 
critique will also evoke the parallel Levinas points out between the pretentious unity of 
artworks and the impersonality of the il y a – the similar feeling of nausea accompanied 
with a desperation for escape within the artwork.  This section exposes an implicit 
pattern of continuity within the Nietzschean individual of naturalism and the aesthetic 
justification of life.   
The final section begins with a focus on Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal recurrence of 
the same and remarks on the influence of Stoicism embedded within the idea of the 
eternal return; which suggests a sense of aestheticization regarding the self-sufficiency 
of the individual.  I contrast the aestheticized suffering of the Nietzschean Stoic with the 
Levinasian account of suffering which is dehumanizing, useless and fundamentally 
traumatic.  I conclude by noting that Nietzsche’s account of suffering entails an 
aesthetic consolation that inevitably suggests a justification of suffering, which is highly 
dubious from Levinas’s ethical perspective.         
a) Ethics and Naturalism 
The Infinite transcends itself in the finite, it passes the finite, in that it directs the 
neighbour to me without exposing itself to me.  This order steals into me like a thief, 
despite the outstretched nets of consciousness, a trauma which surprises me 
absolutely, always already past in a past which was never present and remains un-
representable.
4
    
As the quote suggests, in Levinas there are two realms, the finite and the Infinite, which 
are not separated by any spatio-temporal boundaries.  The Infinite is non-
representational, and it affects the finite in terms of being the eternal frame of reference 
for the possibility of ethics.  Primordial to consciousness, the Infinite is the ethical level 
manifesting itself as a radical passivity more passive than any mode of passivity we 
can understand consciously.   
The link between the Infinite and the finite is the human other.  In Levinas’s thought, 
the way the subject is morally awakened is by the interruption of the Other, which may 
be considered as a mediator between the subject and the Good beyond Being.   The 
intervention of the Other is what grants the subject its ethical capacity.  Thus in 
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Levinas’s philosophy, humanism is the catalyser of ethics.  Rather than nature – which 
is mainly Being posed in the ontological plane5 –, it is the human other(s) who can 
teach us and hence enable us to have a glimpse at the trace of Goodness.  
Levinas’s doubtful attitude towards naturalism can be observed in his depiction of the 
ambiguity of any “ground;” or “arch” – “arch” means ground; so an-archy implies 
groundlessness; a breach of totality.6  By “an-archy,” Levinas draws attention to the 
distraction of the ontological plane which can be nature or Being; or any philosophy 
that advocates naturalism.  It is within that rupture that consciousness discovers in 
itself a Desire for the Other; endless responsibilities prior to freedom; within which there 
is a hint of the “seizure by the Good” – as touched on above.  Levinas suggests that it 
is the “an-archy” that secures humanism.  As any “ground” is an ontological and 
rational category, ethics is groundless; and as explained above, since ethics cannot be 
understood rationally – as it relates to the Infinite and is experienced as a revelation 
from beyond Being –, it is futile to seek naturalistic or ontological foundations for ethics.   
However, the strong emphasis Levinas puts on the transcendental essence of the 
ethical and the primordiality of the non-representable to the ontological spatio-
temporality should not blind us to the importance he gives to the body.  It is important 
to note that, just like Nietzsche, Levinas is also a philosopher of the body; providing 
elaborate accounts of enjoyment, pleasure, need, hunger and suffering, he exposes 
our creaturely natures.  For this reason, in spite of his obvious debt to Descartes on the 
conception of the Infinite, we cannot regard him as a Cartesian thinker who prioritizes 
the mind over the body.  As a matter of fact, Levinas undermines the traditional body 
versus mind duality by emphasizing the ethical significance of the flesh; the meaning of 
ethics he searches for does not dwell within the mind, but within the body, necessarily.  
He makes this idea explicit in memorable metaphors which both physically and 
metaphorically highlight the strong connection between skin and ethics – for instance 
he likens the notion of being for the Other to the phenomenon of pregnancy in which 
the Other is physically under the skin of the subject.7   
Body is a key issue which at first sight brings Nietzsche and Levinas together, as both 
philosophers in their own ways accurately articulate the relationship between 
corporeality and morality or ethics.  This observation is also noted by David Boothroyd 
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who remarks that for both philosophers the subject, the “I,” becomes an undergoing, 
rather than a “conatus essendi”8 – which signifies a struggle for existence; the effort to 
live.  Rather than signifying a fierce and forceful battle for survival, for both 
philosophers the body is a host or an interpreter of various sensations and 
experiences.   
However, the way the two philosophers deal with the body is quite different.  Nietzsche 
regards the body as a microcosmic version of the universe which operates in 
accordance with the will to power.9  In his account, as part of nature, man is an animal 
who throughout his evolutionary adventure turned out in a certain way.  Having learned 
to make and keep his promises as they got branded upon his flesh, he invented 
morality and secured the order of his surroundings.  Levinas, on the other hand, 
proposes a phenomenological account of the body in which he reconsiders the body as 
the precondition for ethics.  In his view, only a body that suffers; enjoys and feels 
hunger can have ethical significance.  My capacity for ethics is dependent on my bodily 
abilities.  Since I am capable of suffering, I suffer for the Other; and since I am able to, I 
can offer my skin to the Other.     
So far we observe that as a remarkable common point, Nietzsche and Levinas 
consider the body primordial to reason and rationality.  Moreover, both of them think 
that morality and ethics are groundless; but for completely different reasons.  As for 
Nietzsche, morality comes about randomly, socio-politically – almost like superstition –, 
as man struggles to adapt to his environment and maintain order within his social 
group.  Yet from a Levinasian angle, Nietzsche’s naturalistic account of the body upon 
which he grounds his conception of subjectivity is superficial (and consequently, violent 
and unethical) because naturalism prompts that we only consider the apparent 
phenomenon; whatever is visible within the scope of Being.  As for those forces lying 
within our bodies, can we rely on anything inherent in us to be necessarily “good,” or 
anything “natural” to be in rapport with ethics?  The answer to this question depends 
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very much on how we regard ethics, and this is the key issue upon which Nietzsche 
and Levinas disagree.    
Do one’s inner forces justify one’s own ethics?  As for Levinas, this is the beginning of 
the tyranny of the ego – or the same – which leads to nothing but violence and 
catastrophe.  As indicated above, he is critical of naturalistic accounts because in his 
view, ethics comes from beyond Being, beyond nature; and in an attempt to prove his 
point, he suggests that if we were to determine ethics from a naturalistic perspective, it 
would be impossible to explain situations such as sacrifice or hostage.  He defends his 
view by stating that subjectivity as being a hostage is not only obviously non-voluntary, 
but particularly, “against nature.”  He states these ideas in the important quote below:    
If obsession is suffering and contrariety, the altruism of the subjectivity-hostage is not a 
tendency, is not a natural benevolence, as in the moral philosophies of feeling.  It is 
against nature, non-voluntary, inseparable from the possible persecution to which no 
consent is thinkable, anarchic ... Egoism and altruism are posterior to responsibility, 
which makes them possible ...  Persecution is a trauma, violence par excellence without 
warning nor a priori, without possible apology, without logos.
10
  
As already noted above, Levinas dissociates his notion of the hostage-subject from the 
altruistic accounts offered by the “moral philosophies of feelings,” which he seems to 
associate with naturalistic propositions that favour natural benevolences – one 
assumes he implies the philosophies of utilitarianism or naturalistic views suggesting 
altruism to be beneficial for group solidarity.  Nietzsche is obviously not a utilitarian; yet 
he clearly reveals his naturalistic attitude on the matters of morality and the genealogy 
of moral feelings.  Altruism is always already under the category of rational acts for 
Levinas because of its voluntary nature.  So, in Levinas’s account, it is not possible to 
trace the genealogy of ethics or Goodness within the accounts of evolutionary survival 
or socio-political maintenance of a society.   
However, there is another argument Nietzsche proposes on the issue of selflessness 
and sacrifice.  For Nietzsche, every act is an act of egoism; even the most apparently 
altruistic ones such as parenthood, sacrificing oneself for a cause11 or spontaneous 
courageous acts, such as risking one’s own life by jumping into a river to save the 
drowning person or venturing into a burning building to rescue a stranger. 
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For Levinas, on the other hand, the proposition that “every act is an act of egoism” can 
still be valid but for an entirely different reason: as my primary mode of living is 
enjoyment and hedonism, I nourish myself by assimilating everything around me to into 
the self-same.  It is because of my narcissistic nature that I am always already guilty; 
whatever I do is never good enough or morally justifiable because in all my attempts to 
relate to the Other, any word I utter already sounds violent and every act I perform 
remains inadequate within my finite realm.  Yet it is this inadequacy that prompts 
Levinas to protest against my limitations and try to overcome my egoism.  So, the 
important difference between Levinas and Nietzsche is that for the former, every ethical 
act means overcoming a fundamental egoism whereas for the latter, my egoism itself 
an issue worth investing in by way of creating my values or cultivating my idiosyncratic 
virtue.  Rather than denying or suppressing it, the problem lies in how to reinterpret my 
egoism and what to do with it.     
Above, while presenting Frithjof Bergmann’s account, I conveyed that our habitual way 
to regard egoism and altruism as opposites is misleading as it mainly aims to 
consolidate an authoritarian moral law.12  In addition to that, Bernard Reginster argues 
that according to Nietzsche, there is not an opposition between egoism and altruism in 
terms of value, and the important point to keep in mind is that altruistic does not 
necessarily mean selfless:13       
An accident and suffering incurred by another constitutes a signpost to some danger to 
us; and it can have a painful effect upon us simply as a token of human vulnerability 
and fragility in general.  We repel this kind of pain and offense and requite it through an 
act of pity; it may contain a subtle self-defense or even a piece of revenge.
14
 
Nietzsche suggests that in certain situations which appear as sacrifice, if we scratch 
the surface, we see an unyielding revolt against the poor and inadequate nature of man 
to protect himself.  Reginster notes that Nietzsche’s deep psychological perceptiveness 
conveys an unconscious protest against the fragility and vulnerability of human life.15  
In such situations, as the quote makes clear, the person who risks her life to save the 
person in danger acts out of pity, which is partially mixed with a subtle sense of 
arrogance; as if the person cannot bear the sight of such a terrorizing scene depicting 
the human subject – the victim – in distress.  This feeling is further intensified with the 
inevitability of self-association; the helper sees the dangerous context as a possible 
scenario which signifies a potential threat to her very being as well; what is happening 
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to the victim may happen to her too, so the fate must be reversed.  The last notion, the 
hidden motive to change or reverse the fate is associated with “a piece of revenge;” yet 
one could ask “revenge for what?”   
In Nietzsche, “revenge” can be taken against the past, in terms of a constant battle with 
the inner voice that whispers into one’s ears that “things could have been otherwise.” 
When the spirit of revenge is at work in a sacrificial scenario like this, presumably the 
worry is about one’s capability to deal with future life threats.  In any case, it is clear 
that from a Nietzschean angle, helping someone in danger stems from a pretty egoistic 
concern, namely one’s own security.  Nietzsche reads this context quite emphatically 
and sounds like an enlightened cynic who makes us revisit our presumptions regarding 
the forceful opposition between altruism and selflessness.  However, despite the 
euphemism, from a Levinasian perspective, this approach resonates with the 
ontological totality and consolidates the ego rather than pointing at the ethical 
responsibility.        
Without denying the psychological depth and truth of this Nietzschean attitude towards 
sacrifice based on life-risking, what would irritate Levinas about this account is not 
necessarily the selfish motive in helping the other person but the nature of the 
relationship between the self and the Other.  Levinas would protest at the “absence” of 
the Other in the argument.  In my view, he would respond by indicating that Nietzsche’s 
intolerance of human weakness and vulnerability is basically the consciousness of a 
physical challenge.  However, Levinas is not interested in risky scenarios but in the 
ethical moment which is when my consciousness itself is challenged; not the other way 
around (not when I feel conscious of any specific challenge).  While alluding to the 
phenomenon of the face, Levinas writes: 
This is a challenge of consciousness, not a consciousness of a challenge.  The Ego 
loses its sovereign coincidence with self, its identification where consciousness comes 
back triumphantly to itself to reside in itself.  In the face of the obligation of the Other, 
the Ego is banished from that repose, is not the already glorious consciousness of this 
exile.  All complacency destroys the rectitude of the ethical movement.
16
 
In this respect, we see that Nietzsche’s naturalistic account does not challenge 
Levinas’s ethics.  In addition, quite different from Nietzsche’s naturalism, Levinas 
elaborates on the inspirational account of sacrifice out of saintliness.  He argues that 
everyone, including even the most cynical people, can be moved by saintly acts.  The 
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fact that there is something in every human being that is affected by saintliness is 
presumably a hint of the Good beyond Being that gets a channel to come forth through 
a human other – saints are not hermits or loners but individuals who are for the people; 
for-the-Other(s).  Levinas ascribes a sense of the holy to saintliness as it evokes a 
possibility for human elevation.  Holiness signifies an opening for humanity, and as if 
substitution’s motive, saintliness evokes the lived experience of authentic humanity.  
Levinas says:  
Holiness is nevertheless the supreme perfection, and I am not saying that all humans 
are saints!  But it is enough that, at times, there have been saints, and especially that 
holiness always be admired, even by those who seem the most distant from it.  This 
holiness which cedes one’s place to the other becomes possible in humanity.  And 
there is something divine in this appearance of the human capable of thinking of 
another before thinking of himself.  With humanity, holiness thus comes to transform the 
being of nature by constituting this opening...
17
  
Levinas’s understanding of saintliness reveals continuity with his notion of substitution.  
In both ideas, he explicitly seeks the condition for the possibility of ethics based on the 
asymmetrical relationship to the Other – “thinking of another person before oneself” 
defies reciprocity.  Without preaching human sacrifice, Levinas asks how it comes 
about that one can sacrifice oneself for the Other; given that such a situation is both 
unnatural and non-voluntary.  In the same way, without calling people saints, Levinas 
wonders how we are all moved by saintly acts.  In his view, just the bare fact that we 
feel a certain affectivity towards saintly acts tells us something about our human 
“nature” or humanity.  It suggests that different from Nature in which Being poses itself 
ontologically, human nature does not crystallize itself through maintenance in Being but 
by transcending it.  Rather than consolidating the self through self-preservation or self-
indulgence (which could take any form; including the Nietzschean notion of artistic 
expression or “creating beyond oneself”18), humanity seeks a breach in totality; the 
interruption of Being which only comes about through the Desire for the Good beyond 
Essence.    
So, one wonders, is it the saint or the animal in us that is the most necessary for 
human flourishing and transcendence?  Nietzsche emphasizes the “great intelligence 
of the body” whereas Levinas asserts that the idea of the Infinite already overflows 
cognition.  How can we interpret the vast space between these utterly conflicting 
views?  I am tempted to suggest that by remarking on the great intelligence of the 
body, Nietzsche intends to demystify rationality and dethrone reason.  However, his 
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method is still naturalistic; the ambiguity of his proposal makes itself most apparent as 
he clouds the boundary between the animal and the human being.  Levinas, on the 
other hand, also aims to draw attention to the limitations of reason, but since his utmost 
concern is to emphasize the call of the ethical, he is indifferent to the account of the 
human being which treats it merely at the level of an “organism.” 
Nietzsche asserts that what is most valuable in man is his animal side, and argues that 
it is because of the initial detachment from his early animal self that man today is so 
degenerate, corrupt and weak.19  In his account, the animal man, by contrast, was 
determined, strong-willed and pure.  Nietzsche explicitly praises the master type for 
being active, strong, spontaneous, aggressive, life-affirming and thinks that “active” 
feelings such as the desire to dominate or possess have greater biological value than 
reactive feelings like hatred, envy, ressentiment, rancour or revenge.20  Even though it 
is generally assumed that reactive feelings are the home of justice, he argues that it is 
the active feelings that lead to justice – namely, justice in the Nietzschean “healthy” 
sense; free from ressentiment: 
The active, attacking, encroaching man is still a hundred paces closer to justice than his 
reactive counterpart; to the extent that he has no need to evaluate his object in a false 
and prejudiced manner as the reactive man does.  For this reason, in fact, the 
aggressive man, the stronger, braver, nobler man has at all times had the freer eye, the 
better conscience on his side.  Conversely, perhaps it is clear by now on whose 
conscience the invention of “bad conscience” rests – that of the man of ressentiment!  
As a final point, one need only consult history:  where has the entire administration of 
law, and also the actual need for law, made its home up to now? In the sphere of the 
reactive man?  Not at all: rather in that of the active, the strong, the spontaneous, the 
aggressive man.
21
 
 
It is important to consider the issue of ressentiment in combination with Nietzsche’s 
keenness on our animal aspect in order to interpret this connection correctly: does 
Nietzsche simply advocate modelling the master type and taking on a ruthless and 
aggressive attitude for the sake of attaining justice?  It is always alluring to link those 
ideas to the various places in TSZ where Nietzsche insists that man is only slightly 
superior to an ape, compared with the Overman.  When we consider these ideas, we 
could be tempted to conclude that Nietzsche is deeply suspicious about the integrity of 
being human; and as a far more dignifying alternative, he is highlighting the fact that 
the human animal is basically a part of nature; hence an animal.   
Bernard Reginster offers a plausible response to this issue.  He argues that 
Nietzsche’s main target of critique is not necessarily values themselves, but valuations 
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that are born out of ressentiment.  As a psychological condition, ressentiment leads the 
agent to self-deception and alienation; hence robs her of her integrity.22  In Nietzsche’s 
view, moral judgments are mainly expressions of psychological attitudes; so, when one 
acts under the psychology of ressentiment, one undermines one’s own integrity.  
Likening the psychology of ressentiment to Aesop’s well-known fable of the fox and the 
sour grapes, Reginster remarks that the man of ressentiment finds himself in a 
paradoxical situation: he is neither able to achieve the attributes he finds desirable 
(such as socio-political power) nor does he give up his desire; moreover he is utterly 
dishonest about accepting his failure.23   
When we reconsider the two important quotes above, we observe that Nietzsche 
essentially makes a comparison between the man of ressentiment (the ascetic priest) 
and the man-animal (the master clan) and regards the latter as having more wholeness 
of character than the former.  The honesty of the man-animal is valuable not because 
he is more truthful or more intelligent than the man of ressentiment but because unlike 
the latter, he does not tell himself “dishonest lies.”24     
On the other hand, to most provocative issue, Nietzsche’s emphasis on our animal 
side, Levinas would presumably respond by noting that the vitality of the animal 
definitely is precious and special; however, lacking the face in the human sense makes 
animals speechless or turns them into ethical invalids, at some level.  Since ethics 
reveals itself through the Saying, language would not come out without the (human) 
face.  In his account, what makes the face the initiation of language and ethics is its 
frailty and authority – which is, of course, the moral authority of the vulnerable face 
which is itself without force.  One would not see those attributes in the face of a lion, for 
example – which would be a fine example for Nietzsche in terms of characterizing the 
active, encroaching animality.  When asked what it is that makes a human face more 
distinctive from an animal face, Levinas says:  
One cannot entirely refuse the face of an animal.  It is via the face that one 
understands, for example, a dog.  Yet the priority here is not found in the animal, but in 
the human face.  We understand the animal, the face of an animal, in accordance with 
Dasein.  The phenomenon of the face is not in its purest form in the dog.  In the dog, in 
the animal, there are other phenomena.  For example, the force of nature is pure 
vitality.
25
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In my opinion, Levinas’s neglect of the topic of animals is consistent with his low 
opinion of naturalistic accounts.  Associating animals with pure vitality suggests that 
Levinas regards animals as part of nature; pertaining to the realm of enjoyment or the 
elemental rather than the ethical – they are not capable of traumatizing me with their 
unforeseeableness.  Likening the order of animals to the web of the Dasein evokes that 
the animal mainly cares for itself and struggles for its own existence; it is not capable of 
receiving a revelation or sacrificing its life for another fellow animal.   
John Llewelyn notes that Levinas seems to display a Kantian attitude on this issue: 
since an animal is not capable of responsibility, it is not capable of ethics; so my 
responsibilities do not extend to an animal the same way they extend to my human 
fellows who are capable of responsibility and ethics.  Llewelyn states that Levinas’s 
world is clearly a “very human world;”26 so the sociality which evokes a promise of the 
Infinite does not include the realm of animal.27  Levinas is not apologetic about his 
anthropocentricism.  Yet he confronts the ambiguity of the face of the animal by 
suggesting that one can be capable of discovering the face of an animal only after one 
is capable of realizing the meaning of ethics – which can only be possible through 
one’s relationship with the human other.28  An animal cannot teach me the meaning of 
ethics, only the Other can.  That is why my relationship with the animal is contingent 
upon my primordial relationship with the human other.  
However, Llewelyn speculates on the dubiety of Levinas’s easy dismissal of animals in 
the ethical debate by quoting from Jeremy Bentham that the burning question is not 
“Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”29  I also think that 
suffering is a key issue in Levinas’s dismissal of animals.  Even though it is true that 
animals do suffer, they do not suffer the way human beings suffer.  An animal suffers 
the way the Dasein30 suffers; it cares only for its own life - or instinctively for its 
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offspring - in an automatized manner.  A human being, on the other hand, is the unique 
creature who is capable of suffering for fellow humans; who can “substitute” for the 
human other.  For this reason, the issue of animals is an incident revealing the close 
relationship between Levinas’s notion of substitution and suffering for the Other(s).  
Just like the self-caring Dasein, an animal’s life signifies “a struggle for life without 
ethics;” 31 so even if the animal suffers physically at a tremendous level, its suffering is 
devoid of ethical meaning, in the Levinasian sense.   
A moment pointing at Levinas’s confusion on this matter is when he likens animals to 
young children and says that we like children for their animality.32  Babies and young 
children are always interesting creatures in terms of evoking the ambiguous middle 
stage between the animal and the proper human being.  When Levinas theorizes on 
the Other, he customarily implies (male) adults; yet there are also moments when he 
refers to women and children as the “widow” and the “orphan” – when they allude to 
suffering.  It seems that even though children are animal-like, they gain humanity and 
ethical significance only when they suffer.      
Getting back to the challenge of Nietzsche’s naturalistic argument, we could consider 
the primordiality of nature versus ethics in relation to the theme of consciousness as 
well.  According to Nietzsche, consciousness is an organic outcome of evolution 
whereas Levinas claims that the subject is the pre-conscious, pre-reflective being, and 
ethics is the first philosophy.  The problem of consciousness is definitely a key point to 
exemplify the question of naturalism and subjectivity.  Even though neither Nietzsche 
nor Levinas ascribe much importance to consciousness; what each philosopher thinks 
as the pre-conscious is nonetheless uniquely distinct.  In Levinas’s philosophy, the 
notion of the pre-conscious alludes to the primordial passivity of the subject of 
substitution who responds to the ethical command evoked by the face of the Other. 
As a completely naturalistic alternative, Nietzsche’s notion of the pre-conscious 
corresponds to the fascinating operations of the will to power which guide our intricate 
mental operations; our innate interpretive forces that valuate our surroundings.  
Consciousness originates as the outcome of this faculty of interpretation – of which we 
are only partially aware.  Nietzsche explains the elusive nature of consciousness by 
asserting that consciousness is only present as much as it is useful, whose use is 
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determined by the extent that it enables us to preserve ourselves.33  Our conceptions of 
spirit, reason, logic, morality etc. as “fictitious synthesises” are completely contingent 
upon the interpretations of consciousness, which is an immature organ that has been 
evolving based on our responses to the outer world.34  For this reason, Nietzsche does 
not attribute much significance to consciousness as he thinks that what matters is the 
will to power; the will to be stronger; to grow further, which is the source that originated 
consciousness in the first place.  Consequently, he regards moral issues as 
misconceptions or misinterpretations of the body.  In order to present the Nietzschean 
perspective fully, I would like to quote a substantial passage from The Will to Power:  
In the tremendous multiplicity of events within an organism, the part which becomes 
conscious to us is a mere means:  and the little bit of “virtue,” “selflessness,” and similar 
fictions are refuted radically by the total balance of events.  We should study our 
organism in all its immorality –  
The animal functions are, as a matter of principle, a million times more important than 
all our beautiful moods and heights of consciousness: the latter are a surplus, except 
when they have to serve as tools of those animal functions.  The entire conscious life, 
the spirit along with the soul, the heart, the goodness, and virtue – in whose service do 
they labour?  In the service of the greatest possible perfection of means (means of 
nourishment, means of enhancement) of the basic animal functions: above all, the 
enhancement of life. 
What one used to call “body” and “flesh” is of such unspeakable importance:  the 
remainder is a small accessory.  The task of spinning on the chain of life, and in such a 
way that the thread grows ever more powerful – that is the task.   
But consider how heart, soul, virtue, spirit practically conspire together to subvert this 
systematic task – as if they were the end in view! – The degeneration of life is 
conditioned essentially by the extraordinary proneness to error of consciousness:  it is 
held in check by instinct the least of all and therefore blunders the longest and the most 
thoroughly. 
To measure whether existence has value according to the pleasant or unpleasant 
feelings aroused in this consciousness:  can one think of a madder extravagance of 
vanity?  For it is only a means – and pleasant or unpleasant feelings are also only 
means! 
What is the objective measure of value?  Solely the quantum of enhanced and 
organized power.
35
  
It is Nietzsche’s contention that rather than pointing at the emergence of 
consciousness, what we call ethics is basically our herd instinct moralizing nature and 
attaching value to consciousness.  Ascribing moral value to consciousness is a 
hangover from religion – which actually descends from ancient times all the way down 
to (Platonic) Judaeo-Christianity.  Nietzsche’s ambition to demystify the cult of the 
moral subject mainly targets the underlying idea of associating consciousness with 
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God, which still manifests itself as the association of consciousness with subjectivity.  
Our emphasis on authorship makes us overrate our consciousness or rationality. 
However, according to Nietzsche, what makes us interesting and prone to growth is our 
animal nature, which is our genuinely life-enhancing side.  Our animal functions are 
crucial not only because they reveal vitality, but also because they are the parts which 
are uncontaminated by misinterpretations of rationality.  Our conscious (rational) minds 
often cloud our “best judgment;” which is our bodily affects and drives.  As touched 
upon above on the importance of active feelings, Nietzsche thinks that candidly, the 
primitive man of the master clan is by far closer to the concept of justice than the 
cunning ascetic priest of ressentiment.  In addition, Nietzsche’s argument is that we are 
only partially conscious of our organisms, and that is why the separation between what 
is conscious and what is unconscious is not as clean-cut as Levinas insinuates, in 
terms of “ontological modality.”36      
Hypothetically, even if Nietzsche’s account does not necessarily object to Levinas’s 
assertion that ethics signifies a rupture in consciousness,37 the latter’s denigrating 
association of consciousness with totality; in other words, Levinas’s complete 
indifference to our complex mental operations could nonetheless disappoint Nietzsche.  
Rather than disclosing the mundane or trivial order of things, what Nietzsche hints at 
instead is the exciting operations of the will to power concealed underneath 
consciousness, which is itself essentially a mere symptom;38 like the tip of the iceberg.  
Without overrating or underrating its essence, Deleuze interprets Nietzsche’s notion of 
consciousness as “nothing but the symptom of a deeper transformation and of the 
activities of entirely non-spiritual forces.”39   
Far from being a rigid, fixed entity, consciousness is an ongoing process of organic 
transformation, and the way consciousness operates is hidden from conscious 
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experience.40  Even though the active and passive forces constantly affect one another, 
the active forces elude us, so we can only have access to the passive or the reactive 
part.  That is why consciousness is essentially reactive;41 in other words, we can never 
have the full story regarding what goes on within our organisms.  In addition, it is also 
misleading to reduce consciousness to self-awareness or mere self-consciousness.  
Interpreting Nietzsche, Deleuze writes: 
In Nietzsche consciousness is always the consciousness of an inferior in relation to 
superior to which he is subordinated or into which he is “incorporated.”  Consciousness 
is never self-consciousness, but the consciousness of an ego in relation to a self which 
is not itself conscious.  It is not the master’s consciousness but the slave’s 
consciousness in relation to a master who is not himself conscious ... This is the 
servility of consciousness; it merely testifies to the “formation of a superior body.”
42
     
In Deleuze’s accurate analysis, Nietzsche discerns the “servility” aspect of 
consciousness; it always responds to a superior body.  Almost in an analogous 
manner, the inferior force (reactive) obeys the superior (active) which is evocative of 
the Levinasian subject serving the Other (the morally superior party).  However, rather 
than taking place in the context of inter-subjectivity, for Nietzsche all these phenomena 
occur within consciousness.   
However, in spite of the plausibility of naturalistic accounts distinguishing the complex 
workings of consciousness, it is important to note that Levinas would be rather 
indifferent to the distinction between the conscious and the non-conscious.  For 
instance, Levinas could suggest that ressentiment as a psychological condition is 
utterly different from the phenomenon of hostage and persecution.  The man of 
ressentiment is a conscious ego, not a pre-conscious, pre-sentient self undergoing the 
trauma of persecution, which is a crucial distinction.  As a matter of fact, Levinas even 
distances himself from psychoanalysis – in its initial Freudian formulation – because he 
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thinks that just like any other naturalistic account, psychoanalytic approaches do not 
convey anything about the meaning of ethics either.43    
According to Levinas, neither plain consciousness nor plain unconsciousness leads to 
ethics.  Ethics is not some sort of dormant energy remaining latent in the unconscious, 
waiting to come out.  Rather, it is the realization of the primordiality of the Other before 
me.  Levinas defends the plausibility of his ethical account on the basis of primordiality.  
According to him, ethics precedes ontology; the face-to-face encounter is primordial to 
rationality and the face of the Other says “Do not kill me” before it prompts the rational 
question of “what is.”   
But if primordiality determines the plausibility of accounts, then does not Nietzsche’s 
evolutionary naturalistic account precede Levinas’s ethics?  And how are we supposed 
to understand primordiality; does it mean that which comes first; or which is more 
essential, more important by essence? Influenced by the natural sciences of his day, 
Nietzsche gives an account of the “eye” in Daybreak, arguing that vision cannot be the 
motive behind the evolution of the eye; vision must have been construed much later, as 
a side effect or by pure chance.44  Nietzsche holds a similar opinion for the emergence 
of consciousness as well; that it is an organ – one among others – that must have been 
evolving as the result of the adaptation process.  As for Nietzsche, body clearly 
precedes consciousness.  
While arguing that ethics precedes rationality, technically Levinas seems to work from 
an already established and functioning consciousness.  However, this technicality is 
not a genuine worry because Nietzsche and Levinas tackle with different questions.  
How consciousness or rationality evolved; or the genealogy of our values is the 
question the former asks whereas the possibility for the condition of ethics is the 
question the latter is interested in.  The answer to the first question – perhaps science 
can help us – does not have to relate to the second question.  And as a matter of fact, 
the essential separation between these two realms constitutes the backbone of 
Levinas’s philosophy:  the sciences explore the scope of Being whereas ethics comes 
from beyond Being.  So, it is futile to seek naturalistic accounts for ethics.  
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Not being able to give a naturalistic account of ethics at a satisfactory level does not 
mean that we need to dismiss our search for the meaning of ethics altogether.  Quite 
the contrary, it shows that we should give up wasting our intellectual and spiritual 
energies trying to wed nature to ethics.  In Levinas’s account, it is not possible to give a 
naturalistic account of ethics because ethics comes from exteriority, beyond nature – 
for which, only the human other can be my guiding sign; not wild nature or hungry birds 
of prey.  Attempts to ally nature with ethics are doomed to fail because nature is amoral 
– and Nietzsche convincingly explains this fact all throughout his career; which is also 
illustrated as the gist of this thought in the long passage above.   
Most probably, Levinas would not deny that “the objective measure of value” is “solely 
the quantum of enhanced and organized power.”  Yet he would insist that this tells us 
nothing about the nature of ethics.  In seeking our very "capacity;" our unique "ability" 
or "possibility" to sacrifice ourselves for the Other, Levinas regards consciousness as 
always already posterior to ethics.  In this sense, I consider the quote below to be a 
valid response to Nietzsche’s provocative passage above:  
Proximity, obsession and subjectivity as we have expressed them are not reducible to 
phenomena of consciousness.  But their un-consciousness, instead of giving evidence 
of a preconscious stage or a repression which would oppress them, is one with their 
exception from totality, that is, their refusal of manifestation.
45
 
The quote above elucidates that for Levinas the essential factor that makes us human 
– our capacity for ethics – is the aspect of us which cannot even be translated to 
consciousness.  That is why, the debate pertaining to the ontological or chronological 
primordiality of nature versus ethics is a wrong question.  If asked from the position of 
Being, of course evolution is primordial.  However, what Levinas pursues in his 
philosophy is non-representable; the interruption of Being does not signify the birth of 
consciousness but rather a suspension of spatio-temporality – hence, the suspension 
of the subject.  And ethics means the subject’s spontaneity being called in question.   
b) The Aesthetic Justification of Life 
... it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally      
justified.
46
  
Even though it is the young Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy who proclaims the 
spectacular statement above, the idea remains prevalent all throughout Nietzsche’s 
works; revealing itself in his middle career underneath the themes of amor fati and the 
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eternal recurrence of the same, and in his late career as the Dionysian affirmation of 
life in The Will to Power.  It is important to see the continuity between Nietzsche’s 
naturalism and his medical concern to heal society as the philosopher-physician and 
his regard for aesthetics as the sole justification of life.     
Aesthetics is the ultimate sign that reveals the concern for appearance – of course, it is 
not only limited to sight but engaging all five senses –; for apparent things; for Being.  It 
is detectable, on display for examination; it is exposed just as a patient is exposed 
before the physician.  Walter H. Sokel remarks that attributing himself the role of a 
physician, particularly in On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, Nietzsche 
takes on a “medical perspective;” he points to certain individuals who are distinguished 
from the rest of the herd and claims it is owing to their contributions to history that the 
overall health of a culture can be evaluated.  Nietzsche’s metaphor for history is 
therefore “calls from mountain top to mountain top with vast stretches of flatland 
between them.”47   
Sokel’s observation is tenable when we consider that rather than worrying about the 
general well-being of individual lives, which constitute the herd, Nietzsche is genuinely 
concerned about the potentially damaging effects of the herd morality upon great 
individuals.  His strongest opposition to morality arises from his worry that those 
exceptional individuals may be inhibited and hindered from attaining greatness, which 
could result in the intellectual and spiritual stagnation of the overall society.  It is those 
individuals who pave the way for healing the society and spurring the advancement of 
a culture.   
As noted above, Nietzsche is horrified at the idea of the sick (the ascetic slave morality) 
inflicting their sickness upon the healthy; thus he dedicates his philosophy to protecting 
those candidates for the great individuals, or the philosophers of the future.  In this 
respect, Sokel suggests that the physician-philosopher does not seem to have any 
reservations about cutting out the gangrened organs to save the whole body: “the 
physician’s task is not to cultivate and preserve each organ, but to care for the health 
and life of the whole body.”48       
Richard Cohen also observes the connection between aesthetics and health in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy and suggests that this inevitably becomes the framework from 
which we can understand his thought; notably the theme of the will to power.  Similar to 
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Richardson, Cohen regards him as a metaphysical thinker who asserts that within 
every organism inherently lies the essence of the will to power, as conatus essendi; 
which is supposed to be the necessity of the universe.49  Critiquing Nietzsche’s 
obsession with health and greatness, Cohen regards his philosophy as aesthetics: 
In contrast to all asceticism, Nietzsche demands greatness: “great health” in individuals 
and “grand politics” for nations.  Nietzsche’s philosophy is therefore an aesthetics: a 
philosophy of the body, and on top of this it is a pagan or Greek aesthetics: the 
celebration of victory, superiority, domination – hegemony as greatness.
50
  
Cohen’s provocative quote suggests a striking parallel between naturalism and 
aesthetics.  It is notable that the greatness Nietzsche passionately propagates is 
essentially an aesthetic judgment, especially in this context.  That is, when greatness is 
associated with the celebration of victory, superiority, domination and health, the one 
that celebrates always already occupies the position of a “spectator.”  Sokel remarks 
that in the same manner, the aesthetically justified life implies a sense of delight and 
admiration within the spectator on whose behalf the world gains meaning and 
significance.51 
Sokel contends that greatness is not a moral but necessarily an aesthetic notion as it 
presupposes an object of admiration; yet the admirer is not the agent of action but the 
spectator.52  Rather than initiating (moral) action, admiration prompts self-indulgent 
contemplation accompanied with a sense of detachment.  One recalls Nietzsche’s 
notion of the “pathos of distance” which the master clan used to maintain before the 
common herd, the slaves.  Likewise, spectatorship evokes a condescending attitude in 
which what is admired is reduced to an object of spectacle.     
The incompatibility between the aesthetic attitude and the moral attitude sounds very 
Levinasian.  However, can admiration ever be innocent?  In the quote above, Levinas 
suggests that the holiness evoked by the saints and saintly acts are admired even by 
the most distant people such as atheists and cynics.  Could we also regard saints as 
performance artists – which is somewhat equivalent to a Nietzschean spectacle?  
Could it be that, similar to Nietzsche, Levinas is also envisioning a divine spectacle in 
which the God from beyond Being is pleased at sacrifice scenarios and appreciates the 
acts of saints as the deeds of the tragic heroes?   
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Moreover, considering that Levinas is greatly influenced by Plato on the theme of the 
Good, the question becomes slightly puzzling when we also bear in mind that for Plato 
the Good is at the same time the beautiful and vice versa.  However, we must note that 
“beautiful” cannot be merely reduced to the production of an aesthetic effect upon the 
audience.  The saint sacrificing herself for another person can be regarded as having a 
beautiful soul as she evokes the transcendence of the human soul – that is beautiful.  
But the aesthetic evaluation of the spectacle itself is completely irrelevant.   
As a matter of fact, Levinas would intimate that anyone who regards such a scene as 
an aesthetic moment is immoral.  He argues that while looking at a face, noticing the 
eye colour or the particular features of the Other distracts one from the ethical 
encounter.53  Likewise, we could think that a scene of sacrifice could invite us to action 
– to do “good” – for the Other(s) rather than providing us with a panoramic scene to 
consume and remain as passive observers.  So, an act of sacrifice or saintliness does 
not count as an aesthetic performance for the bystanders to enjoy.  Actually, Levinas 
would be quite critical towards even the idea of an artistic attempt to make a painting or 
a sculpture of such a saintly deed, because compared with the eternal (and Platonic) 
concept of saintliness, the depiction; the “caricature,” the “lifeless life of an image,” 
would seem dehumanizing and degrading.54  
Apart from the notion of “admiration,” another notion Sokel raises in relation to 
Nietzsche’s urge to translate life into an aesthetic spectacle is the latter’s use of the 
word “interesting” while praising the “cunning intelligence of the slave.”  Nietzsche 
thinks that it is owing to the role of the slave in world history that the world has become 
an “interesting” place at all.  Sokel remarks that: “‘Interesting’ is a cognitive, also an 
aesthetic, category, but definitely not an ethical one.”55  He explains that when 
something is “interesting,” what mainly matters is the effect upon the spectator; it does 
not call one into take action, but rather leads to an irresponsible hedonism or passive 
observation.  Yet, at times, this seems to be the world worth justification in Nietzsche’s 
mind:  
Nietzsche conceives of his task as helping to make the spectacle of human existence 
as interesting and admirable as possible.  His thinking was to help transform life from 
the dull and drab show, to which it had deteriorated as a result of the victory first of 
Judeo-Christian and then modern democratic slave morality, into a provocative, 
breathtaking, and sublime show, one worthy to entertain gods.
56
    
                                                             
53
 Levinas, EI, 85. 
54
 Emmanuel Levinas, “Reality and its Shadow” (1948) [RS], in CPP, 9.  I refer to Levinas’s 
ideas on arts in more detail, below.   
55
 Sokel, 513. 
56
 Ibid., 512. 
118 
 
An important Nietzschean theme, amor fati suggests a similar sense of aesthetic 
detachment and disinterestedness regarding the “fate” (of others) for the sake of 
“seeing the big picture” and loving necessity.  Cohen remarks that seeing the will to 
power as a metaphysical necessity of the universe, with his notion of amor fati, the love 
of fate, Nietzsche propagates the idea of “accepting one’s life without moral or 
metaphysical judgment, to the point that one accepts one’s life and all of reality even if 
it were to recur eternally.”57  The worrying aspect of this idea is that in complete 
surrender to the blind forces of the will to power – even if one innately hosts those 
forces within one’s being –, there is no room for the ethical.  
It seems that there is a pattern in Nietzsche’s thought which begins with the assertion 
of aesthetics as life’s justification and reveals itself all throughout his naturalistic claims 
which advocate moral neutrality; yet consolidates itself most explicitly with the themes 
of amor fati / the love of fate and the eternal recurrence of the same.  Presumably, the 
notion that underlies all these ideas is a concern for justifying suffering and consolation 
for existence.  From a Levinasian perspective, an aesthetically justifiable life is ethically 
question-begging because such a proposition inevitably conveys an attitude towards 
life which is irresponsible, escapist and amoral.  If morality is a hindrance to 
understanding life, then Nietzsche’s attempt to justify existence suggests cultivating an 
essentially positive attitude towards life that is morally neutral.58  I would like to begin 
discussing the notion of amor fati by quoting a memorable passage from The Gay 
Science:               
For the New Year.—I still live, I still think; I must still live, for I must still think.  Sum, ergo 
cogito, ergo sum.  To-day everyone takes the liberty of expressing his wish and his 
favourite thought: well, I also mean to tell what I have wished for myself to-day, and 
what thought first crossed my mind this year, -- a thought which ought to be the basis, 
the pledge and the sweetening of all my future life!  I want more and more to perceive 
the necessary characters in things as the beautiful: -- I shall thus be one of those who 
beautify things.  Amor fati: let that henceforth be my love!  I do not want to wage war 
with the ugly.  I do not want to accuse, I do not want even to accuse the accusers.  
Looking aside, let that be my sole negation!  And all in all, to sum up: I wish to be at any 
time hereafter only a yea-sayer!
59
  
One of Nietzsche’s most beautiful passages conveys several crucial aspects of his 
philosophy.  Before critiquing this idea from a Levinasian view-point, firstly I will attempt 
to explain it.  In an implicitly ridiculing manner, Nietzsche starts by dissociating himself 
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from Descartes by emphasizing the primordiality of life and the lived experience to 
conceptual thought.  He stresses the word “to-day” by using it twice to draw attention to 
the present fleeting moment.  In addition, Nietzsche curiously emphasizes his wish to 
see the necessary things as beautiful – as if one can love at will.  He desires a shift in 
perception and aspires to this change to transform his life – and future. Plus, his 
determination not to face ugliness but to turn from it as his sole response hints at his 
special notion of fatalism, the Russian fatalism.  These are several ideas pertaining to 
Nietzsche’s enigmatic theme of amor fati, so it is crucial to unpack those ideas and 
reveal how they relate to an aesthetic consolation which is ethically dubious from a 
Levinasian perspective.  
What does Nietzsche mean or propagate by amor fati?  Why should we necessarily 
love fate?  If it happens whether we love it or not, then what difference does our love 
make?  Is this not an absurd idea or “futile love?”60  A thought-provoking interpretation 
comes from Beatrice Han-Pile who interprets amor fati by dealing with each term of the 
expression separately.  She begins her account by focusing on the first term “amor” 
and notices that the plain translation of “love” is not enough to understand its meaning.  
Trying to figure out what kind of “love” Nietzsche implies with his notion of amor fati, 
Han-Pile remarks that there are several types of love in ancient (Greek) literature – 
such as eros, agape, caritas, philia and so on –, however only two types of love can be 
relevant to what Nietzsche seems to have in mind: eros and agape.61  
Han-Pile distinguishes between eros and agape by suggesting that the former type of 
love (erotic love) is “motivated by the perceived value of the object; we love someone 
or something because we value them.”  Agape, on the other hand, can be associated 
with divine love, in which case “we value someone or something because we love 
them.”62  She suggests that is the latter kind of love that better characterizes the 
Nietzschean notion of amor fati.  Fate is not lovable in the erotic sense since I cannot 
love at will; I cannot choose my fate, the way I can choose my lover.  My fate includes 
suffering which is not possible to love; I cannot force myself to love my painful 
memories either.  My love of my fate can be limited to neither pleasant memories nor 
predictable happiness.   
As for the second term “fati,” in order to interpret fate, we must note that amor fati 
roughly translates as the love of fate.  Yet even while loving fate, Nietzsche is 
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determined “not to wage war against the ugly.”  Nietzsche does not associate amor fati 
with blind fatalism.  In order to make the distinction clear, he contrasts Russian 
Fatalism against Turkish Fatalism, which he regards as despicable since it dictates 
people to be weak, fearful, submissive and gloomy.  In this mode of fatalism, fate acts 
on man as a force overpowering and manipulating him.  As Craig Dove notes, rather 
than emphasizing the interconnectedness of everything and the celebratory affirmation 
of life, this version of fatalism depends on a metaphysical separation between fate and 
man.63  Nietzsche rejects Turkish Fatalism as it propagates pure passivity (passivity as 
inactivity) in a resentful and revengeful manner.64 
Compared with Turkish fatalism, Nietzsche is in favour of “Russian Fatalism” which is, 
according to him, “fatalism without revolt.”65  This fatalism is like a will to hibernate; 
similar to slowing down the metabolism, and unlike passive Turkish Fatalism, it is 
necessarily an active decision to remain inactive.  To illustrate his point, Nietzsche 
gives the example of the Russian soldier who, figuring that the military campaign is 
becoming too difficult, decides to lie in the snow.  He decides not to react.  What 
Nietzsche finds remarkable about this mode of fatalism is not only that this strategy 
may prove quite effective at times for survival, but basically that it does not 
accommodate ressentiment.  By not reacting, one reserves his energy for longer, and 
keeping control of his metabolism he does not get worn out. 
However, even while hibernating in the snow, one is still reacting to one’s 
circumstances – only minimalizing action on purpose.  Yet the notion of amor fati is not 
only about “tolerating necessity” but not wanting to change anything; neither in the past 
nor in the future, not for eternity – it is about “loving” necessity.66  In that respect, loving 
fate also implies trusting fate.  But that is not an entirely passive condition either; to the 
contrary, it requires an active appropriation of fate into one’s life;67 in other words, it 
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points to an intermediary state between the active and the passive.  Life affirmation is 
intricately linked with self-affirmation, and in Nietzsche’s thought it bears on our 
shoulders our “greatest responsibility,” which is to create values in a world after the 
death of God.  
At some level, we may be tempted to regard amor fati as a reconsideration of one’s 
whole life from a bird’s-eye view and try to calculate; measure and evaluate the 
positives and negatives on both scales to determine the overall picture.  In addition, 
Han-Pile interprets Nietzsche as thinking only about one’s individual fate rather than 
loving life in general.68  As stated above, she rejects the erotic construction of amor fati 
because love cannot come as the result of the effort of the will.  Rather, by associating 
amor fati with the hint of divine love, she associates it with agape and ascribes a 
fatalistic mode of surrender to amor fati.69  
In my view, however, Nietzsche’s notion of amor fati is ethically unacceptable for 
Levinas. Even the most sympathetic interpretation of amor fati as the active 
appropriation of fate into one’s life, as if it is possible to mould fate the way an artisan 
moulds clay, does not save Nietzsche from a Levinasian attack.  As a matter of fact, it 
is this effort to give a necessarily “artistic” account of life – the concern to “beautify 
things” and “loving necessity” – that is utterly questionable since Levinas is rather 
conscious and cautious about the anaesthetizing effect of the aesthetic.  
What makes amor fati vulnerable to a Levinasian criticism is primarily its ego-centric 
content.  In agreement with Han-Pile, I also think that with this idea Nietzsche only 
considers one’s own life rather than life in general.70  However, this separation of the 
ego’s care for itself is unethical for Levinas.  According to him, since I am always 
already obsessed with the Other, an ontological clean-cut separation between my fate 
and the fate of the Other(s) is implausible.  The essential separation between the self-
same and the Other not only secures the alterity of the Other but also makes it possible 
for the former to relate to the Other by justice, by the Saying.  Rather than separating 
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my fate from the Other’s, the essential separation in between binds and unites us in 
terms of the expiation of humanity.71 
That is why, my life without the Other is not only meaningless but also impossible even 
as a thought experiment.  Of course, Nietzsche’s ideas pertaining to self-affirmation 
and the individualistic essence of amor fati (loving one’s own fate) do not lead to 
solipsism or any sort of solitary existence.  However, the very idea of loving one’s own 
fate evokes the possibility of dissociating one’s fate from the fates of others.  But how 
does one draw the line to separate the responsibilities towards “one’s own fate” and 
towards others?   
As elaborated above, Levinas is so sensitive on this issue that he makes it very clear 
that I am not only responsible for the Other, but also for the others; I am even 
responsible for their responsibilities, which include their responsibilities towards me as 
well.  I am therefore infinitely responsible for everyone and everything, and that is the 
essence of my subjectivity. Amor fati is rather question-begging for Levinas also 
because it alludes to the Nietzschean notion of responsibility (creating values) which is 
quite distinct – almost oppositional – from Levinas’s conception of responsibility. From 
a Levinasian perspective, another dubious aspect of amor fati is its ambiguous 
fatalism.  Nietzsche’s differentiation between Turkish and Russian fatalism would not 
ease the Levinasian worry about justice and responsibility for the Other.  In his view, 
fatalism cannot be justified with any version, be it Turkish or Russian, because it could 
easily turn into a strategy to turn a blind eye to the Other(s).   
Amor fati embraces the Nietzschean idea of the dice-throw which signifies a 
fundamental difference between Nietzsche and Levinas on the issue of existence.  For 
the former, existence is innocent as it evokes an essentially “Dionysian affirmation of 
the world,”72 which is already visible in the quote laying out Nietzsche’s ambition to see 
the necessary characters in life as beautiful; his aim to beautify things and his aversion 
to waging war against the ugly.  Deleuze remarks that in Nietzsche’s notion of the dice 
throw, it is the bad player who counts on the throws of the dice; who employs causality 
and probability to see the desired result.  Yet those are the ones who do not know how 
to play dice as they do not know how to affirm chance.73  As for Nietzsche, the world is 
the eternal dance floor upon which dice are thrown; as all things “dance on the feet of 
chance:”   
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A little wisdom is no doubt possible; but I have found this happy certainty in all things: 
that they prefer – to dance on the feet of chance. / O sky above me, you pure, lofty sky!  
This is now your purity to me, that there is no eternal reason-spider and spider’s web in 
you -- / that you are to me a dance floor for divine chances, that you are to me a god’s 
table for divine dice and dicers!
74
  
From a Levinasian perspective, such a concern for interpreting everything aesthetically, 
which could inevitably include the suffering of the Other as well, would sound almost 
ludicrous.  The Nietzschean notion of the dice-throw would be a rather uncomfortable 
idea for Levinas as it would remind him of the chaotic il y a, which portrays Levinas’s 
account of Being.  Levinas characterizes the il y a as impersonal,75 sonorous, 
imprisoning, entrapping and pagan; analogous to a nightmare.  Bettina Bergo remarks 
that the entrapment is two-fold: within the self and within Being that is outside of us;76 in 
a way, Being is entrapped within itself.   
Rather than evoking “divine chances” or infinite possibilities, the il y a alludes to the 
impossibility of possibilities; suffocation, nausea and the loss of separation between the 
interior and the exterior.  Perhaps the most terrifying aspect of it is the lack of anything 
human to orient oneself towards; as an inhuman condition, it evokes no trace for 
transcendence.  For Nietzsche, Being can be interpreted in a Heraclitian manner as a 
child at play77 whereas for Levinas, the il y a marks the end of childhood as it signifies 
the seriousness of Being.78 
Pertaining to Levinas’s understanding of suffering, the il y a makes it impossible to 
enjoy existence, which is the main reason why the Nietzschean notion of amor fati is 
unethical and implausible from a Levinasian point of view.  The Nietzschean notion of 
everything being connected within a sheltered and harmonious mode of cosmology 
interprets existence as innocent.  Yet if everything is interconnected, then there can be 
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no singularity singled out; no responsibility to fulfil; no orientation towards the Good as 
there is no guidance by the Other; which altogether makes it impossible for the 
Levinasian subject to emerge.  What is unacceptable in Nietzsche’s account for 
Levinas is that the former aims to overcome ressentiment and guilt with his notion of 
the innocence of existence.  The il y a is terrifying because surrounded by the 
unknown, alienating and rumbling chaos, it defies sociality.  The only “exit” from this 
prison would be being-for-the-Other, rather than seeking escape in arts and investing in 
aesthetic sensibilities.   
Levinas’s criticism would target the internal sufficiency of amor fati which is quite 
analogous to an artwork.  From a Levinasian view, it is not at all surprising to see the 
connection between Nietzsche’s naturalism and aesthetics as both rely on a 
fundamentally totalizing instinct.  Levinas is deeply critical of this totalizing effect of 
aesthetics which he examines in his essay “Reality and Its Shadow,” where he 
expresses his concerns about the ethical validity of artworks. He notes that since an 
artwork is a totality in itself, it resists the conversation with the Other in which there 
could be any space for the possibility of ethics.  Yet since even the artists or writers 
cannot assist their work, left alone without a face, a work cannot offer us any trace for 
transcendence.  Levinas contends that art-making and revelation are oppositional: “... 
art does not belong to the order of revelation.  Nor does it belong to that of creation, 
which moves in just the opposite direction.”79  Contrary to conventional thought, 
Levinas dissociates arts from creation, and by firmly refusing the latter’s link to artistic 
endeavour, he instead hints at an implicit rapport between revelation and creation.80  
There is a notable continuity between Levinas’s depictions of the il y a and the arts, 
which can be detected by the similar vocabulary he employs in expressing his dismay 
and bitterness such as “entrapment,”81 “nightmare,”82 “impersonality,”83 “anonymity,” 
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“inhumanity,” “monstrosity”84 and “paganism.”  While speculating on artworks, Levinas 
is terrified by the closedness of an artwork whose suspension of time leaves no open 
door for interruption; neither by way of dialogue nor by any promise of a positive 
change in the future.  Reminiscent of pagan gods, the artwork is frozen in its 
representation.  
Levinas observes a dreamlike quality pertaining to artworks whose intoxication does 
not lead to enjoyment but rather to a dodgy experience of Being by resonating with the 
impersonality and impossibility of relations.  For instance, the sound of musicality 
haunts the listener with “relationshiplessness,”85 and its sonority evokes a loss of 
selfhood.  Levinas refers to rhythm almost as a sort of violation in which the subject is 
affected without consent; without the possibility of escape, the self loses itself to 
anonymity.86  With reference to music, even though both Nietzsche and Levinas invoke 
the similar associations of intoxication and the loss of boundaries of individuality, they 
end up with entirely different interpretations.  In contrast to Nietzsche’s case where this 
experience is described as a Dionysian ecstasy, orgy and the absolute moment of life 
affirmation,87 Levinas emphasizes an agonizing sense of self-annihilation.  
In relation to representational arts, Levinas seems to take offence at the fact that a 
mere representation is taken as a depiction of life; he stresses that “every image is 
already a caricature.”88  Reducing life to an image which is always already a caricature, 
Levinas suggests that artworks not only misrepresent life but also, through 
representation, they ridicule to entertain.  Evoking irresponsibility and hedonism, the 
artwork is hostile to interruption: “the work is completed in spite of the social or material 
causes that interrupt it.”89  Because the frozen immobile image cannot go towards the 
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better;90 that is, be open to dialogue, the artwork blocks theoretical reflection and 
thereby enables the spectator to avoid one’s responsibilities by getting immersed in the 
beautiful.  Endowing himself with “pretentious and facile nobility,”91 the artist or the art 
consumer suspends criticism by the easy escape offered by the artwork: 
To make or to appreciate a novel and a picture is to no longer have to conceive, is to 
renounce the effort of science, philosophy, and action.  Do not speak, do not reflect, 
admire in silence and in peace – such are the counsels of wisdom satisfied before the 
beautiful.  Magic, recognized everywhere as the devil’s part, enjoys an 
incomprehensible tolerance in poetry... There is something wicked and egoist and 
cowardly in artistic enjoyment.  There are times when one can be ashamed of it, as of 
feasting during a plague.
92
 
What Levinas rejects about art is blind admiration without critical interpretation.  He 
highlights the significance of criticism through which philosophy can undo the frozen 
effect of solid art – be it a statue, painting or a novel – and open new possibilities for 
dialogue.  By breaking the self-sufficiency of the artwork, art criticism can help 
overcome the “artistic idolatry” and thus make a breach for revelation.  That is why 
Levinas regards modern literature as exceptional in terms of being aware of the 
potential idolatry artworks can evoke.  The self-reflexive nature of a Dostoevsky novel 
can be promising for undoing the mythical totality of the work and leave an open door 
for interruption by the art critic.  Levinas’s interest in the notion of the self-reflexivity of 
artworks can be regarded as the continuation of his pattern of thought according to 
which ethics is the subject’s spontaneity called in question.  In a similar way, an 
artwork’s justification can be called in question by criticism; just as the narcissism of the 
same is challenged by the Other, the totality of the artwork can be ruptured by the 
criticism that emerges from the outside.   
Nietzsche’s assertion that life can only be justified aesthetically could be challenged by 
Levinas as the latter could ask what justifies aesthetics in the first place.  Levinas’s 
proposition is that aesthetics can only be justified through criticism; which owes its 
validity to the interruption by the Other (the Other can be the art critic or anyone taking 
the role of the art critic; the reader, the observer etc. – we should bear in mind that the 
art critic is not supposed to take over the privileged position of the “genius-artist” 
either).  Yet the idea of interruption is completely missing from Nietzsche’s account 
which, through the theme of amor fati, suggests the opposite.  Loving fate in such a 
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Nietzschean sense can be as passive, irresponsible and detached as enjoying an 
artwork; as if one lives one’s life as a narrative.93   
From Levinas’s viewpoint, in addition to its irresponsibility and inherent amorality, the 
notion of amor fati implies some other philosophically implausible points as well.  In 
spite of Nietzsche’s enchanted language which adorns the idea of amor fati with an air 
of Dionysian revelation and the creative processes of appropriation, some paradoxes 
reveal themselves.  An obvious paradox is the temporal aspect of it: how can one live 
one’s life and reflect on it or love it simultaneously?  Is it not necessary to take a step 
back from one’s life to decide whether she loves it or not?  The ambiguity of amor fati is 
that it prompts us to live – love our fate –, and to think – measure and calculate –, at 
the same time.  Rational evaluations which require contemplative detachment are 
supposed to be made while being enveloped within the richness of immediate life 
experience.   
As a response to this paradox, Han-Pile suggests that Nietzsche conceptualizes amor 
fati to be necessarily “lived” or “experienced” rather than theoretically “understood.”  
She argues that it is not possible to reduce amor fati to pure conceptuality.  Moreover, 
the temporal ramification of this idea is that as a mediopassive – only partially active 
and partially inactive - modality of existence, determining the capacity of our will, amor 
fati helps us live fully in the present moment by enabling us to realize and appreciate 
the “smallest, most fleeting moments that life gives us.”94  In addition, the surrendering 
mode of amor fati endows us with an affirmative attitude towards the future.  
Although Han-Pile’s defence seems tenable and accurate, it would not be satisfactory 
for Levinas.  In my opinion, Levinas would critique amor fati the way he critiques the 
ambiguity of artworks.  Even if it looks similar to Levinas’s elaborate account of 
enjoyment and the elemental at first sight, focusing on the present moment still pertains 
to the economy; to the realm of need where ethical responsibility for the Other is 
suspended.  Yet it must be noted that Levinas’s love of life is utterly different from 
Nietzsche’s love of fate (or amor fati) as the former signifies the prerequisite condition 
for receiving revelation because only an enjoying subject can suffer.   
Nietzsche’s love of fate, on the other hand, suggests appropriating suffering into 
enjoyment because only a suffering subject can enjoy life.  In order to say yes to a 
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single joy, do we not need to undergo all the suffering that goes along with it?95  In 
addition to being a prerequisite for intensifying enjoyment – or happiness or pleasure, 
in Nietzsche’s terms –, pain and pleasure act like interdependent factors that add to the 
spice of life, just like the ornaments of the big picture; without contributing any ethical 
significance to it.  The emphasis on the “smallest, most fleeting moments that life gives 
us” is analogous to the attempt artworks make – such as capturing the smile of Mona 
Lisa – to freeze the fleeting moment.  Consequently, since the subject of amor fati only 
affirms what she has just experienced, her experience of fate could be comparable to 
nature morte.   
For Levinas, such a conception of temporality cannot lead to ethics because what 
ignites ethics is a non-representable primordiality. Similar to the alienating effect of a 
still life painting, amor fati makes the subject estranged to the actual life which is 
synchronized with the Other(s).  For this reason, the Nietzschean notion of amor fati 
will only give us an incomplete, shallow and inaccurate “picture” of reality.  What is 
worse, Nietzsche proposes amor fati as his resolution for the New Year; as a way of 
living his future life.  By “looking aside” as “his sole way of negation,” he implies to 
secure himself from the unpredictable, unforeseeable possibilities – or the Other? – in 
the future.  It almost seems like he buys himself the ring of Gyges as the New Year’s 
present.  The Dionysian affirmation Nietzsche invests in sounds pagan rather than 
ethically significant.  Is it really possible to stay ego-centrically carefree within the 
present moment?  Is it ethical to affirm life only by loving one’s own fate at the 
complete disregard of the fate of others?  Does not “loving” fate tempt us to remain 
inactive and not attempt to change anything for the better, for others?    
From a Levinasian angle, in spite of its high spirited tone, the Nietzschean notion of 
amor fati lacks revelatory essence because it is not inspired by the Other.  However, 
would it be accurate to suggest that, according to Nietzsche, one’s fate is never 
affected by others?  This is an important question leading to various responses; yet for 
the sake of brevity we could discern that in Nietzsche’s account, one’s fate can be 
affected by one’s family, heritage, nationality, and so many other factors.  Yet others do 
not affect or traumatize the Nietzschean subject at a fundamental level; other people 
can either be obstacles that need to be removed if they hinder development or positive 
challenges to spur the individual’s growth – like soil, water or the shade which affect 
the flourishing of a plant.   
                                                             
95
 Nietzsche, TSZ, IV, “The Intoxicated Song,” 10. 
129 
 
Nietzsche philosophizes in the thin air of the mountainous heights where solitude can 
be much more rewarding than company.  Speculating on the one who “has turned out 
well,” Nietzsche comments that one “is always in his own company, whether he deals 
with books, men, or landscapes.”96  Rather than being exposed to the Other like an 
open wound, in a relatively self-controlled manner, the Nietzschean individual 
calculates the pros and cons of what the relationship may contribute to him and 
evaluates and discriminates people based on their affects on his economy.  In this 
regard, it seems that from a Levinasian perspective, Nietzsche considers other people 
as fulfilling some “needs” rather than evoking “Desire” for transcendence.  The most 
expressive notion summarizing Nietzsche’s position on the influence of other people on 
oneself is his conception of friendship; in particular the “stellar friendships.”  One can 
befriend someone, benefit from one another, but when the time comes, it is only natural 
that paths separate, as each individual has his own project to pursue.  Time changes, 
individuals change; their needs and desires shift; the former friends may turn out to be 
strangers or even enemies; yet that is “the law to which we are subject.”97      
Jean-Michel Longneaux notes the utter difference between Levinas’s notion of being-
for-the-Other and Nietzsche’s seemingly more intimate account of being for another 
person, namely a friend.  He comments that the question of the other person is one of 
the very core issues on which these two philosophers can never share a common 
ground.  Observing their “impossible relation,” Longneaux remarks on the inadequacy 
of Nietzsche’s notion of stellar friendship: “stars are incapable of friendship – or any 
other relation – because their frozen light is blind.  They shine, but they cannot 
illuminate one another: only the night reveals them, to themselves.”98 
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c) Suffering, Theodicy and Nietzsche’s Aesthetic Consolation 
The Heaviest Burden.—What if a demon crept after thee into thy loneliest loneliness 
some day or night, and said to thee: “This life, as thou livest it at present, and has lived 
it, thou must live it once more, and also innumerable times; and there will be nothing 
new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh, and all the 
unspeakably small and great in thy life must come to thee again, and all in the same 
series and sequence – and similarly this spider and this moonlight among the trees, and 
similarly this moment, and I myself.  The eternal sand-glass of existence will ever be 
turned once more, and thou with it, thou speck of dust!” – Wouldst thou not throw 
yourself down and gnash your teeth, and curse the demon that so spake?  Or hast thou 
once experienced a tremendous moment in which thou wouldst answer him: “Thou art a 
God, and never did I hear anything so divine!”  If that thought acquired power over thee 
as thou art, it would transform thee, and perhaps crush thee; the question with regard to 
all and everything: “Dost thou want this once more, and also for innumerable times?” 
would lie as the heaviest burden upon thy activity!  Or, how wouldst thou have to 
become favourably inclined to yourself and to life, so as to long for nothing more 
ardently than for this last eternal sanctioning and sealing? — 
99
 
Following on from the previous section, Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal recurrence of 
the same is the twin concept of amor fati in terms of promoting an aesthically justified 
way of existence.  It can be suggested that from a Levinasian view, what makes amor 
fati such a notorious idea is its infamous allusions to the moral aspect of justifying 
suffering; especially the suffering of the Other(s) and thereby resonating with theodicy.  
The quote above presents the thought experiment of the eternal return as an 
experience to challenge and overwhelm the individual, signifying a change which 
reveals itself explicitly upon how she conducts her life.   
It is John Llewelyn who also sees the interdependency between amor fati and the 
eternal recurrence of the same and argues that in an attempt to redeem suffering, in 
his early career Nietzsche turns to arts (particularly non-plastic forms such as music, 
dance and ancient Greek tragedy) and seeks there a vital Dionysian spirit which is 
supposed to discharge a redemptive power beyond suffering through artistic creation 
and thereby justify life aesthetically.  However, Nietzsche’s enchantment does not last 
long partially because of his disappointment in the reception of Wagner in Bayreuth; 
presumably the audience’s interest in food, drinks, clothes, being seen; in short, art 
being turned into “show business” makes him question his belief in the role of art in 
revolutionizing the “health” of the society.  
Nietzsche comes to realize that in overestimating the value of art, he falls into the trap 
of ascribing other-worldly meanings to art, which is evident in his criticism of his own 
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work, Birth of Tragedy in 1886 as he renounces it to be embarrassingly romantic.100  
Llewelyn suggests that losing faith in the power of art in redeeming suffering, Nietzsche 
eventually turns to the doctrine of the eternal return and the theme of amor fati and 
seeks there what he cannot find in art.101  Llewelyn particularly emphasizes that with 
his teaching of the eternal return of the same, Nietzsche’s main purpose is to relate it to 
Becoming; that is, the essential aspect of the eternal recurrence is not necessarily the 
“same” to which one returns but the actual “return” itself which stresses the constant 
movement and flux rather than making the “same” the absolute fixed goal.102  
Llewelyn’s point is crucial for indicating the primordiality of Becoming over Being, which 
is the very modality of existence for Nietzsche.  This idea is already expressed quite 
vividly in the passage above as Nietzsche refers to life as the “eternal sand glass of 
existence” being turned again and again; and the individual is called a “speck of dust.”  
However, Llewelyn enables us to see another important point: stressing the close 
relation between amor fati and the eternal recurrence of the same prompts us to see 
the organic bond between them: the Nietzschean subject “loves” the eternal return and 
therefore affirms his life.  Yet this affirmative love of fate makes him also love his 
mistakes, his joys, his sorrows, his religion, his neighbour and consequently redeem 
his past.103  To repeat, after all, does not Nietzsche sing in TSZ that in order to say yes 
to one single joy, one also has to say yes to every accompanying sorrow?      
Llewelyn’s criticism gains significance when we note that repeating everything infinitely, 
the eternal recurrence of the same always already contains the Overman and his 
supposed values as well.  On the one hand, as broad themes, amor fati and the eternal 
recurrence seem promising in their proposition to overcome revenge and pity; but on 
the other hand, within their enclosure they also accommodate the love of man, of the 
herd; God; Christianity; pity, morality and everything that has been, is and ever will be.  
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Since everything is intricately interconnected, affirmation of life as a philosophical 
theme appears rather unspecific, to the extent of losing its meaning. 
If one loves everything, one excludes nothing; and the flaw in this encapsulating 
attitude is that if one affirms everything, one ends up not leaving an open door for new 
possibilities.  As a matter of fact, it is this sense of claustrophobic repetition that points 
to the challenge of Nietzsche’s thought experiment.  In his regard, the weak person 
would react in bitter protest and resentment whereas the strong-natured individual 
would have an epiphany.  As I see it, the eternal recurrence makes sense most in 
terms of overcoming the spirit of revenge which eats up one’s soul by constantly 
whispering to the subject that “things could have been otherwise.”  The brightest 
moment of the eternal recurrence is to get over the futile wish to change the past for 
the better; more suitable or advantageous to one’s current condition.  But perhaps, this 
is as good as it gets.  It would indeed be a great relief to defeat the endless annoying 
feeling to obsess oneself with the past and stop investing so much creative energy and 
time in wishful thinking in spite of accepting the rational impossibility of changing the 
past.  Moreover, getting over the fixation with the past also marks a possibility for 
overpowering the feeling to take revenge on one’s past104 and thereby overcoming self-
pity and ressentiment.   
Ressentiment underlies our most so-called sacred convictions and taints all the 
otherwise decent and promising values, such as justice.  For this reason, once we beat 
ressentiment, we can be one step closer to the Overman who signifies an evolved type 
of persons, which in Nietzsche’s thought, gives meaning to the Earth.  Overcoming 
ressentiment can also point at a different way to regard the future; rather than 
obsessing about her mistakes and organizing her future in a way to compensate for the 
losses in the past, one can devote her full attention to the present moment to create 
her values and cultivate her character. 
Llewelyn suggests that when we consider the core issues of their philosophies, 
Nietzsche and Levinas differ drastically; yet it seems that in his service to the Other, 
Levinas turns out to be more bound-to-earth than Nietzsche.  Llewelyn remarks that 
despite its otherworldly associations at first look, Levinas’s notion of the Good beyond 
Being is not a telos.105  Rather than Levinas, Llewelyn argues that it is Nietzsche who 
presupposes to have some kind of telos; even if somewhat indirectly.  Even though 
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Nietzsche does not have an explicit “hoped-for goal” to arrive at; the very circling; the 
“return itself” is the essential operation of the will to power.106  As mentioned above, the 
Nietzschean notion of “loving necessity” most importantly corresponds to this 
affirmation of the cycling of the return.  The danger of the deterministic operation of the 
will to power which manifests itself through the eternal return of the same and amor fati 
reveals itself as we try to figure out the role of the subject for ethics.  If the subject 
eternally loves her fate, then her subjectivity gets dispersed through the affirmation of 
life which is already too great a task.  The problem is that in his Dionysian celebratory 
mood of life affirmation and Becoming, Nietzsche leaves no proper space for the 
subject to emerge.   
This idea is also brought up by Longneaux who notes that Nietzsche mainly refers to 
the subject as an “error” or as a “necessary fiction.”107  The way Nietzsche portrays the 
role of the subject within the themes of amor fati and the eternal recurrence (“a speck 
of dust”) can be regarded as analogous to the characters imprisoned within a novel.  
Just like novel characters, it is pointless for them to feel ressentiment or the wish to 
change the past or affect the course of the novel.  What remains the most reasonable 
thing to do on their behalf is to affirm their existence infinitely and repeat themselves as 
self-sufficient novel characters.  They have no possibility for moral or intellectual 
improvement because they are already locked up, immobile.   
Levinas emphasizes the locked-up condition of literary artworks by likening characters 
in a novel to prisoners108 where nothing new can be added or subtracted; where the 
totality of the work cannot be challenged or interrupted; where there is no possibility for 
improvement towards the better109 as everyone’s role – or “rank” - is already firmly 
inscribed.  I consider this analogy quite appropriate as a possible interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal recurrence because otherwise, why should one 
necessarily consider to be “favourably inclined to oneself and life, so as to long for 
nothing more ardently than for this last eternal sanctioning and sealing?”  What can be 
so divine about one’s fate being sealed?   
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Perhaps the celebration of entrapment could signify a fundamental human need for 
having boundaries.  One feels secure within established boundaries, within which the 
entrapment functions as a safety net where nothing from the exterior can harm the 
individual or pose a threat to her being.  In addition, if everything is to be repeated 
infinitely, then this condition is at the same time a guarantee that nothing worse can 
ever happen than what has already happened; so it can provide a sense of consolation 
for the tiny “speck of dust.”  Yet this comfort zone is reminiscent of the cluster of needs 
that Levinas would critique as a version of interiority or economy; referring to home 
laws, economy is that which is familiar and has boundaries carefully drawn and 
protected by the individual subject. 
Regarding Nietzsche’s fascination over being sealed, it is possible to read this passage 
in relation to his keen interest in Stoicism and Stoic ethics which appreciate self-
sufficiency, self-mastery and tolerance of hardship without giving in to the comforts of 
pity or compassion.  Martha Nussbaum elaborates on Nietzsche’s close affinities with 
Stoic thought and reveals how the latter has definite influences on his philosophy – in 
particular on the issue of pity.  In her account, even though she clearly dissociates 
Nietzsche from a “boot-in-the-face fascist,”110 Nussbaum nevertheless remarks on a 
considerable controversy and internal inconsistency surrounding his interpretation of 
“Stoicism.”111  
In a brief overview of the theme of Stoicism,112 Nussbaum comments that “according to 
Socrates, one’s own virtue is entirely sufficient for a flourishing human life, or 
eudaimonia.”113  Eudaimonia is mainly associated with the notions of sufficiency and 
completeness; such that in Socratic thought “a virtuous person is truly complete in him 
or herself, whatever the world around him is doing.”114  Nussbaum gives the example of 
a Stoic person not lamenting the death of his friend or a member of his family; he would 
reject pity as it would signify an indication of incompleteness, and thereby offend him.  
Any misfortune related to external things such as family, friends,115 money or reputation 
are not supposed to pose a threat to his wholeness or belittle his integrity.116  In 
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Nussbaum’s account, following Socrates’s notion of the importance of self-sufficiency 
for the equivalence of virtues, Greek and Roman Stoics go even further and denounce 
not only pity but also all the other basic emotions such as fear, love, anger, envy, 
gratitude and so on because they are dependent on fortune, which is an external factor 
uncontrollable by one’s virtue.  That is why it is wrong to ascribe great significance to 
those emotions: 
To love is to give hostages to fortune.  And there will be no occasions for either anger or 
gratitude for a person who does not entrust her eudaimonia to the care of others.  If I 
value only my virtue, which nobody else can either damage or produce, I will see the 
events that are the usual occasions for anger as beneath me, unworthy of a passionate 
response.
117
    
As Nussbaum clarifies, in Stoic tradition since love is perceived as a liability, the Stoic 
maintains his personal integrity at the cost of turning indifferent to the love, affection or 
the needs of others.  Allowing himself to be irresponsible towards everyone else, his 
virtue becomes his shield to ward anyone who needs his attention off.  For this reason, 
Nussbaum emphasizes that the happiness of the Stoic lies in his fear; the Stoic is 
someone who needs security, and the reason he values nothing material or familial is 
because he does not want to fear losing them.   
Nussbaum questions the tangibility of the pretentious “hardness” in Stoic thought by 
unravelling the vulnerability hidden under the reclusive image.  She emphasizes that, 
as a matter of fact, it takes far more courage to be vulnerable to others – any damages 
or heart breaks that may come from others – and be aware of one’s own feebleness 
than shut oneself off from others for the sake of security.  She conveys that the Stoic 
“looks like a fearful person, a person who is determined to seal himself off from risk, 
even at the cost of loss of love and value.”118  
On further reflection, it becomes notable that the ideals of Stoicism appear ironically 
similar to Buddhism, which Nietzsche strongly criticizes for being other-worldly.  The 
only superficial difference between the Buddhist and the Stoic would be that the former 
aims to reach Nirvana whereas the latter aims to cultivate his eudaimonia.  Both 
appear to envision a solitary way of existence where one is fully occupied only with 
oneself, to the extent of disregarding everything and everyone else.  All these efforts of 
the Stoic thus stem from a desire to be invulnerable to others and to the whims of 
fortune.  
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There is an implicit connection between Stoicism and asceticism; the Stoicism 
Nietzsche attests has common roots with Christianity and otherworldliness in the sense 
that both advocate a sense of hardness as a form of “self-protection” and “both express 
a fear for this world and its contingencies, both are incompatible with the deepest sort 
of love, whether personal and political.”119  What is paradoxical is that underneath 
Nietzsche’s emphasis on life affirmation and eternal recurrence seems to lay a hidden 
wish, an implicit fear and desire to be immune from the caprices of fate and others.  
Even while expressing his admiration to the evil demon, Nietzsche’s speck of dust is 
genuinely fearful and insecure about his well-being and place in this world.  His 
exaggerated enthusiasm seems to disguise a fundamental angst.   
Nussbaum challenges Nietzsche’s argument against pity by noting that there is still 
some valuable truth regarding pity being the source of moral sentiments.  Nietzsche 
rejects the fundamental moral feelings associated with pity too simplistically by 
asserting an unnatural and rigid divide between pro-pity traditions versus anti-pity 
traditions.  He does make some important points, such that a certain attitude in pitying 
can have a violating effect upon the pitied, and that rather than relying on others, one 
should always primarily seek one’s own inner resources.120  However, Nussbaum 
remarks that Nietzsche’s assertions regarding pity increasing suffering in the world and 
pity being essentially egocentric are overstatements.121  It is always possible that one 
can orient pity and compassion towards others such as people undergoing severe 
socio-economic deprivation without violating their personal integrity or increasing the 
amount of suffering in the world.   
Nussbaum suggests that underlying Nietzsche’s facile rejection of pity may be that he 
does not understand what pity really entails.  This dubious attitude is also visible in his 
hasty dismissal of democracy and socialism too easily based on a rather superficial 
understanding of those political ideas – in whose core lies the provision and protection 
of the very fundamental human needs for equal opportunities such as in food, shelter, 
health, education etc.122  Nussbaum thinks that Nietzsche’s Stoicism, which shapes his 
views on pity, is basically a “bourgeois vulnerability” rather than a genuine “basic 
vulnerability;” and his solitude is a romantic bourgeois solitude which spurs his 
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creativity rather than a real plight of a hungry person who can barely function.123  
Getting carried away with his romantic lyricism, the reader never gets to know which 
basic welfare system is supporting Zarathustra in the mountains.124  
In agreement with Nussbaum, a Levinasian critique would not leave Nietzsche’s overly 
simplified notions of pity and compassion for the Other(s) unchallenged.  In Levinas’s 
philosophy, pity and compassion are crucial concepts which affect not only the trivial 
everyday interactions, but also significantly contribute to issues such as justice and the 
elevation of humanity.  In Levinas, the basic moral sentiment is being for the Other; 
feeling for the Other; experiencing the impossibility of being disinterested towards the 
Other, as expressed in his words: “It is through the condition of being a hostage that 
there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon, and proximity – even the little there 
is, even the simple ‘After you sir.’”125  In contrast to Nietzsche’s romanticism, Levinas 
appears much more realistic and indeed bound to earth – as suggested by Llewelyn 
above.   
The discussion on pity brings to mind the theme of suffering which has substantial 
implications for both philosophers, and their attitudes towards suffering, either for 
oneself or for Other(s), reveal their unique differences from one another.  For most of 
the time, Nietzsche regards suffering in terms of suffering for oneself; such as failing 
health or loneliness, which mainly indicate one’s own problems with life in general at 
individual basis.  For Levinas, on the other hand, suffering is associated with 
victimization and evil; analogous to the victimization of the anti-Semitic hatred during 
the Holocaust era.  Richard White notes that Levinas regards suffering not as 
something happening to me but as something done to me,126 targeting me personally.   
According to White’s interpretation, in Levinas’s account suffering signifies the 
impossibility of escape; the subject feels the insurmountable superfluous disclosure of 
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Being or the il y a.  Consequently, suffering not only marks the end of her mastery and 
virility over her being but also evokes an intimation of death.127 
Completely different from Nietzsche’s depiction of suffering which implies a sense of 
self-control (as characterized by the proud Stoic), for Levinas, suffering points to an 
intense disturbance; even a violation of order.128  Levinas’s suffering subject is deeply 
paralysed by the evocation of evil, and her humanity is “overwhelmed;”129 suffering 
shatters her personal integrity as it is a “pure undergoing.”130  Overwhelming the 
subject with its excessiveness, it makes it impossible for her to appropriate; to integrate 
or synthesize the surrounding world to her. As the very “denial and refusal of 
meaning,”131 suffering cannot be made intelligible or justifiable.  Experiencing her loss 
of agency, the victim feels a radical passivity which is not necessarily a denial of her 
freedom or the frustration of her desire, but necessarily, the negation of her subjectivity 
in pure absurdity.   
However, Levinas suggests that where there is evil, there is also the possibility of a 
response,132 a hint for the promise of goodness which can only be canalized through 
the inter-human relationship.  The only way out of suffering is sociality, which signifies 
the ethical dimension of suffering.  Rather than seeking any way to justify suffering by 
associating it with any pattern of theodicy, Levinas suggests that the sociality evoked 
by suffering can at some level mitigate the evil suffering embeds.  Yet it is crucial to 
note that this proposition does not even remotely suggest any sense of compensation; 
as mentioned above, there is no possibility of balancing “good” with “evil” in 
harmonious symmetry – since both are transcendental, hence incomprehensible.   
Nevertheless, even though the Goodness pertaining to sociality cannot counter-pose 
the evil of suffering, by alluding to the Good beyond Being, the Goodness inherent in 
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hearing the sufferer’s cry and responding to it can ease the sufferer’s isolation and 
desperation, at the very least.  Even if responding to the suffering of the Other 
intensifies my own suffering, which is unjustifiably useless and meaningless for me, I 
still respond to the Other’s suffering; hoping that my suffering can alleviate hers:      
... the suffering of suffering, the suffering for the useless suffering of the other person, 
the just suffering in me for the unjustifiable suffering of the Other, opens upon suffering 
the ethical perspective of the inter-human.  In this perspective a radical difference 
develops between suffering in the Other, which for me is unpardonable and solicits me 
and calls me, and suffering in me, my own adventure of suffering, whose constitutional 
or congenital uselessness can take on a meaning, the only meaning to which suffering 
is susceptible, in becoming a suffering for the suffering – be it inexorable – of someone 
else.
133
  
Without hinting at any remedy or justification, Levinas ascribes some meaning to it only 
when one suffers for the suffering for the human other(s) – even if my suffering is still 
useless in the Other; and insufficient for founding a political or ethical order134.  He 
notes that it is useless to try to alleviate my suffering or seek justifications to make it 
tolerable as pain will always be incomprehensible and unassumable.  Nonetheless, 
Levinas seems to make a distinction between the actual suffering and the beyond of 
suffering – or what suffering gives to signification.  He explicitly states that for “pure 
suffering, which is intrinsically meaningless, (useless) and condemned to itself without 
exit, a beyond takes shape in the inter-human.”135   
Of course this “beyond” does not apply to me to get out of my painful condition, but 
rather signifies the possibility that there is always something that can be done for the 
Other.  “Beyond” manifests itself as the relationship with the human other; and the core 
of this “inter-human” is the “non-indifference of one to another,”136 which is also my 
connection with the Good beyond Essence.  And as an important detail, when I suffer, 
this suffering indubitably cannot have any melancholic pleasure.  Suffering is distant 
from any mode of pleasurable cynicism, self-pity, melancholy or consolation; I cannot 
be consoled because I am always guilty and responsible.   
Levinas builds his philosophy upon the re-ignition of “human dignity” by implying that 
everyone is an Other; and every human being has dignity simply for being human.  
This is a non-negotiable fact for him, and any ideology or philosophy which ignores this 
reality he considers evil.  Levinas’s theory of suffering is crucial for understanding his 
philosophy and his difference from Nietzsche.  The absurdity of suffering marks 
Levinas’s vehement stress on the uselessness of suffering.  For this reason, it is vital to 
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understand that he rejects theodicy not only rigorously on philosophical grounds, but 
also on ethical grounds.  He writes that seeking any sort of justification or “use” in 
suffering is the mark of evil: “the justification of the neighbour’s pain is certainly the 
source of all immorality.”137  
According to David Boothroyd, in both Nietzsche and Levinas, the theme of suffering is 
central for the moral formation of selfhood.  Boothroyd notes that the issue of suffering 
seems to occupy the minds of both philosophers as they try to establish the main 
threads of their thinking and condense their major arguments – life affirmation, 
becoming and overcoming in Nietzsche and responsibility and transcendence in 
Levinas.138  So, in an attempt to understand the relationship between these two 
philosophers, it is crucial to consider what each of them thinks about the relationship 
between “suffering” and “what lies beyond suffering.”139  
For instance, as for Nietzsche, what distinguishes the noble from the herd is the 
former’s attitude towards the meaninglessness of suffering.  The noble has no issues 
concerning the meaninglessness of suffering whereas the slave cannot accept 
suffering without justifying it by ascribing religious significance to it or moralizing it.  The 
slave is the spider which gets stuck within its own web of reason, as in the quote 
above.  The noble, on the other hand, dissociates himself from the meanings attributed 
to suffering by the herd, and thereby individuates his will.140  By individuating his will, he 
re-interprets suffering and it is basically this creative power that makes him noble and 
gives him the authority to “name” things in his world.  The noble is the good player who 
knows how to play dice; the one who does not calculate the throws or seek strategies 
to get the desired result.  
Nietzsche’s account of suffering reveals itself most clearly as he explains it in terms of 
willing; as the dialectic between pain and pleasure.  He asserts that pleasure and pain 
are not opposites but are actually the components that create the dynamics of the 
feeling of power.141  Moreover, pleasure and pain always accompany the undergoing of 
an act; the consciousness of a work.142  Mutually dependent on each other, pain is the 
feeling associated with facing an obstacle whereas pleasure relates to the experience 
of growing power owing to the overcoming of the obstacle.  Thus, pain indirectly 
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enhances growth; so, experiencing pain can be canalized into a productive outcome.143  
Even though he does not directly or deterministically say that pain is experienced for a 
reason, Nietzsche implies that undergoing suffering can serve certain purposes.    
For the same reason, Nietzsche emphasizes that it is misleading to overrate happiness 
and underrate the significance of suffering.  Suffering tests one’s limits for tolerating 
resistances; and in the meantime, similar to a strength training exercise it builds one’s 
stamina to tolerate further difficulties; hence empowers one to overcome the obstacle.  
That is why, Nietzsche wishes his friends much suffering; desolation, humility and even 
diseases just so that the people he cares about can be challenged and consequently 
get stronger as they struggle to master their problems.144  In Nietzsche’s mind, 
happiness is associated with the removal – not mastery – of the obstacle and thus 
promises a blissful monotony and stagnant peacefulness.  Happiness is the invention 
of the last man who no longer creates but blinks like a dull animal.  As a matter of fact, 
Nietzsche suggests that if there is anything useless, it must be the monotonous 
happiness and the joy of conforming to the society; even suffering can be more useful 
than happiness.    
So, from a Nietzschean perspective, suffering can even be considered a reward; if 
handled wisely, it can be a prerequisite for getting stronger.145  However, it is important 
to interpret Nietzsche correctly: the subject getting stronger is not the consciously 
desired or anticipated result of the dice throw.  One can experience anything; any 
disaster or accident in life.  Yet, being a good player means not to interpret the 
conditions of life in terms of good or bad.  I do not suffer in order to become strong; 
strength comes naturally as I learn how to play dice, which means not to calculate the 
throws.  So even if I got stronger, I may not be aware of it as a “reward” necessarily.  
Loving necessity means not to wage war against what one dislikes or cannot control; it 
means to cultivate an attitude in life; cultivating the love of life, even if it means that one 
perishes at the end.  Having created beyond oneself, having created oneself, what 
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matters is eventually to learn how to dance with chance.  If there is a reward at the end, 
it is the individual herself only, nothing else.   
Based on a certain interpretation of Nietzsche, it can be said that suffering can have a 
purpose after all; it may not be as “useless” as Levinas claims.  The striking difference 
between Nietzsche and Levinas is that the former finds some “use” in suffering.  
However, does this sense of “use” justify suffering?  Daniel Came explores this issue 
and suggests that what Nietzsche aims at by justification ends up taking the form of 
some sort of consolation rather than justification proper.  Came argues that Nietzsche’s 
notion of justification does not pertain to the intrinsic qualities of the object or our 
relation to it; or whether it makes us happy or not, but rather the Nietzschean notion of 
justification enhances life-affirming attitudes in us.  So, Came claims that this kind of 
justification is “optative;” rather than rational or having any propositional truth value.146 
Came writes that “when Nietzsche speaks of the aesthetic justifying life, he does not 
mean that it shows us that life is actually justified, but rather that it educes an 
affectively positive attitude towards life that is epistemically neutral.”147  Came’s 
observation is important as it also confirms Boothroyd’s impression that the “beyond” of 
experience leaves an imprint that will carry on its signification regardless of its actuality 
– the meaning or the value of the experience or suffering endured.  Came associates 
this “beyond” with the positive attitude towards life that will have an ongoing effect upon 
the subject.   
However, for Levinas, even the epistemic neutrality evokes an amoral approach 
towards the Other.  The Levinasian subject is not epistemically neutral but traumatized; 
the condition she undergoes is persecution and being a hostage.  So the notion of 
neutrality still resonates with the naturalistic approach in which the subject is only 
occupied with herself.  What Levinas suggests instead is that we are not “neutral” but 
rather, for good reason, deeply “traumatized” at a fundamental, primordial level.  Since 
suffering is “an ordeal more passive than experience,”148 suffering for a meaning is 
irrelevant.  Imposing any sort of meaning, even to say that it is “neutral” always already 
comes much later than suffering, since suffering is prior to ascribing meaning to 
experience.  It is important to note that “neutrality” is a value judgment as well, and as 
such, it arrives much later than the primordial experience:  
Suffering, in its hurt and its in-spite-of-consciousness, is passivity.  Here, ‘taking 
cognizance’ is no longer, properly speaking, a taking; it is no longer the performance of 
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an act of consciousness, but, in its adversity, a submission; and even a submission to 
submitting, since the ‘content’ of which the aching consciousness is conscious is 
precisely this very adversity of suffering, its hurt ...  It is the impasse of life and being, 
their absurdity, where pain does not come, somehow innocently, “to colour” 
consciousness with affectivity.  The evil of pain, the harm itself, is the explosion and 
most profound articulation of absurdity.
149
 
 
When Levinas claims that suffering is unassumable, he implies that it is already 
irrelevant to ascribe any meaning or use (or social or religious function) to suffering.  
And since suffering in this Levinasian sense neither lacks nor awaits meaning, it is 
clear that Levinas does not remotely seek any pattern of theodicy to compensate for 
any loss (of God or of personal happiness or well-being).  One does not choose to 
suffer, one just suffers.  Levinas’s account of suffering is quite different from 
Nietzsche’s notion of suffering which can be somewhat controllable or even 
“welcomed.”  
  
It is impossible to ascribe any meaning to suffering because suffering is prior to 
interpretation or conscious evaluation, as it is the experience of losing all the ground for 
thinking.  Compared with Nietzsche, Levinas offers a far more elaborate account of 
suffering by emphasizing that it is misleading to consider suffering based on the 
conscious experience of the dialect between pain and pleasure.  Suffering is not 
something to spice up one’s life either to break the monotony of everyday life or to take 
risks to explore further possibilities in one’s life.  The vitality that comes with a sudden 
shock of misfortune or a chosen solitary life style cannot be associated with the 
phenomenon of suffering in the Levinasian sense.   
All in all, I believe that Levinas’s rejection of theodicy – no matter how disguised – and 
accentuation of the ethical dimension of suffering offers a much fuller, more concrete 
and convincing account of suffering than Nietzsche’s.  Yet, in addition to its persuasive 
power, with his argument Levinas also reveals that rejecting theodicy is not only a 
matter of intellectual preference but beyond that, signifies an ethical choice in which 
one refuses to turn a blind eye to the suffering of the Other.   
Conclusion 
 
Since in Levinas’s ethics moral consciousness is not an experience of values or virtues 
but exposure to the alterity of the Other, any philosophy which invests in the closure of 
the individual to the Other is immoral.  Nietzsche explores the possibility of creating 
values after the death of God by relying heavily on the frontiers of the individual, 
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alluding to a Stoic self-sufficiency.  Nietzsche’s notion of suffering which promotes an 
epistemically neutral and morally detached attitude towards life is closely in line with his 
naturalistic philosophy of the will to power where the self seeks compensation between 
harm and benefit.  His account of suffering is continuous with his notion of an aesthetic 
justification of life where, considering the “big picture,” one can comfortably evaluate 
and reflect on the advantages and disadvantages of the damage upon the overall 
health of the subject.   
 
Yet Levinas argues that suffering is not something reducible to my calculative 
schemes.  As deeply constitutive of my subjectivity, suffering is not a matter of 
narcissistic caprices where one suffers due to the ambitions and the greed of the 
conscious ego.  To the contrary, suffering signifies an opening for substituting for the 
Other.  It evokes transcendence when one suffers for the suffering of the Other; without 
expecting any reward or consolation, but solely out of responding to the Goodness 
disguised under the desperate cry of the human other demanding response.  
Responding is Good.  And Good is useless.        
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A NIETZSCHEAN CHALLENGE TO THE LEVINASIAN SUBJECT 
Introduction 
Nietzsche dedicates his Zarathustra to everyone and no one1 whereas Levinas 
explicitly states to whom he dedicates his Otherwise Than Being.2  To me, the crucial 
distinction between the concrete dedication of Levinas and the abstract dedication of 
Nietzsche is like a sign post pointing at the distinct approaches of the two philosophers.  
Zarathustra’s dedication hints at the transcendence of the Overman, who is everyone 
and no one; everyone in the sense that every individual person has the potential to 
pave the way for the Overman – by way of being one of his forefathers – and no one as 
the time for the Overman has not come yet.  The Overman is an untimely being; it is in 
the “not yet.” 
Nietzsche’s cheerful dedication evokes a sense of individualization which is capable of 
embracing everyone who wants to seek the road to the Overman within one’s own 
soul.  Levinas, on the other hand, ascribes responsibilities to everyone by invoking one 
of the most traumatic events of the twentieth century.  He haunts the individual reader 
with the immemorial guilt – however irrational or pre-logical may it be – of living; 
surviving on behalf of the deceased ones.  In his sermonic tone, Levinas also hints at 
an authoritarian or universalistic moral philosophy which attributes a sense of shame to 
everyone.  It is this inhibition; this non-indifference to the Other (even if out of sight; 
even if deceased) upon which Levinas theorizes his conception of subjectivity.         
The main tension in this chapter is based on the utter conflict between Levinas’s 
conception of universalism and Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism which leads to an 
individualistic ethics of the character.  In the first section, I explore Levinas’s notion of 
universalism within its frames of reference.  In the second section, I delve into 
Nietzsche’s idea of perspectivism and challenge Levinas’s universalism with the 
former’s perspectivism according to which a subject individuates not by submitting to 
the authority of the third party but by refining her drives and cultivating herself.  This is 
a genuine criticism of Levinas as it asks whether there is any room for the creative 
individual subject within the Levinasian notion of substitution.  In the last section, I 
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 On its dedication page, Nietzsche refers to TSZ as “A book for everyone and no one.”  
2
 Levinas’s dedication in OTB goes as follows: “To the memory of those who were closest 
among the six million assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions of all 
confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-
semitism.” 
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explore the notion of subjectivity in terms of the character and question whether the 
Levinasian subject lacks the rich inner complexity of a proper character.       
a) Levinas’s Universalism 
The very status of human implies fraternity and the idea of the human race ... it involves 
the commonness of a father, as though the commonness of race would not bring 
together enough.  Society must be a fraternal community to be commensurate with 
straightforwardness, the primary proximity, in which the face represents itself to my 
welcome.  Monotheism signifies this human kinship, this idea of a human race that 
refers back to the approach of the Other in the face, in a dimension of height, in 
responsibility for oneself and for the Other.
3
    
In a broad sense, Levinas’s conception of universalism relies on the intricately 
interwoven dual aspects of humanity and the relation to the Infinite.  Yet in spite of the 
embracing quote above, upon close scrutiny we realize that Levinas’s universalist 
account of subjectivity alludes to a very special combination of ontological 
particularities, namely Judaeo-Christianity and Platonism.  Associating humanity with 
fraternity can only lead to an abstract notion of fraternity.  Even though the 
phenomenology of humanity as an abstraction of fraternity could be plausible, 
problems occur while interpreting the relationship between the abstract and the 
concrete.  In contexts where Levinas depicts man as too abstract, Robert Bernasconi is 
eventually driven to comment that “for Levinas, there is not an other who is the Other.”4    
In my view, what seems philosophically question-begging about Levinas’s universalism 
is the conflict that emerges between Levinas’s notion of the singularity of the subject 
and its relation to universality.  In order to unravel this problem, firstly, I explore the 
significance of Judaism in his thought.  After that, I examine his close association of 
universalism with Platonism.  Lastly, I question the meaning of the third party as the 
guiding sign of ethics and argue that the third party stifles the individual by suppressing 
her inner active forces.  Overall, Levinas’s universalist account is open to a 
Nietzschean criticism.  
There is an undeniable continuity between Levinas’s humanistic philosophy and 
Judaist thought in his account of subjectivity based on his idiosyncratic synthesis – as 
discussed above.5  He weds Platonism with Judaism in a relatively secular manner by 
rejecting any sense of dogmatic otherworldliness.  For instance, even if its reference 
point is the (Platonic) ideal, the “perfect,” the manifestation of transcendence must be 
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 Levinas, TI, 214. 
4
 Robert Bernasconi, “Who is my Neighbor? Who is the Other? Questioning ‘the Generosity of 
Western Thought,” in Katz and Trout (eds.), IV, 9.  This quote will gain clarity below. 
5
 See page 62-63, n. 46. 
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sought in this world by serving the Other.  In an attempt to mitigate the potentially 
religious undertones, Levinas suggests that rather than praying for oneself, one directly 
serves the Other.  Richard Cohen touches on this matter as he conveys that Levinas is 
keen on quoting Rabbi Israel Salanter, the nineteenth-century Eastern European rabbi 
who is also known for his zealous commitment to ethical self-examination and self-
improvement, and who is famous for his quote: “The other’s material needs are my 
spiritual needs.”6  
Richard Cohen explicitly draws attention to this issue as he states: “Humanism, after 
all, is not merely the affirmation of the dignity of one person, of each individual alone; it 
is an affirmation of the dignity of all humanity, the affirmation of an interhuman morality, 
community, and social justice.”7  Already referred to as moral perfectionism, Levinas’s 
philosophy can be regarded as the subject’s investment in self-improvement; as a way 
of moral self-overcoming whose teacher is the Other. 
 
Levinas emphasizes two essential aspects of human fraternity; the common father and 
singularities.  The former signifies the utmost human kinship independent of blood 
relationship or family resemblances which is by analogy, indicated in the opening quote 
as the common father of monotheistic religions.  The latter, on the other hand, points to 
self-referential singularities which cannot be logically reduced to differences in a 
genus.8  Even though he does not elaborate on these matters in detail, one assumes 
that by these irreducible individualities Levinas evokes the alterity of the Other(s) and 
my singularity which must be understood as my non-substitutable responsibilities for 
the Other(s). 
 
Very plausibly, critics such as Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Hillary Putnam, Robert 
Bernasconi, Judith Butler and Fabio Ciaramelli note Levinas’s tendency to interpret and 
universalize the human condition – particularly, the human subject – in terms of Judaist 
thought.  As hinted in the dedication of OTB, Levinas always has in mind the Jew as 
the uttermost model for subjectivity, which was already indicated above in his portrayal 
of the Jew as “the stiff neck that supports the universe.”9   
 
Referring to the dedication of OTB, Peperzak writes: “This dedication shows that anti-
Semitism is for Levinas the equivalent of antihumanism, and that to be a Jew is 
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 Richard Cohen, HO, xxxiv. 
7
 Ibid., xviii. 
8
 Levinas, TI, 214. 
9
 See page 63. 
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identical with being authentically human.”10  Is this necessarily a problem?  Responses 
differ on this matter.  However, since I regard this issue as quite central to Levinas’s 
depiction of universalism, I intend to devote some space to this discussion.  Peperzak 
does not consider Levinas’s association of Judaism with authentic humanity 
problematic in terms of undermining the power and plausibility of his philosophical 
arguments: 
... just as a Jewish chemist is not necessarily Jewish in his chemistry, so a philosopher 
obeys professional rules and standards that are neither Jewish nor Buddhist, neither 
atheist nor antireligious ... Philosophy speaks a universal language, even if this 
language was discovered or invented in Greece (just as the language of chemistry was 
discovered in modern Europe, but in principle is open to all people).
11
 
It is important to recall the Levinasian claim that philosophy is rooted in pre-
philosophical experiences, “orientations” and commitments.  In that respect, it does not 
matter if it is Judaism that kindled the spark for philosophizing in Levinas’s case. It 
could have been anything; Christianity, Buddhism etc. would not make any difference.  
Peperzak argues that Levinas’s “method” of uniting philosophy and Judaism is not 
problem-begging as long as he keeps his rigour in philosophizing.12     
I consider Peperzak’s comparison between chemistry and philosophy implausible 
because of its disregard for the substantial differences between ethics and sciences.  
Philosophy is a vast subject covering a huge variety of subjects from logic and 
epistemology to metaphysics and ethics.  So I think that if Levinas were an 
epistemologist working on justification of truth claims; also focusing closely on 
mathematics (in philosophy), it could be more suitable to compare him to a chemist.  
Fields such as mathematics and chemistry seek truth without reference to moral 
interpretations, and as natural sciences they are international and universal.  Levinas, 
on the other hand, is not even a naturalist in philosophy.  Concentrating specifically on 
ethics and seeking the transcendental possibility for its meaning, he confesses on 
many occasions how Judaism has shaped his thought.  I suspect Judaism would shape 
the perspective of a chemist or a mathematician.     
As for the other aspect of Peperzak’s argument, is philosophy really as clean-cut and 
precise in requiring “professional rules and standards,” analogous to chemistry, as he 
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 Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1997, 7. 
11
 Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, “Levinas’ Method,” in Katz and Trout (eds.), I, 338. 
12
 Peperzak touches on a crucial theme concerning philosophy; on whether religious belief can 
be compatible with philosophy or whether such is always inevitably the onto-theology.  Since 
this is a deeply controversial subject, I limit it to Levinas’s case. 
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would like to think?  I do not think so.  In my opinion, even Levinas’s very own 
approach to philosophy, his claim about its origination in the pre-philosophical 
sensations defies easy and straightforward categories for doing philosophy.   
In Nietzsche’s view, since one’s philosophy is as personal as one’s autobiography, 
Levinas’s affinity with Judaism does not pose any problems when explored in terms of 
ad hominem arguments.  What matters is the character of the philosopher; so a 
philosopher like Levinas, who is deeply intrigued with religion and transcendence can 
be even more interesting as a character for Nietzsche.  However, ascribing universal 
authority to his philosophy would appear as counter-intuitive as ascribing universal 
authority to his own character.  Yet, the controversy concerning Levinas’s universalism 
does not end here.  What is furthermore problematical about Levinas’s association of 
authentic humanity with Judaism reveals itself as we consider the latter’s ontological 
status.  The quote below exposes the continuity of ideas from Otherwise Than Being 
especially on the notions of responsibility and substitution: 
The ultimate essence of Israel derives from its innate (innée) predisposition to 
involuntary sacrifice, its exposure to persecution.  Not that we need think of the mystical 
expiation that it would fulfil like a host.  To be persecuted, to be guilty without having 
committed any crime, is not an original sin, but the obverse of a universal responsibility 
– a responsibility for the Other (l’Autre) – that is more ancient than any sin.  It is an 
invisible universality!  It is the reverse of a choosing that puts forward the self (moi) 
before it is even free to accept being chosen.  It is for the others to see if they wish to 
take advantage of it (abuser).  It is for the free self (moi libre) to fix the limits of this 
responsibility or to claim entire responsibility.  But it can do so only in the name of that 
original responsibility, in the name of this Judaism.
13
 
Judith Butler notes that Levinas seems to neglect the fact that Judaism is the outcome 
of specific historical and social circumstances.  Rather than manifesting authenticity, it 
discloses facticity; it is therefore an ontological category rather than a pre-ontological 
one.  In that respect, Butler asserts that overlooking the fact that the Jew is a culturally 
constituted ontology, Levinas confuses the ontological and the pre-ontological.14  For 
this reason, it can only recount a very limited extent of human experience let alone 
exemplify the pinnacle of humanity.  Butler comments that portraying Jews as always 
the persecuted but never the persecutor is already outrageously misleading.  However, 
what Levinas does that is even more worrying is to neglect the ontological status of 
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 Cited in Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, New York:  Fordham University Press, 
2005, 93. 
14 Ibid., 94. 
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Judaism which leads him to racist and dehumanizing remarks about the non-Jewish 
and non-Christian people.15         
It is already far-fetched to claim Judaism to be a modality rather than a particularity.16  
Yet when Levinas insists on regarding it as a non-category, he unreservedly ascribes 
universalist meanings to Judaism by associating it with humanity.  Bernasconi 
observes this attitude both in his confessional and philosophical works.17  The 
dedication of OTB, equating anti-Semitism with the general term “hatred” should not go 
unnoticed; anti-Semitism is definitely a part of the hatred of the other man, but it does 
not constitute the essential core of it.  We must note that associating the original 
responsibility with “this Judaism” is in line with Levinas’s conception of humanity.  
Pointing to the dangers of this mode of universalization based on a specific race, 
Bernasconi states that “the language of the victim is not a universalizable language.”18   
In his attempt to ascribe universal value to particularity, Levinas’s other benevolent 
source is Platonism from which he borrows the concept of the Good beyond Being.  
Staehler elaborates on Levinas’s universalism in terms of “the universality of the Good” 
which is mainly influenced by the Platonic notion of the Good. She suggests that from a 
Platonic point of view, the Good beyond Being is the universal and eternal point of 
reference which addresses and unites all human beings as the “ultimate ‘for-the-sake-
of-which’ (hou heneka)” that guides all human activity.19  Since Plato’s influence on 
Levinas is mostly evident in his important essay “Meaning and Sense,” I regard it as a 
key text in unravelling how Levinas develops his theory of universalism, so below I offer 
some space for its assessment.   
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 Butler notes: “Levinas claims that Judaism and Christianity are the cultural and religious 
preconditions of ethical relationality itself and warns against the ‘rise of the countless masses of 
Asiatic (des masses innombrables des peuples asiatiques) and underdeveloped peoples (who) 
threaten the new-found authenticity’ (DF, 165) of Jewish universalism.  This, in turn, resonates 
with his warning that ethics cannot be based on ‘exotic cultures.’” (ibid., 94). 
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 Levinas says: “... to be Jewish is not a particularity; it is a modality.  Everyone is a little bit 
Jewish, and if there are men on Mars, one will find Jews among them.  Moreover, Jews are 
people who doubt themselves, who in a certain sense, belong to a religion of unbelievers.  God 
says to Joshua, ‘I will not abandon you’ (and, in the subsequent phrase): ‘nor will I let you 
escape’ (Josh. I:9)” (IIR, 164). 
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 Bernasconi, “Who is the Other?” 19. 
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 Bernasconi writes: “... if racism does call its victim to his or her ‘ultimate identity,’ it is not an 
identity that can in all cases be given the name ‘anti-semitism’.  It is only the Jew who can 
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other races, but ‘an invisible universality’ (DF, 225).  Blacks could make the same discovery 
only under some such name as anti-blackness.  And so on.  But perhaps this is the point.  The 
language of the victim is not a universalizable language.” (ibid., 22). 
19
 Staehler, 118. 
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In “Meaning and Sense,” Levinas roughly associates “meaning” with the historical, 
cultural or artistic manifestation of the ontological order,20 granting Being intelligibility.  
“Sense,” on the other hand, is associated with the a-historical, the primordial, beyond 
Being, which is termed by Levinas as the essential “orientation” for the ethical.  
Throughout the article, Levinas endows it with the meaning of the “unique sense;” the 
“one-way sense” which implies the radically non-reciprocal (Western) generosity and 
openness for the Other.  
In the article, Levinas accuses contemporary philosophy of a growing interest in the 
“meaning” which manifests itself as the enthusiasm for cultural expressions and arts.  
He attributes mere ornamental qualities to cultural meanings as he associates them 
with the realm of needs.  What pass as culture is therefore mere oddities and 
peculiarities, which lead to the celebration of multiculturalism.  Levinas displays a 
dubious attitude towards multiculturalism as it suggests a possibility for the equivalence 
of cultures, which is a notoriously unacceptable idea for him.   
In Levinas’s view, we need to be able to judge cultures, and in order to be able to do 
so, we need to have certain reference points; some “norms of morality” which are most 
elaborately developed and theorized by Plato with the notion of the Good beyond 
Being.  That is why, according to Levinas, any ethical, political or philosophical theory 
disregarding the key insights of Plato is doomed to fail.  While developing new ideas 
(even if to reject Plato) we need to refer to Plato – to capture within a slogan, while 
philosophizing on ethics, one can philosophize with Plato; against Plato; but not without 
Plato.  In defence of Plato, Levinas writes: 
For Plato there exists a privileged culture which approaches it (the world of meanings 
that precede language and culture) and which is capable of understanding the 
provisional and as it were infantile character of historical cultures.
21
      
Levinas argues that multiculturalism leads to a “de-occidentalism” of the world; which 
also means the “dis-orientation” of the world.22  He warns us against this disorientation 
as it implies the loss of sense; and hence the loss of the ground for the possibility of 
moral norms; evoking the dispersion of ethics altogether.  Levinas seems disappointed 
in the recent ethnographic findings which locate multiple cultures on the same plane, 
and evaluating this as symptomatic of “disorientation,” he interprets multiple cultural 
meanings to be the modern expressions of atheism.23 
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 Levinas writes: “Culture and artistic creation are part of the ontological order itself.” (MS, 82). 
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 Ibid., 101. 
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To illustrate orientation and generosity, Levinas gives the example of a French person 
deciding to learn to speak Chinese.  Levinas notes that prior to the decision to learn 
Chinese grammar, she has already displayed an ethical orientation for the Chinese, 
which is a quality she owes to the impressive generosity of Western thought.24  Levinas 
regards Greek as a kind of esperanto in which everything can be expressed25 without 
loss; since it is the language of the university, Levinas ascribes universal or 
international potency to it.  The complacency of Levinas’s argument reveals itself when 
he goes as far as asserting that Western civilization is even able to understand cultures 
that never understood themselves.26  Yet as a consolation for those who are not 
Westerners, Levinas offers a recipe as well:  so long as one speaks Greek, one can be 
elevated to the level of the master:  
Whereas the Platonic soul, liberated from the concrete conditions of its corporeal and 
historical existence, can reach the heights of the empryrean to contemplate the Ideas, 
whereas a slave, provided that he “understands Greek” which enables him to enter into 
relationship with the master, reaches the same truths as the master...
27
   
It is quite surprising that Levinas does not seem to notice the irony of this situation:  on 
the one hand he dedicates himself to dignify the alterity of the human other and on the 
other hand, he feels too comfortable associating himself with the privileged language of 
the West.28  In spite of his general conviction that ethics cannot be formalized, Levinas 
states the necessity to “fix with precision the conditions for such an orientation.”29  The 
prerequisites for this condition are – as elaborated previously for the notions of the 
Infinite and substitution – “a departure with no return;” implying the movement of the 
same into the Other without the anticipation of self-coincidence.  
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 Bernasconi rightly queries how it is that the Chinese person’s generosity in learning French is 
never acknowledged (ibid., 23). 
25
 Levinas says: “One can express everything in Greek.  One can, for example, say Buddhism in 
Greek.  Speaking Greek will always remain European; Greek is the language of the university.  
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speaking in the university is Greek and cosmopolitan.  Certainly, in this sense, Greek is spoken 
at the University of Tokyo.  It is central, because Greek is not one language among others ...  
When I speak about Europe, I think about the gathering of humanity.  Only in the European 
sense can the world be gathered together!” (IIR, 138-9).      
26
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Westerner is, for Levinas, not something confined to the West.  It is open to all.. there is nothing 
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 Levinas, MS, 91. 
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Associating ethics with “liturgy,” Levinas asserts that one dedicates herself to this 
“work” even if she cannot witness the results of her efforts in her lifetime.  In line with 
the argument in “Useless Suffering,” this orientation is “an eschatology without hope for 
oneself.”30  This work is not prompted by need but by Desire, and it is revealed as 
Goodness which only manifests itself as sociality.  The Other creates in me an 
unquenchable desire to be generous, good and benevolent.  Yet since this 
benevolence or generosity is interpreted as responsibility in Levinas’s thought, my 
responsibilities lead me to a paradoxical situation: on the one side I am liberated, on 
the other side I am restricted by the Other as I am aware of my responsibilities more 
than ever: 
The relationship with the other puts me into question, empties me of myself and empties 
me without end, showing me ever new resources.  I did not know I was so rich, but I no 
longer have the right to keep anything for myself.  Is the desire for the other an appetite 
or a generosity?  The desirable does not gratify my desire but hollows it out, and as it 
were nourishes me with new hungers.  Desire is revealed to be goodness.
31
  
As the essay develops, we witness Levinas associating sense with the third party and 
the face of the Other.  The “abstract man” becomes the frame of reference towards 
which ethics orients itself.  Eventually, the abstract man alludes to the primordial non-
representational time and space – the “before culture” – and as such, bears the trace of 
God.  It is crucial to explore the abstract face and the abstract man.  I begin with the 
former. 
The face is nude and abstract, yet, in Levinas’s account, there always seems to be 
some ambiguity pertaining to the abstractness of the face in terms of evoking a 
potential danger of effacement.  The abstractness of the face turns dubious when it 
suggests denying the heterogeneity of the concrete singular face (of the person).  
Levinas highlights that what constitutes the bareness of the face is necessarily its 
dispossession of cultural ornamentation.32  Even though the ambiguity of the 
abstractness of the face is visible also in TI, the account given in the book does not 
lead to problematic situations as it does in “Meaning and Sense.”   
In TI, Levinas rigorously argues that the face cannot be reduced to the plastic oval 
shape as it primordially evokes language and peace.  Levinas emphasizes the 
insignificance of the physical features of the face by claiming that while looking at a 
person, noticing the colour of her eyes in a way disrupts the ethical relationship.33  
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Rather than signifying facial features, the face signifies conversation and the existence 
of ethics.  On the issue of the face, the accounts given in TI and “Meaning and Sense” 
lead to contradictory conclusions.  When the nudity of the face is explained in terms of 
its fragility and potency for the ethical relationship, it is highly plausible. But when its 
nudity is a matter of deprivation of culture, then this account seems untenable because 
deprivation of culture (analogous to the nude and abstract face) leads to the question 
of the abstractness of the human other.  That is why we need to be cautious about the 
uniformity insinuated by the “abstract.”   
Critiquing “Meaning and Sense,” Bernasconi offers a twofold criticism to Levinas’s idea 
of the abstract humanism and the abstractness of the face.  Firstly, Bernasconi asks 
Levinas a Levinasian question just to develop his thought further by drawing attention 
to the ethnic alterity of the Other.  Does not the challenge of the face also call one’s 
ethnic identity into question?  Is not one’s ethnicity – plus one’s gender, which is 
another aspect determining one’s identity that Bernasconi notes Levinas never takes 
into consideration34 – also a part of one’s identity?35  So when the Other suspends 
one’s subjectivity, is not one’s (Western) culture also questioned?36   
Apart from the obvious problem about the self-righteousness of the Western identity 
never being called into question by any non-Western culture, there is also the problem 
of the absence of the concrete identity of the Other, which is suggested by Levinas’s 
notion of the “abstract man.”  By pointing to the vagueness of the notion, Bernasconi 
infers that Levinas implies that we do not take the Other’s identity or culture into 
consideration.  But then, is it not violent to strip the Other of her alterity (are not 
ethnicity and culture constituents of one’s alterity content, after all?) to reduce her to a 
mere person “like me?”37  Bernasconi argues that within the notion of the abstract 
humanity, Levinas implicitly suggests homogenization.  The stranger, the widow and 
the orphan are obviously Biblical references, yet these are at the same time curiously 
anonymous terms; rather than pointing at concrete individuals, they evoke unspecified, 
faceless beings:    
Does Levinas’s claim about the abstractness of the face mark a certain continuity with 
abstract humanism and its complicity with homogenization?  Levinas’s emphasis on the 
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Other as etranger – stranger, foreigner, alien – offers a natural starting-point from which 
to develop such questions ...  For Levinas, there is not an other who is the Other.
38
 
At this point, one cannot help but ask again: who is the Other for Levinas, then, if 
everyone speaks Greek and everyone is to be gathered in Europe?  I think that 
Levinas’s arguments lose their credibility in these three points:  Firstly, Levinas regards 
Judaism not as any religion or culture but as a privileged modality of being which 
exemplifies authentic humanity.  Secondly, Levinas regards Greek not as any language 
among others but as the language of the university – the medium via which all 
universal truths can be conveyed perfectly without any loss in translation.  And 
importantly, Levinas regards Platonism not as any philosophy emerging from some 
specific history, culture or tradition but as the a-historical absolute norm of morality 
which all the other patterns of thought and societies need to model in order to 
overcome their infantile cultures, peculiar traditions or moralities.  
These three issues reveal a disguised double standard embedded within Levinas’s 
thought – to me, this is reminiscent of George Orwell’s classic dystopian fable Animal 
Farm which is famous for its notorious slogan “All animals are equal, but some are 
more equal than others.”  In my opinion, when Levinas advocates universalism under 
those three rationales, his rigour weakens and his writing turns into quasi-philosophy.  
In his quest for the meaning of ethics he loses his sincerity.  The problem is not only 
limited to Levinas just losing his “rigour” in making philosophical arguments but the 
bigger worry is that he is at the brink of undermining his main argument by 
contradicting himself at his very core.39  His main criticism against Western philosophy 
is its “egology;” in which disregarding the exterior, the narcissistic self-same coincides 
with itself.  But if Levinas is indifferent to the Other as the non-Western – by implying 
that the non-Europeans are mere “dancers,” – then what he ends up achieving is only 
the crystallization of the authority of the (common) “Father” of Western philosophy, 
namely Plato.   
Perhaps the most valuable lesson we learn from Levinas is self-questioning and the 
interruption of self complacency.  Yet these ideas gain more significance when we 
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form of Western ethnocentrism, sustained by its tendency to define and measure the humanity 
of man in terms of approximation to a European model?  In this way is it not found to be 
complicitous with the racism it is supposed to contest?” (ibid., 17).          
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surpass Levinas; rather than ignoring his fallacies, we could expose his mistakes and 
developing his crucial insights, we could become better Levinasians than Levinas 
himself.  He presents a provocative account exploring the meaning of ethics which 
emerges at the moment when the subject’s ego, power and spontaneity are called into 
question; as the ego acknowledges the priority of the human other before itself.  Yet 
when Levinas ceases to make us question our beliefs about subjectivity and ethics by 
asserting universalist formulations, his account becomes less convincing;40 or at best, 
incomplete. 
From a Nietzschean point of view, Levinas’s universalistic account of subjectivity is 
problematic because of its final reference point as well: the third party.  It can be 
suggested that Levinas’s strong emphasis on the third party seems to disguise the 
homogenizing effect of his universalism; the point of reference for the “abstract man.”  
In Levinas’s philosophy, in order for justice to be possible at all, the third party is 
indispensable.41  According to Levinas, justice always comes from the outside because 
by its essence, justification of anything is provided by an above view, by an external 
examiner, or appeal.  There has to be a judge, and it is the third party, which is always 
already embedded within the illeity (the He-ness; the trace of God) of the Other.   
However, from a Nietzschean viewpoint, the third party has a stifling effect on the 
activity of the subject.  For Nietzsche, the notion of justice is essentially a reactive – or 
slavish (because of its reactive essence) – concept because it gains its significance 
based on man’s reactive forces rather than active forces.  The quality of an action is 
“judged” from the single point of view of the third party – be it the state, the law, God or 
the Church.  And what is “judged” is only the tip of the iceberg; only the consequences 
of the manifest action.  Since we have no access to the performer’s hidden motives – 
even she may not know it herself, consciously –, we only take the effect as the cause 
of the damage done.   
It may be helpful to remember Nietzsche’s criticism of free will to understand on what 
grounds he doubts the validity of the justice determined by the third party – or the 
society which can be regarded as a disclosure of the third party (this would not be 
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 Bernasconi states this situation quite nicely as he writes: “Although Levinas seems to mean 
no more than that each nation has a universal responsibility, the slippage between having to 
answer for all and having the answer for all is particularly acute.” (ibid., 26).  
41
 Levinas states: “It is requisite for this totality that a free being could have a hold on another 
free being.  If the violation of one free being by another is injustice, the totality can be 
constituted only through injustice.  But injustice could not occur in the society of love, where 
pardon annuls it.  There is real, that is, unpardonable, injustice only with respect to a third party.  
The third party is the free being whom I can wrong by constraining his freedom.  The totality is 
constituted through the other qua third party.” (ET, 37). 
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inaccurate as Levinas also associates the third party with humanity or sociality; at least 
as one possible interpretation).  Society needs a subject to punish so as to reinforce its 
own force upon the subject and maintain the status quo.  In order to punish, it invents 
the subject as an agent of free will – who can be punished and thus the evident 
damage be calculated and translated into the currency of punishment.  Deleuze points 
out that the third party determines the utility of an action precisely because he does not 
perform it himself.42  This is quite interesting because with this observation, Deleuze 
seems to note Nietzsche’s idea that the third party is the sterile omnipotent point of 
view, the perspective from which the “fairness” of actions is judged.  For Levinas, the 
third party signifies not only justice but also the possibility of ethical relationship.  Yet 
from a Nietzschean view, this justice upon which the Levinasian ethical relationship is 
built is actually established at the cost of oppressing the individual subject – the 
performer of any act – and most importantly, diminishing her “perspective” for the sake 
of submitting to the perspective of the omnipotent third party has an alienating effect 
upon the subject.43  
Of course, there could be some significant differences between what Deleuze 
interprets as Nietzsche’s third party and Levinas’s conception of the third party.  Yet 
there are also some undeniable similarities in terms of designating exteriority as the 
frame of reference to restrict the activity of the subject.  As a matter of fact, as 
mentioned above, Levinas is also highly conscious of the potentially tyrannizing effect 
of the third party, and that is why he suggests that the face interrupts the third party 
and vice versa; with the intention that the ethical invalidates the context-blind rigidity of 
the political. 
Nevertheless, all sciences, morality and laws are done by considering only the reactive 
forces.  Sciences draw conclusions based on observing the reactive forces.  Morality 
and laws – justice – also operate with the same instinct; solely evaluating the reactive 
causal relations based on calculating damage done and referring to utilitarianism as its 
most defining value.  Nietzsche emphasizes that there is a common spirit in sciences, 
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 Deleuze writes: “to whom is an action useful or harmful?  Who considers action from the 
standpoint of its utility or harmfulness, its motives and consequences?  Not the one who acts: 
he does not ‘consider’ action.  It is rather the third party, the sufferer or the spectator.  He is the 
person who considers the action that he does not perform – precisely because he does not 
perform it – as something to evaluate from the standpoint of the advantage which he draws or 
can draw from it... we always end up replacing real activities (creating, speaking, loving etc.) by 
the third party’s perspective on these activities: the essence of the activity is confused with the 
gains of the third party, which he claims that he ought to profit from, whose benefits he claims 
the right to reap (whether he is God, objective spirit, humanity, culture or even the 
proletariat...).” (69). 
43
 Nietzsche proclaims: “For me – how should there be any outside-myself?  There is no 
outside!” (TSZ, III, “The Convalescent,” 2). 
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morality and the juridical system, which is the triumph of the reactive forces.  And as 
such, all these systems feed on ressentiment and consolidate nihilism.  According to 
Nietzsche, the third party diminishes the subject by suppressing its active, essentially 
creative force.  Consequently, unable to find its exit for discharge; when separated from 
what it can do, the active force eventually turns back against itself and becomes 
reactive and thereby loses its power.44       
A similar idea can be considered in relation to Levinas: for Levinas, the Other 
separates me from what I can do and therefore limits my active force.  But on the other 
hand, as apparent from the quote above, Levinas claims that the Other makes me 
realize and expand my capacity for generosity and hence gives me other powers that I 
did not know existed or thought I was capable of.   
Generosity is an interesting theme that signifies the different approaches between the 
two philosophers.  In TSZ, Nietzsche regards gift-giving, bestowing as the highest 
virtue, but it can only gain significance depending on who does and with which motive.  
As for him, the charity of the weak does not have much value because if the weak 
performs generosity, it is still out of weakness – without the claws to fight back; it offers 
its services as compensation.45  The goodness of the weak is its only asset for survival; 
it “has to” play the pious out of necessity.   
Yet if the noble is generous, it is done out of strength rather than a disguised “need” for 
self-protection, and it is performed out of a spontaneous overflowing; without 
calculation or slavish evaluation of harm or utility.  For Nietzsche, generosity does not 
seem to be necessarily directed towards others but points to an explosive energy; 
discharge; superfluity or dynamic abundance, as an event of natural benevolence.  For 
Levinas, on the other hand, generosity is directed towards the Other; and as if in a 
calculative manner, the Levinasian subject is obligated to respond more to whomever 
is in need the most – the more vulnerable the Other is, the more responsible the 
Levinasian subject is.  From the Nietzschean perspective, Nietzsche’s notion of 
generosity is an active phenomenon whereas Levinas’s conception of generosity is 
predominantly, reactive. 
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 Deleuze accurately summarizes the characteristics of reactive force: “Thus reactive force is: 
1) utilitarian force of adaptation and partial limitation; 2) force which separates active force from 
what it can do, which denies active force (triumph of the weak or the slaves); 3) force separated 
from what it can do, which denies or turns against itself (reign of the weak or the slaves).  And 
analogously, active force is: 1) plastic, dominant and subjugating force; 2) force which goes to 
the limit of what it can do; 3) force which affirms its difference, which makes its difference an 
object of enjoyment and affirmation.” (57). 
45
 Nietzsche speaks through Zarathustra thus: “In truth, I have often laughed at the weaklings 
who think themselves good because their claws are blunt!” (TSZ, II, “Of the Sublime Men”). 
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Another critical point concerning the plausibility of Levinas’s account is the Levinasian 
subject being infinitely responsible for the Other without expecting reciprocity.  When 
questioned “how about the Other’s responsibilities for me?” Levinas briefly states that 
“It is his affair.”46  Notwithstanding his humble reply, we can infer that Levinas proposes 
a distinct conception of the subject, which he believes is a solid “account of subjectivity” 
– applying to everyone, including the Other.  Otherwise, it would be merely Levinas 
himself who personally believes that what the Other does is only his affair.  Yet it is 
clear that Levinas’s reply is the key component of his theory of subjectivity, universally 
valid for every subject, not just himself.  As a matter of fact, if he were not claiming 
universal plausibility for his ideas on subjectivity, then why would he even bother to 
write and publish anything at all and persuade us that his ideas are plausible?47  
Levinas attempts to lay out a necessarily “universal” account of subjectivity – what is 
the case for one individual is the same for everyone else as long as everyone is a 
subject.  The subject cannot monitor, criticize or keep an account of what the Other 
does for her – “it is his affair” – but she very well knows that since the Other is also a 
subject, he must have been sensing the same inhibition; the same primordial passivity 
pertaining to persecution and being a hostage (even if he acts indifferent or cruel to 
her), because the very experience of subjectivity – as substitution – is universal.  Even 
if one is not consciously aware of the primal condition of being a hostage, it is precisely 
because of this condition that, as mentioned above, one can never annihilate the moral 
authority of the face even if one kills the Other physically.48 
That is why Fabio Ciaramelli notes that Levinas’s notion of subjectivity is more than just 
a “private adventure,” but rather the universality of ethics addresses everyone.49  
Ciaramelli explores and critiques substitution and asks whether it appears like a 
“theatrical role;” yet, defending Levinas, he emphasizes that it is only me who can play 
my part, no one else.  So, the notion of this so-called theatrical role cannot be ridiculed 
or reduced to the inauthenticity or banality of any actual theatrical role where any actor 
can play any part interchangeably.50  However, from a Nietzschean perspective, I think 
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 Levinas, EI, 98. 
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 Fabio Ciaramelli, “Levinas’s Ethical Discourse between Individuation and Universality,” in 
Bernasconi and Critchley (eds.) [1991], 93.   
48
 In Levinas’s lucid statement: “It is through the condition of being a hostage that there can be 
pity, compassion, pardon, and proximity in the world - even the little there is, even the simple 
‘after you, sir’.” (S, 91, emphasis mine).  Nevertheless, obviously the condition of being a 
hostage by its sole existence does not prevent cruelty or promise any cure for evil deeds.  
Hostage embeds the subject without literally telling it what to do or how to respond to the 
Other(s).   
49
 Ciaramelli, 83. 
50
 Ibid., 99. 
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that the Levinasian defence cannot exactly refute the criticism posed here.  Continuing 
with the analogy, a theatrical role is still a role, ascribed to me by someone else – the 
Other – rather than originating from within my own being. 
In relation to the ambivalence pertaining to the asymmetrical relationship, another issue 
we need to consider is the impossibility of “knowing” the Other.  Levinas bases his 
account upon this impossibility by emphasizing that the Other is eternally elusive, 
unforeseeable and incomprehensible; the only quality one can infer is the Other’s moral 
superiority over the subject.  Even though there is not an isolated self without the 
Other(s) – no subjectivity without intersubjectivity – I can never understand the Other, 
which, from a Nietzschean point of view, makes my relationship with the Other too 
complicated, almost impossible to maintain.  I can have no access to the active forces 
at work within the Other; just as I have no conscious access to what goes on within my 
own body.  So, while experiencing my own self, my ipseity proper by way of 
substitution, which Levinas insists is the case of subjectivity, what I am experiencing is 
a double alienation.  I am already alienated from my own acts – the operations of my 
own body –, and yet the workings of the other person’s interiority seems like further 
alienation.  For this reason, when I try to respond to the other person in the Levinasian 
sense, I can only superficially re-act to the Other’s reactions – that is, “re-action” in the 
Nietzschean sense; which points to a slavish mode of passivity spurred by 
ressentiment. 
In addition to the Nietzschean vexation of not knowing the Other, the last issue I would 
like to raise is the validity of the responsibilities of the Levinasian subject.  Ciaramelli 
suggests that with his idea that I am responsible before I am free, Levinas is alluding to 
a pre-ethical condition rather than an ethical one.51  Levinas insists that my 
responsibility is prior to consciousness, and I am not – as a matter of fact, I have never 
been – in a condition to choose or not to choose my responsibilities.  It is, rather, the 
other way around; I am chosen for my responsibilities as “the elect;” to the point that no 
one can fulfil my responsibilities on my behalf.  For Levinas, ethics is the way of 
responding to the call of the Other which is undeniably there.     
But if there has never been a choice in the first place, can there still be ethics? And in 
this case, can we consider the subject, who is responsible before she is free, as either 
ethical or not?  Rather, the subject Levinas theorizes about seems like a pre-ethical 
subject who senses pre-philosophical revelations.  Pre-ethically, I am called to respond 
to the demands of the Other.  Moreover, I am judged not only by the Other but 
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simultaneously also by the third party who “looks at me in the eyes of the Other”52 by 
holding the moral authority.     
Yet it is this third party that causes distrust in Nietzsche as he associates it with an “eye 
impossible to imagine.”53  From a Nietzschean viewpoint, Levinas’s conception of 
ethics is disputable also because it takes the third person as its point of reference.  
Levinas’s universalist account of subjectivity is construed by the consolidation of the 
third party and the gathering of humanity within the responsible subject at the cost of 
the loss of one’s own perspective.  In this respect, Nietzsche’s strong emphasis on 
perspectivism – the topic of the next section – might be considered as his aim to 
dethrone the third party or the figure of authority that signifies justice (the system of the 
slaves) because, for him, the third party signifies the mediocre.     
Overall, as a humorous contrast to Levinas’s universalist account based on Judaism 
and Plato, I cannot help but think of Nietzsche’s extraordinary Zarathustra who is 
neither Jesus nor Moses nor Plato nor Buddha – even though he has hints of every 
one of them (his town is called “The Pied Cow;” he has disciples, he retreats to his 
cave, he is a prophet and so on).  In this respect, the figure Zarathustra is intentionally 
symbolic; rather than crystallizing any myth, Nietzsche undoes the myth; deconstructs 
it and thereby leaves it to the reader to reconstruct whatever she makes of it for herself.  
The actual historical figure Zarathustra originated in the Middle East which is the home 
of the all three monotheistic religions; Judaism, Christianity and Islam; but the way 
Nietzsche depicts his character is fictional, in a fictional land.  This way, Nietzsche 
seems to parody all religions and dogmas.  And rather than consolidating the teaching 
of the Bible or Plato, Nietzsche suggests rejecting all of them in order to signify a new 
beginning for humanity; but first: for the individual. 
b) Nietzsche’s Perspectivism 
... to see differently, the desire to see differently for once... is no small discipline of the 
intellect and a preparation for its eventual ‘objectivity’ – this latter understood not as 
‘disinterested contemplation’ (which is a non-concept and a nonsense), but as the 
capacity to have all the arguments for and against at one’s disposal and to suspend or 
implement them at will: so that one can exploit that very diversity of perspectives and 
affective interpretations in the interests of knowledge.  From now on, my dear 
philosophers, let us beware of the dangerous old conceptual fable which posited a 
‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject’, let us beware of the tentacles of 
such contradictory concepts as ‘pure reason’, ‘absolute spirituality’, ‘knowledge in itself’; 
– for these always ask us to imagine an eye which is impossible to imagine, an eye 
which supposedly looks out in no particular direction, an eye which supposedly either 
restrains or altogether lacks the active powers of interpretation which first make seeing 
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into seeing something – for here, then, a non-sense and a non-concept is demanded of 
the eye.  Perspectival seeing is the only kind of seeing there is, perspectival ‘knowing’ 
the only kind of knowing; and the more feelings about a matter which we allow to come 
to expression, the more eyes, different eyes through which we are able to view this 
same matter, the more complete our ‘conception’ of it, our ‘objectivity’, will be.  But to 
eliminate the will completely, to suspend the feelings altogether, even assuming that we 
could do so: what? would this not amount to the castration of the intellect?
54
   
With the close guidance of the substantial quote above, in this section I critique 
Levinas’s universalism from the viewpoint of Nietzsche’s conception of perspectivism, 
which is a very rich topic with diverse interpretations.  Nietzsche’s notion of 
perspectivism is a multifaceted idea leading to suggestions regarding both the 
possibility of knowledge and the cultivation of values.  Moreover, in accordance with 
Nietzsche’s naturalistic account, perspectivism reveals on the one side a conscious 
aspect of the subject; based on which we can associate a perspective with one’s set of 
beliefs, rational and moral choices; world view or philosophy.  On the other side, 
perspectivism can also hint at the unconscious aspect of the subject; such as the 
conflicting drives, affects, the judgments based on the “taste” or the spontaneity of 
hidden “muscle movements” that constitute each individual.  It is at the intersection of 
these two facets – the conscious and the unconscious – that the will to power operates 
and values are created.  For the current purposes of my project, I keep perspectivism’s 
relation to the possibility of knowledge and truth quite limited and focus mostly on its 
suggestions for values.  I begin by unpacking this exquisite quote.   
Nietzsche begins by emphasizing the importance of gaining a certain discipline of the 
intellect:  before anything else, seeing. The quote highlights a metaphorical connection 
between seeing and knowing.  Maudemarie Clark notes that the metaphor of 
perspective conveys that what one knows depends on where one stands.  So, how one 
interprets or justifies knowledge depends on what one already believes: “all justification 
is contextual, dependent on other beliefs held unchallengeable for the moment, but 
themselves capable of only a similarly contextual justification.”55  In Nietzsche’s 
account, all knowledge is dependent on needs and interests.  Brian Leiter accurately 
conveys that the aspect of perspectivism pertaining to knowledge can never be 
disinterested; it always presupposes some affect or interest, and knowing is thus 
analogous to an optical situation.  Seeing and knowing is intricately interrelated; how 
we see affects what we know and vice versa.56 
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 Brian Leiter accurately summarizes the basic aspects of perspectival seeing: “Necessarily, we 
see an object from a particular perspective: for example, from a certain angle, from a certain 
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What we know can always enhance our perspective by improving the way we see.  In 
order to earn this quality, the genuine inclination to see differently is a manifestation of 
a mind that has an implicit responsibility to acquire objectivity.  Stressing the notion of a 
“preparation for its eventual objectivity,” Nietzsche implies that gaining that objectivity is 
a desirable quality which demands an ongoing effort – hinting that it is also eventually 
an ethical responsibility.  What Nietzsche means by this “objectivity” is an expansion of 
capacity for considering a further set of possibilities for thinking:  rather than clinging 
tightly to our anonymous convictions, Nietzsche invites us to revisit our thinking 
patterns and suspend the gravity of our beliefs and values. 
There are always more interpretations that are different from ours.  Even though we 
can never exhaust all possible interpretations, having more perspectives is invaluable; 
one can always consider a diversity of perspectives and revise one’s own perspective 
accordingly.  Leiter notes that Nietzsche’s conception of perspectivism hosts the 
notions of non-egalitarianism and pluralism57 as the structure of perspectivism is both 
pluralistic and hierarchical.  Along the way, some interpretations will be better than 
others, and the way to judge them would again be based on our interests.     
For this reason, while evaluating other perspectives, one is never disinterested (or 
“objective” proper); one interprets them based on one’s affects, needs and desires.  Yet 
Nietzsche thinks that this is an expected and mandatory aspect because even when 
one is open to other diverse perspectives, one has to rely primarily on one’s own active 
interpretive forces.  Otherwise, being alienated from one’s perspective; being 
completely absolved in other perspectives or being tuned in to some “thing-in-itself” or 
omnipotent source would lead to the castration of one’s own intellect.  One has to 
maintain one’s feelings and will in order to have a perspective in the first place.      
Perspectives are flexible.  Just as expanding one’s perspective is desirable, limiting 
one’s perspective is also crucial for achieving something; to focus, to concentrate on 
one single goal;58 so much that even stupidity can spur development and progress at 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
distance, under certain conditions (perspectivism claim).  The more perspectives we enjoy – for 
example, the more angles we see the object from – the better our conception of what the object 
is actually like will be (plurality claim).  We will never exhaust all possible perspectives on the 
object of vision (infinity claim).  There exists a catalogue of identifiable factors that would distort 
our perspective on the object: for instance, we are too far away or the background conditions 
are poor (purity claim).” (“Perspectivism in Genealogy of Morals,” in Schacht (ed.), 344).  
57
 Leiter writes: “... we do indeed have knowledge of the world, though it is never disinterested, 
never complete, and we can always benefit from additional nondistorting perspectives.  As long 
as we can make out the purity claim, this epistemology is not egalitarian, though it is certainly 
pluralistic.” (ibid., 346). 
58
 Nehamas writes: “Nietzsche never attacks Christianity because it has ‘tyrannized’ its followers 
or because it has imposed an overarching direction upon people’s lives.  He himself is not (as is 
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times.59  Yet it is promising that one can always be ready to accept that one’s ideas are 
wrong or misdirected; or one’s thinking is flawed.  Changing or revising one’s 
perspective is always possible and necessary.  In this respect, I think that Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism is immune from a potential Levinasian attack on the self-identical 
subject.  Since a perspective is not rigid, its flexible nature makes it unsuitable for self-
coincidence.  Presumably, the only possibly self-identical subject would be “the pure, 
will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject;’” the “‘pure reason,’ ‘absolute spirituality,’ 
‘knowledge in itself;’” “an eye impossible to imagine.”  Yet it is this precise subject that 
Nietzsche’s conception of perspectivism rejects. 
As a matter of fact, it is at this moment that I see a parallel pattern of thought between 
Nietzsche and Levinas; the latter defines ethics as the suspension and critique of one’s 
spontaneity by the Other.  Nietzsche, on the other hand suggests suspending our 
ages-old convictions in order to cleanse our thinking and feeling patterns; this implies a 
progress in thinking, which is itself an ethical and decent attempt in terms of taking 
intellectual responsibility for our thoughts.  Yet the way to achieve this is to suspend 
our beliefs at will (which, as one may imagine, would require an immense training of 
self-discipline and self-overcoming) and experience a diversity of (other) perspectives.  
It seems that Nietzsche hints at the definition of (not ethics but) reasoning as the 
suspension of one’s beliefs and thoughts.     
Nehamas suggests that alternative readings and interpretations could always, in 
principle, be devised.60  Consequently, there is no such thing as omni-perspectival 
seeing, and Nietzsche also explicitly argues against this possibility in the quote.  By 
nature, any perspective is limited and subjective; even the belief in the possibility of an 
omnipotent eye is perspective-denying, hence self-negating.  It points to the 
impossibility of knowledge and creation of values.  Some perspectives are better than 
others, but the best perspective does not exist.   
                                                                                                                                                                                  
sometimes thought) an enemy of single, distinct, clear ends and purposes: ‘The formula for my 
happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal’ (Twilight, I, 44).  What he cannot accept is the 
particular direction Christianity has chosen.  And even more, he cannot tolerate the fact that 
Christianity has always been dogmatic, and has always tried to conceal the fact that its direction 
is only one direction among many others.  He is quite aware, however, that to pursue any of 
these other directions would have entailed no less a subjection to similar ‘capricious laws.’  In 
itself, therefore, this is not an objection to Christianity.” (48). 
59
 Nietzsche states: “... this tyranny, this arbitrariness, this severe and magnificent stupidity, has 
educated the spirit; slavery, both in the coarser and the finer sense, is apparently an 
indispensable means even of spiritual education and discipline.  One may look at every system 
of morals in this light:  it is ‘nature’ therein which teaches to hate the laisser-aller, the too great 
freedom, and implants the need for limited horizons, for immediate duties – it teaches the 
narrowing of perspectives, and thus, in a certain sense, that stupidity is a condition of life and 
development.” (BGE, “The Natural History of Morals,” 188).       
60
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What makes a certain perspective better than a lesser one depends on the interests of 
the people who hold it.  If it proves more cognitive or serves better to their needs, the 
people will prefer that specific perspective to be better than the other one.  This nature 
of perspectivism reminds us of the agonistic contests mentioned above.  The common 
tendency of the competitors in the ancient Ephesus was to ostracize the best one 
among them.61  In the competition, all the competitors wanted to compete, but no one 
wanted to win or be the best one because that would mean the end of the contest – 
this ancient culture of competition is quite different from how we regard contests today; 
we make the cult of the champion and consider the rest of the competitors losers.    
Yet from a Nietzschean viewpoint, omniperspectivism seems to be the claim in 
Levinas’s philosophy.  Rather than a humble perspective – one among others –, 
Levinas asserts his argument (the Bible and the Greeks to signify cultural superiority) 
to be a solid frame of reference for ethics and moral norms.  In a way, Levinas proves 
Nietzsche right on the fact that knowledge (hence, values) is never disinterested as 
Levinas’s personal reference points for formulating his own thoughts are Plato, Bible 
and Judaism.  Refusing to change or revise his perspective, Levinas expects the rest of 
the world to adjust itself to his point of view.  In a way, he seems to have always 
already associated himself with the authority of the third party which is a very 
problematic moment even for Levinas, because the essential separation between the 
subject and the exteriority (the Other and the third party) is the backbone of his 
philosophy.   
In Nietzsche’s point of view, the complacency of Levinas’s perspective implies 
omniperspectivism which refuses the question of justification from the beginning.  As a 
matter of fact, this seemingly dogmatic approach reveals itself in Levinas’s attitude 
towards ancient Greek philosophy as well, especially Plato.  Even though both 
philosophers are fascinated by ancient Greek thought, their attitudes are quite distinct.  
Although Nietzsche is deeply impressed with ancient Greek philosophy, particularly the 
Pre-Socratics, his interest is relatively non-dogmatic.   
Nietzsche is very attentive to the changes concerning the interpretations of concepts 
over time such as “good,” “bad” and “evil.”  Yet a more telling example is the unusually 
positive connotations of words such as “envy,” “jealousy” and “ambition” (Eris) – as 
explored in the first chapter.  Nietzsche’s aim in pointing at the change of 
interpretations in these concepts is to illustrate that there has been a time and culture 
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in the world in which values were different; people thought and felt differently from how 
we think and feel today.  As there have already been different “perspectives,” it is 
therefore always possible to interpret life, create values and seek new meanings in the 
future.   
Nietzsche never displays a blind admiration or fetish for the ancient Pre-Socratics; he 
does not imply that we should imitate them today as our model.  But he conveys the 
important message that our current ways of thinking and feeling are not the ultimate 
ways to interpret and live in the world.  Different cultures existing in different slices of 
time can inspire us to think differently and prompt us to seek new beginnings, to be 
pursued by the philosophers of the future.  Although we do not need to take their 
accomplishments as our reference points, we could nonetheless be appreciative about 
the most precious lesson they teach us: that different ways of thinking and feeling are 
always possible; there are always open possibilities for the future.  In this respect, 
Nietzsche seems much more future-oriented than Levinas who hints at a past-oriented 
model of Platonic morality.62   
Agreeing with Clark on the fact that perspectivism is mainly a claim about justif ication, 
Bernard Reginster notes that its anti-foundationalism63 points to the “contingencies of 
practical reasons”64 which characterize Nietzsche’s perspectivism as the 
interconnectedness between reasons and desires.  Even though the boundaries of a 
perspective are somewhat indecisive, one has to observe its standards of justification 
while evaluating it.65  Reginster observes two possible approaches: weak perspectivism 
and strong perspectivism.  The former focuses on the sheer subjectivity of knowledge 
and values almost at a nihilistic level and as a form of radical scepticism, it denotes the 
simplistic idea of “anything goes.”  The latter, on the other hand, is “a deflationary view 
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of the nature of justification:  there is no coherent notion of justification other than 
ratification in the terms provided by one’s perspective.”66  
Reginster argues that what Nietzsche pursues is the strong perspectivism which is 
nevertheless a quite complicated view because there is not an easy answer to Clark’s 
worry:  if we reject the thing-in-itself or any common standard criteria such as “pure 
reason,” then how are we to compare two conflicting perspectives and decide which 
one is the better one?  Reginster suggests that the self-referential coherence of a 
perspective can be a guiding sign and calls this the “internal criticism,” to judge the 
validity of a certain perspective.  Internal criticism is the strategy that judges values by:  
... showing that they are not acceptable by the very light of the perspective from which 
they are made ... The suggestion, in sum, is that criticism in terms internal to the 
perspective under consideration is meant to replace criticism in terms of objective 
‘foundational’ standards.
67
 
This is presumably the core aspect of Nietzsche’s conception of perspectivism.  It 
reveals how an argument inherent within a perspective undermines itself and 
invalidates its meaning.  For instance, if we take Levinas’s philosophy as his 
perspective, we would expect some sort of coherence and consistency within the 
pattern of his thought.  Of course philosophers always change, revise or at times even 
reject their former convictions; but we do not expect them to contradict their former 
ideas at a fundamental level without acknowledging their change of heart.68   
Levinas is accurately known as the “philosopher of the Other” who seeks the meaning 
of ethics within the alterity of the human other and criticizes Western philosophy for 
being narcissistic and egocentric.  He associates self-coincidence with a deficiency in 
ethics by suggesting that if one is not willing to venture out to the Other, any 
exploration that ends up in self-coincidence is only a consolidation of one’s own ego.  
Yet even though Levinas never abandons this idea, it becomes much more clear in his 
later works that his philosophy does not genuinely intend to stretch beyond the 
egological boundaries of the Western thought or ideology either; as he asserts that 
Plato must be the reference point for any (ethical) philosophy whether one agrees with 
Plato or not.  With his implication that multicultural approaches are degenerating 
(“disorienting”) and corrupting the Western heritage which is meant to be the model for 
the whole world, Levinas takes a rather dismissive attitude towards non-Western 
cultures.  So what is dismaying about the internal inconsistency of his perspective is 
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that Levinas, the philosopher of the Other, is rather reluctant to stretch out his hand to 
recognize the (cultural) integrity of the non-Western (non-Jewish) Other.    
Reginster observes an essential distinction between criticizing a certain view 
emanating from a perspective and criticizing the person who holds that view.69  
Although the validity of a perspective is always subjective, it does not mean that a 
foreign perspective cannot be criticized by our perspective and vice versa.  To the 
contrary, as indicated above, in Nietzsche’s thought it is crucial to reconsider and 
revisit our own perspective to check for our own inconsistencies, prejudices or taboos.  
Such a constant evaluation and reinterpretation can always make our perspective 
considerably more creative and progressive.  Theoretically-speaking, even when 
critiquing Levinas’s perspective, Nietzsche could be re-evaluating his own values.  So, 
when criticizing a perspective, it is important to know our purpose of criticism.  
Reginster very plausibly summarizes this aspect of Nietzsche’s perspectivism: 
Typically, we would say that showing that a view is wrong and showing that an agent is 
wrong to hold it are one and the same.  Perspectivism compels us to distinguish 
between these two as distinct purposes of criticism, to be achieved by different means.  
For a critic to show that a view is wrong is to show that she has no reasons to accept it, 
or has reasons to reject it.  By contrast, for a critic to show that her interlocutor is wrong 
in holding a view is to show that the interlocutor has no reasons to accept the view, or 
has reasons to reject it.
70
     
In other words, when we apply this idea to the case of Levinas, there is an important 
distinction between claiming that Levinas is wrong to favour Judaeo-Christian-Platonic 
world view and claiming that there is an inherent flaw in Levinas’s perspective; a flaw 
that would make that perspective unappealing to Nietzsche.  I would argue that 
Nietzsche would go for the latter option.  I think Nietzsche’s perspectivism would not 
criticize Levinas for holding his belief about the superiority of Western culture.  But it 
would note that Levinas’s views are contradictory because Levinas criticizes Western 
philosophy for being egocentric when he himself feels alarmed about the world losing 
its essential orientation – as he considers multiculturalism a threat to Western culture.  
This situation reveals a double standard at work in Levinas’s perspective, and if 
honesty and consistency are Nietzsche’s core values, he would reject Levinas’s 
perspective but probably would not necessarily try to prove Levinas wrong – on his 
belief in the cultural superiority of the West.   
As a matter of fact, from Nietzsche’s view point, Levinas cannot be right or wrong – no 
one can.  Reginster dissociates between internal irrationality and external irrationality; 
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the latter is irrelevant for Nietzsche’s perspectivism as he denies pure reason or the 
thing-in-itself; since there is no external referee to judge right or wrong.  There is, 
however, such a thing as internal irrationality, which is what we spot in internal 
criticism.  But what would we do with the internal irrationality of a foreign perspective?  
Merely point out that the view is wrong or to convince its holder that she is wrong to 
hold that view and thereby try to win her over to our side?71  Presumably, Nietzsche is 
not interested in the latter.  Levinas’s beliefs concern him, and him only; his perspective 
is his affair.            
On the other hand, this attitude should not take us back to the nihilistic experience of 
sheer relativity, the weak interpretation of Nietzsche’s perspectivism famous for its 
shallow slogan “anything goes.”  After all, if Nietzsche only ever wanted to keep himself 
to himself, he would not even bother to publish his books.  In addition, Nietzsche is not 
the ascetic priest who makes notorious statements such as “philosophy is dead” and 
announces himself as the last of the philosophers; thereby reserve himself the best 
place within the pantheon of charismatic philosophers.72  To the contrary, his whole 
philosophy is an attempt to refute nihilism by offering an alternative to it.   
So what should criticism do if it does not aim to convince other people that our 
perspective beats theirs?  It seems that criticism is invaluable even for its own sake; 
without any further grand objective or benefit for their owners.  Perspectives do need to 
come out; compete, corrupt, critique, challenge or even inspire one another.  For 
instance, when we point out an internal inconsistency within a perspective, we may at 
least prompt our interlocutor to be more self-critical and reconsider her views – either in 
general or on some specific view that is rationally flawed – without blatantly exposing 
the inferiority of her viewpoint and forcing her to share our perspective.73  Nietzsche’s 
notion of perspectivism seems to deconstruct the pattern of thought of a certain 
interlocutor or a grand teaching such as Christianity; point to its flaws and leave it 
there.  Further interference would be against the values of a free spirit as a free spirit 
should not insist any further than that.74    
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At this point we could be tempted to question who a free spirit is.  A free spirit is 
someone who demands reasons and creates her values and lives accordingly.75  What 
is most special about a free spirit is her search for her own reasons to develop and 
cultivate her perspective.  Even if her ideas are not superior to other people, it is her 
spirit yearning for freedom that is worthy.  She works toward giving her own account of 
life through her own perspective; and in order to give one’s account, one has to have 
cultivated one, first.  Improving, developing one’s reasoning is an ethical responsibility 
in the Nietzschean sense as the greatest responsibility sitting on our shoulders, which 
is to create values after the death of God.  In this respect, a rigorous demand for 
reasons is a matter of intellectual conscience.76   
This is a crucial point that a Levinasian perspective needs to take into consideration.  
Levinas claims that one has language at a primordial level to offer one’s world to the 
Other.  But even to offer my world to the Other, do I not first need to have a world; that 
is, have cultivated a world of my interpretation?  Of course Levinas provides an 
elaborate account on the significance of interiority; one has to have a home to offer it to 
the Other; one has to love something –- one has to be really attached to it – so that 
giving it up for the Other can be ethically meaningful.  Yet Levinas only focuses on the 
ethical meaning; neglecting the rational meaning.  He does not emphasize the 
indispensability of reason and improving rationality at a sufficient level.  
The necessity of an active critical agency77 is something Levinas seems to ignore for 
most of the time.  However, it is my contention that even in order to be a moral subject 
in the Levinasian sense, one has to be a free spirit first – in the Nietzschean sense.  As 
expressed in the opening quote of this section, cultivating one’s reasoning takes a lot of 
effort; analogous to a strength training exercise in which one needs to deliberately 
question, critique and suspend one’s beliefs to reconsider and re-evaluate one’s 
perspective to create values and eventually become who one is.  Yet another aspect 
worth emphasizing is that investing in an active critical agency is already indispensible 
for being a moral agent as well.  Levinas insists that hearing the call of the Other 
occurs at a pre-rational, pre-intellectual level as the Other calls my spontaneity into 
question.     
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However, what constitutes my spontaneity?  As for Levinas, it is my capability to act; 
whereas from a Nietzschean viewpoint, we could infer that in order to feel my 
spontaneity called into question, first I need to have within me a strong critical agency 
intact as it is owing to my intellectual conscience that I interpret the call of the Other.  I 
can only respond based on what I interpret from the Other.  Although Levinas does not 
develop this point much further for the sake of avoiding normativity, he hints that one 
responds to the Other in the right way – the ethical relationship with the Other suggests 
that I respond to the Other’s needs; that I serve the Other in the best way I can.   
Besides, any kind of random response does not count as the ethical response; I could 
be a sadist and respond to the suffering of the Other in an even more cruel way – even 
though Levinas’s main point is that I cannot be indifferent to the Other (not not hear the 
Other’s call), the manner of response is up to me.  Paul Ricoeur points to the 
prerequisite capacity of reception prior to response as well and emphasizes the 
significance of discrimination and recognition before acting.  He looks at the question of 
reciprocity from the opposite angle:  what if the Other is a sadist and I am supposed to 
yield to her?78   
Levinas responds to criticisms of this line by arguing that responding to the Other does 
not mean enslaving oneself to the Other’s capricious demands.  Yet the distinction 
between serving the Other (in substitution) and servitude is rather vague.  In addition, 
he notes that in the context of war, the Other can even be an enemy; in his words, “in 
alterity one may find the enemy.”79  But then, we always come back to the problem of 
who the Other is.  Ricoeur remarks that the “aporia” of the Other continues to haunt the 
plausibility of Levinas’s account of subjectivity.  It is never clear whether the Other is a 
concrete human being; or my unrepresentable forefathers (Holocaust victims?); or my 
unforeseeable descendants; my infinite debt to all of them or God.80   
Figuring who or what the Other is already unfathomable.  Moreover, interpreting the 
need of the Other is even more enigmatic; yet Levinas avoids explaining it and 
suggests that my responsibility is what constitutes my subjectivity.  But how can I 
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respond if I cannot even tell what my responsibilities are?  How can I receive the 
revelation of the Other if I cannot interpret what I hear? How can I determine how to 
treat the Other if I lack a strong critical agency – which could enable me to distinguish 
the Other (my neighbour) from the enemy?  Of course, it could be said that one does 
interpret both in the case of Levinas and in Nietzsche, but one can never be sure that 
one’s interpretation is accurate or exhaustive.   
So even if on the surface there seems to be an agreement between Nietzsche and 
Levinas on the issue of never being able to know the Other, for Levinas, this is all the 
more reason that I am infinitely responsible for the Other – because I can never know 
whether I will be good enough in my services to the Other.  For Nietzsche, on the other 
side, the uncertainty surrounding (the true needs of) the Other only creates an 
alienating effect on the subject.  Nietzsche would therefore regard it as a flaw in 
Levinas’s argument that the latter hardly takes into consideration the sense of the 
estrangement the Other has upon one’s active critical agency.  That is why, it can be 
suggested that the Nietzschean active critical agency residing within the free spirit is a 
prerequisite even for the Levinasian subject whose spontaneity is suspended by the 
Other.  Even in order to be able to be suspended, first the self needs to have some 
substance of its own. 
Yet, Nietzsche is quite conscious of the fact that not everyone can be or needs to be a 
free spirit.  In TSZ, Zarathustra is well aware of the fact that very few will be able to get 
his message – if any.  Conformism will always be much more tempting than seeking 
one’s own path in life.  And to make matters even more complicated, contrary to what 
may come to mind, the notion of a free spirit has nothing to do with the superficial 
narcissism prevalent in today’s consumer society.  Contrary to its easygoing image, a 
free spirit in the Nietzschean sense is not someone who feels no obligations or any 
constraint strict enough to limit her.  She can be quite stoical in terms of organizing 
herself determinedly to attain an overall purpose through laborious self-restraint and 
discipline.   
The issue of self-training and the urge to organize oneself is the last issue I would like 
to raise regarding Nietzsche’s notion of perspectivism: the unconscious aspect at work 
within the individual.  Can my spontaneity be essentially my involuntary muscle 
movements?  For Nietzsche, body; reasoning; rationality; justification and ethics are all 
interconnected as they are interpreted by the body in a holistic manner.   
Since perspectivism is a claim about subjective reasoning and justification, it is not 
possible to determine to what exact extent the subjective is conscious.  Nietzsche’s 
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thought-provoking statements such as “Our most sacred convictions, the unchangeable 
in regard to our supreme values, are judgments of our muscles”81 make it difficult to 
evaluate perspectivism in a rational way.  As elaborated above, one is only partially 
conscious of one’s body or emotions – drives and affects.  The rest is unknown even to 
the agent as one is never fully aware of one’s own set of motivations.   
As the last facet of the concept, I intend to associate Nietzsche’s notion of 
perspectivism with his conception of the will to power; with the competitive wills 
conflicting and competing with one another, which is reminiscent of the agonistic 
contest.  Richardson points to the non-conscious aspect of perspectivism which plays a 
key role for the revaluation of values.  He notes that a perspective is not prior to or 
separated from the action but rather, is accompanied by it; unified in doing.  A 
perspective is primarily valuative by determining how things matter to the will in terms 
of value.82  In Richardson’s naturalistic account, a perspective can be equivalent to a 
drive because similar to a perspective, a drive is always already charged with its own 
interests.  A perspective does not mainly aim at truth83 as its perception is not even 
neutral;84 so perspectives and values are related to one another by the will to power.  
Nietzsche’s strong emphasis that a perspective is predetermined by one’s interests 
conveys that each will seeks empowerment by pursuing a goal that enables 
evaluation.85 
When Nietzsche implies value, he does not refer to good or bad; ethical or unethical.  
He acknowledges that Christianity created lots of values, but he does not mean those 
values were necessarily good or bad; some were inherently hypocritical; some were 
decent.  Values are beyond good and evil; some are life-enhancing (or healthy) 
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whereas some are life-negating (nihilistic or sickly).  But overall, values reveal 
interpretations of the world; they reflect our image of ourselves.  So, when Nietzsche 
emphasizes that we must create values after the death of God, he advocates creating 
new meanings, new interpretations for life.  In this respect, it becomes clear that 
perspectivism is about the revaluation of values.   
All in all, Levinas’s universalism suggests a single perspective without any major 
interaction or conflict with other perspectives.  Yet from a Nietzschean angle, it is not 
the will to power that is inherently amoral or nihilistic but rather it is Levinas’s imposition 
of a single interpretation of the world that leads to a nihilistic account of life by hindering 
progress through re-evaluation.  Nietzsche’s notion of perspectivism also reflects the 
method of Nietzsche’s notion of individualization; of knowing oneself.  Perspectivism 
highlights the necessity of self-knowledge – something Levinas hardly focuses on; as 
self-knowledge is a very under-developed theme in his philosophy.  A very crucial facet 
of perspectivism corresponds to seeking the best circumstances for one’s growth.  To 
attain personal greatness, one needs to wisely know one’s personal necessities and 
discover one’s own requirements.86     
Each individual needs different circumstances to flourish and become what one is.  
Even in nature needs vary: some plants need plenty of water and little sun (like ferns) 
whereas some others need little water and much exposure to sun (such as cacti).87  
Every metabolism is different and, consequently, each individual has unique needs for 
flourishing: some people with fast metabolisms need to eat a lot whereas others, with 
slow metabolisms, need to eat very little.  There is no one common recipe to apply to 
everyone, no matter how well-intentioned it is.  There is no single norm; no socio-
political system to determine the requirements of one’s own flourishing.  Only the 
individual can seek and find them for herself.  Nietzsche’s perspectivism is thus the 
perfect bridge to lead to his ad hominem arguments and cultivating the character. 
c) Subjectivity as Cultivating the Character 
... granting that one is a person, one has necessarily also the philosophy of one’s 
personality; there is, however, an important distinction here.  With the one it is his 
defects which philosophise, with the other it is his riches and powers.  The former 
requires his philosophy, whether it be his support, sedative, or medicine, as salvation, 
elevation, or self-alienation; with the latter it is merely a fine luxury, at best the 
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voluptuousness of a triumphant gratitude, which must inscribe itself ultimately in cosmic 
capitals on the heaven of ideas.
88
 
The discussion on perspectivism points to the intermediation between the conscious 
and the non-conscious aspects of the self.  In an attempt to pursue this line of thought, 
I will examine Nietzsche’s notion that the character is the concrete expression through 
which the self manifests itself.  So, in this section, I turn to the character and explore 
the meaning of subjectivity and ethics in terms of the character and critique Levinas’s 
conception of subjectivity from this angle.   
The impressive quote above from Nietzsche seems to follow nicely from my earlier 
discussion on generosity.  By analogy, the value or the rank of any philosophy depends 
on the personality of the philosopher and his motive – either out of negativity (pure 
reactivity) or affirmativeness (active and creative).  One could philosophize out of 
greedy self-preservation, and consequently re-produce traditional values, or one could 
be a thinker of benevolence and bear new fruits.   
This is the viewpoint from which I intend to reconsider Levinas’s responsible subject. 
Rather than seeking her own path in life and bearing her own fruits, does she simply 
hide behind her responsibilities?  Levinas typically responds to such questions by 
stating that I cannot be responsible for myself the way I am responsible for the Other.  
He thinks that what makes such a question insincere is the neglect of the essential 
separation between the self and the Other.  Levinas hints that mere self-occupation is 
self-gratification and vanity.  Yet, regarded from Nietzsche’s point of view, Levinas 
seems to restrain the flourishing of the character.  The Levinasian subject is always 
inhibited, and its potential active forces are suppressed with shame, guilt and 
responsibility for the Other. 
Even though Levinas gives elaborate and sophisticated accounts of the 
phenomenological sensibility and corporeality of the subject – the body that feels 
hunger, shame, erotic desire, need, pain and what not –, the Levinasian subject does 
not develop a character of its own.  In Levinas’s philosophy, the very idea of investing 
too much in oneself is unethical, which is evoked in his indirect and semi-critical 
description of interiority.  As mentioned above, Levinas suggests that, as an option, 
one can always consciously choose to remain closed within the confines of one’s home 
and shut oneself off from one’s responsibilities for the Other(s) – just like wearing the 
ring of Gyges and being invisible.  There is no internal contradiction in doing so.  
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However, in spite of the lack of internal contradiction, Levinas hints that this attitude is 
neither natural nor ethical as the uninterrupted life (by the call of the Other) is an 
ethically unchallenged life.   
Below, I challenge this view from the Nietzschean viewpoint which depicts the 
character as the site upon which aesthetics and ethics merge together, where the will 
to power manifests itself most clearly.  It is not the works; as they can always be done 
out of vanity, or words as one can always lie; but necessarily one’s character which 
displays the essential complexity of the active and passive forces inherent within one’s 
being.  The most determining factor is how one organizes one’s drives; how much one 
can refine or prepare them for an overall purpose.  In this sense, one’s character is 
one’s performative artwork, and that is what Nietzsche means by his famous idea of 
“having a style of character:” 
One Thing is Needful. – To “give style” to one’s character – that is a grand and a rare 
art!  He who surveys all that his nature presents in its strength in its weakness, and then 
fashions it into an ingenious plan, until everything appears artistic and rational, and 
even the weaknesses enchant the eye – exercises that admirable art.  Here there has 
been a great amount of second nature added, there a portion of first nature has been 
taken away:-- in both cases with long exercise and daily labour at the task.  Here the 
ugly, which does not permit of being taken away, has been concealed, there it has been 
re-interpreted into the sublime.  Much of the vague, which refuses to take form, has 
been reserved and utilised for the perspectives:-- it is meant to give a hint of the remote 
and immeasurable.  In the end, when the work has been completed, it is revealed how it 
was the constraint of the same taste that organised and fashioned it in whole and in 
part: whether the taste was good or bad is of less importance than one thinks,-- it is 
sufficient that it was a taste!
89
        
As for Nietzsche, giving style to one’s character is in continuity with his emphasis on 
knowing oneself in terms of determining the best conditions for one’s flourishing.  The 
metaphor of “giving style” as if one is moulding clay implies the active force of creativity 
an individual has at her disposal.  One’s “character,” on the other hand, is a 
combination of one’s principles (the conscious aspect of perspective) and one’s 
temperament (the uncontrollable aspect of one’s inner drives).  It is a matter of  forming 
and being formed.  For this reason, it can be suggested that giving style to one’s 
character hosts allusions to both active and passive forces at work and hints at an 
intermediation between Apollo and Dionysus; between reason and passion.  It is an 
ardent life-consuming work which requires laborious training.  
Cultivating one’s personality is a crucial aspect of subjectivity because it stimulates the 
creative forces at work within one’s own self.  Individuation; or “becoming who one is” 
can be achieved as one learns to incorporate one’s own values or one’s own 
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“philosophy” – in the sense of “the way of life” – into one’s own life.  Nietzsche strives 
to revive the times when philosophy was practised not as an academic career pursuit 
imprisoned within the gloomy walls of lecture rooms; but as it was lived.  He notes the 
etymological aspect of reality as “act”uality (Akt-ualität); thereby noting the continuity 
between acting, performing, living and creating “reality.”90  
In his early works, Nietzsche displays a keen interest in the organic bond between the 
philosophy and the philosopher, the man.   Nietzsche is fascinated by the ancient 
Greek philosophers before Plato; he calls them pre-Platonic philosophers, and includes 
Socrates as the last genuine philosopher of this range because according to Nietzsche, 
Socrates still kept his “purity.”  That is, all these figures such as Thales, Anaximander, 
Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Zeno, Anaxagoras, 
Empedocles, Leucippus, Democritus and Socrates exemplified certain archetypes of 
being a philosopher by interpreting the world and building their systems based on the 
uniqueness of their personalities.   
Nietzsche argues that starting with Plato, philosophers started to be “mixtures;” or in 
the post-modern sense, they employed the “pastiche” personality strategy – for 
instance, selecting and mingling “the regal exclusive and self-contained Heraclitus with 
the melancholy compassionate and legislative Pythagoras and the psychologically 
acute dialectician Socrates.”91  Nietzsche’s early interest in the “personalities” of these 
ancient philosophers can be regarded as a foreshadowing of his later notion of 
individualism and perspectivism.  In Beyond Good and Evil, he writes that each system 
of philosophy reveals the imprint of the personality of its creator.  In that respect, each 
philosophy is inevitably autobiographical as the personal element; the individuality of 
the philosopher cannot be overlooked.  Pointing to the significance of the individual 
character of the specific philosopher; together with his inner drives, affects, desires, 
attitudes, biochemistry and so on; is Nietzsche’s attempt to reincorporate the character 
back into philosophy:  
It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has 
consisted of – namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and 
unconscious auto-biography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in 
every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has 
grown.
92
  
Could we think that Nietzsche is trivializing the universal insights of any philosophy by 
reducing it to the mere idiosyncratic ranting of its specific thinker? One could make this 
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argument and find this idea offensive if and only if she has a low opinion of 
individuality.  However for Nietzsche, that does not necessarily signify denigration but 
to the contrary, the individual is sacred since it is the “character” that matters.  
According to Nietzsche, the thing that determines the ethical value of an act is neither 
the intentions of the person nor the consequences but rather depends on “who” does it.   
As a matter of fact, this idea is evoked both in my earlier discussion of generosity and 
in the opening quote of this section above.  Regarding generosity, I commented that 
the generosity of the weak cannot have the same worth as the generosity of the strong 
or the noble.  The pious can be generous out of weakness; out of the fear of God or for 
the sake of demanding protection from the strong party in return – with the expectation 
of some sort of reward, either in this world or in the afterlife.  The strong-natured on the 
other hand, can be generous as the expression of her overflowing abundance; without 
expecting any reward or reciprocity of any kind – neither in this world nor in the next 
one.  It is a manifestation of the bestowing virtue.   
As for the opening quote, the ascetic priest – disguised as the philosopher – can 
philosophize to camouflage his hidden wish for salvation in his nihilistic discourse 
whereas the free spirit, the philosopher of the future, can employ his rigour and gift in a 
lavish display of extraordinary ideas.  Marking the continuity between these two cases, 
we can observe the remarkable self-affirmation on behalf of the generosity of the noble 
and the philosophy of the free spirit.  
Thomas H. Brobjer claims that Nietzsche’s affirmative ethics can best be understood 
as an “ethics of the character.”93  Brobjer notes that “the word ‘ethics’ comes from the 
Greek ta ethika (or ethikos), which originally comes from the word ethos, meaning 
‘character,’”94 and he claims that Nietzsche must have been quite conscious of this 
fact.  Brobjer argues that Nietzsche’s main fascination with the ancient Greeks is that 
they had a very unique relationship with their gods.  Unlike Judaeo-Christians, who 
idealized God as an external or otherworldly fantasy, the Greeks regarded their gods 
as the beings which exemplified what is best in man:     
The Greeks did not see the Homeric gods as set above them as masters, or themselves 
set beneath the gods as servants, as the Jews did.  They saw as it were only the 
reflection of the most successful exemplars of their own caste, that is to say an ideal, 
not an antithesis of their own nature.
95
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Brobjer suggests that it is most plausible to understand Nietzsche’s notion of the 
Overman (the Übermensch) from this point of view.  In his interpretation of Nietzsche, 
solid personality or the character is much more relevant to philosophy than abstract 
sets of ideas or conceptual systems.  In this sense, Brobjer likens Higher Men – the 
candidates for the Overman, as elaborated in TSZ - to Greek gods since they solidify 
the “most successful exemplars.”96  Perhaps the Overman does not exist physically.  
Nietzsche gives no concrete example; and even Zarathustra, towards the end of Book 
IV, becomes disillusioned about his own fallacy.  He is frustrated with the fact that what 
he thinks could be the candidates for the Overman at “The Ass Festival” are still 
worshippers of some form.  They worship the ass, which says “yea” to everything – a 
caricatured version of life affirmation devoid of any critical agency of which Nietzsche 
wishes us to beware.97 
Yet, even the idea of the Overman is a much more naturalizing idea than preaching a 
religious figure or a prophet.  Presumably, in Nietzsche’s mind the notion of an 
Overman is much more human and bound to earth; much less alienating than the 
overly-idealized Jesus Christ, even though he actually existed in history.  Maybe it 
could be wise to remember Zarathustra’s dedication page and think about it in relation 
to the Overman – perhaps he is “everyone and no one.”  He is to be sought neither 
melancholically in the ancient past nor within the delusion of a redemptive future but is 
to be found within oneself. 
Overall, compared with the Levinasian subject, Nietzsche has a much more complex 
account of selfhood than Levinas.  Nietzsche appreciates the richness and the 
complexity of the inner drives which are evaluative, hence crucial for creativity.  In 
Nietzsche’s thought, creativity cannot be merely reduced to the artistic drive that 
pursues pretty things in life that aesthetically please the viewer but is the modality of 
existence; the force that prompts constant creation; re-creation; interpretation and re-
interpretation with ethical ramifications.98  Levinas’s subject of substitution only acts in 
accordance with responsibility; responding to the Other which, from a Nietzschean 
perspective, seems slavish because she is only “re-active” to the Other; far from 
originating action from within herself.  The Other always alludes to the exterior, so the 
Levinasian subject is always obsessed with her (human) environment; with what is not 
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her.  Acting only reactively, she is essentially passive – in the Nietzschean denigrating 
sense.   
At this point, we may be tempted to bring up the significance of enjoyment and ask how 
this passivity and slavishness reconcile with Levinas’s assertion that life is essentially 
the love of life, as vividly depicted in Totality.  In my view, there is no contradiction 
here.  Let us take a look at a relevant passage from Levinas:  
Life is affectivity and sentiment; to live is to enjoy life.  To despair of life makes sense 
only because originally life is happiness ...  The personality of the person, the ipseity of 
the I, which is more than the particularity of the atom and of the individual, is the 
particularity of the happiness of enjoyment.  Enjoyment accomplishes the atheist 
separation; it deformalizes the notion of separation, which is not a cleavage made in the 
abstract, but the existence at home with itself of an autochthonous I.  The soul is not, as 
in Plato, what “has the care of inanimate being everywhere”
99
; it to be sure dwells in 
what is not itself, but it acquires its own identity by this dwelling in the “other” (and not 
logically, by opposition to the other).
100
   
As I have already emphasized above, in Levinas’s philosophy only an enjoying subject 
can suffer.  The second sentence of the quote above highlights the close 
interdependence between enjoyment and suffering.  Enjoyment has to be prior to 
suffering because without that original sensation, the subject would not even literally be 
capable of suffering – she would not be aware of it.  In addition, after emphasizing the 
uniqueness of the individual (of enjoyment), Levinas states that enjoyment, which hosts 
my particularity, leads to the “atheist separation.”  The subject of enjoyment always 
coincides with the atheistic self where resides the “autochthonous I.”  The atheistic self 
is crucial for the awareness of the separation because only after realizing that the 
cluster of needs does not suffice does the self feel the Desire for the transcendence; 
for the Other; thus steps outside of its home (metaphorically; not in a literally spatio-
temporal manner of course) to open itself to the Other, and thereby gain its “identity.”  
To me, the last sentence is sufficient to prove that the importance of enjoyment does 
not refute my argument.  Levinas clearly states that “the soul ... acquires its own 
identity by this dwelling in the ‘other.’”    
Yet it is important to note that by personality Levinas implies the ipseity of the I rather 
than character in the Nietzschean sense.  Ipseity is my individuation; my being singled 
out; being (s)elected.  Ipseity does not suggest the individual freely expressing his or 
her identity but being a hostage; being called to justice.  The idea of my soul gaining its 
identity by dwelling in the Other is an idea closely supporting the notion of the “divine 
discomfort” that liberates me, which is the key idea of substitution; that which imprisons 
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me at the same time elevates me.  And only a primordially atheistic, originally enjoying 
self can be capable of receiving the relevation of the Other.  For this reason, in spite of 
the stress Levinas puts on enjoyment, I observe a strong continuity between Totality 
and Infinity and Otherwise Than Being in terms of the essential passivity and the 
exposedness of the subject before the Other.        
Levinas’s neglect of the individual is observed by many philosophers and critics.  In an 
interview, Levinas himself says that Paul Ricoeur tells him that his (Levinas’s) “’I’ has 
no self-esteem.”101  Hillary Putnam comments that pursuing Levinas’s notion of 
subjectivity to the extent of substitution and accepting responsibility even for one’s own 
persecution eventually leads the individual to a one-sided life.102  Jean-Michel 
Longneaux notes that while comparing and contrasting Nietzsche and Levinas on the 
issue of subjectivity, one cannot help but notice that the former theorizes about a 
subject that still has zest in life whereas the latter’s subject looks so miserable.103  
Maurice Blanchot interprets Levinas’s notion of subjectivity as “dis-individuation” – to 
the point of losing the ethical – and “subjectivity without a subject.”104  Levinas’s subject 
is always in exile whereas Nietzsche’s free spirit is everywhere at home.  The latter 
takes suffering lightly as it comes; not because he is used to suffering, but because he 
loves life.  And he loves life not because he is used to living but because he is used to 
loving.105  
What leaves the Levinasian subject vulnerable to such criticisms is that Levinas 
associates freedom with shame.  Far from the Nietzschean free spirit who prioritizes 
individuality, active creativity, expressiveness and freedom, Levinas regards freedom 
as a mode of inhibition.  Levinas defines ethics as the moment when my spontaneity is 
called into question.  Thus, in his philosophy, freedom cannot be arbitrary or self-
justificatory.  Rather, it can only be granted by the Other.  The limits of my freedom can 
only be determined by the Other, and the only feeling accompanying this freedom is 
shame:            
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Thus this way of measuring oneself against the perfection of infinity is not a theoretical 
consideration; it is accomplished as shame, where freedom discovers itself murderous 
in its very exercise.  It is accomplished in shame where freedom at the same time is 
discovered in the consciousness of shame and is concealed in shame itself ... Morality 
begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and 
violent ...  Existence is not in reality condemned to freedom, but is invested as freedom.  
To philosophize is to trace freedom back to what lies before it, to disclose the investiture 
that liberates freedom from the arbitrary.
106
  
In Levinas’s account, shame and the Desire are interdependent; reinforcing each other.  
The more I feel shame over my spontaneity, the more I desire the Other and am prone 
to fulfilling my responsibilities for the Other.  It is with shame that I serve the Other.  My 
shame also makes me capable of being ethical, because only a creature capable of 
shame can be capable of receiving a revelation.107  According to Levinas, freedom 
cannot be justified by itself;108 the subject cannot justify herself but can only be 
critiqued by the Other and since justice comes forth with the third party, the freedom of 
the Levinasian subject is granted by the third party.  As objection to this idea, Nietzsche 
annuls the authority of the third party and ascribes full authority to the individual 
subject.  Authority moves from the third party, to the man.        
Brobjer notes that Nietzsche pursues the ad hominem argument which literally means 
“directed at the man – rather than at the principles.”109  With this proposition, Brobjer 
comments than rather than evaluating a philosopher based on his work or deeds, it is 
best to trace the philosophy to the character of the philosopher to fully realize its 
“essence.”  Nietzsche considers ad hominem arguments as “the strongest possible 
form of arguments”110 because they focus on the concrete individual; hence avoid the 
fallacies of rational arguments, free will or hidden intentions.  
Obviously, what determines the value of a person or the level of the nobility of her 
character is her “rank.”  Yet it is crucial to understand the Nietzschean notion of “rank” 
properly.  What causes so much controversy and misunderstanding regarding 
Nietzsche’s “evil” nobles is that we often associate rank with some kind of visible 
measure or the outcome of some sort of “objective” evaluation.  However, Nietzsche 
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interprets rank as a purely subjective phenomenon; as a matter of fact it is so 
subjective that it has no objective criteria other than “self-reverence” which may not 
even be observable from the outside.  Nietzsche thinks that people – mainly 
philosophers and artists – who endow themselves within an air of flamboyance are 
often pathetic creatures desperately trying to “convince” others of their feigned nobility.  
Nobility is not something to be sought, or found or lost.  Interestingly, in the signif icant 
quote below, Nietzsche asks the question not as “who” is noble, but explicitly as “what” 
is noble: 
What is noble?  What does the word “noble” still mean for us nowadays?  How does the 
noble man betray himself, how is he recognised under this heavy overcast sky of the 
commencing plebeianism, by which everything is rendered opaque and leaden? – It is 
not his actions which establish his claim – actions are always ambiguous, always 
inscrutable; neither is it his “works”.  One finds nowadays among artists and scholars 
plenty of those who betray by their works that a profound longing for nobleness impels 
them; but this very need of nobleness is radically different from the needs of the noble 
soul itself, and is in fact the eloquent and dangerous sign of the lack thereof.  It is not 
the works, but the belief which is here decisive and determines the order of rank – to 
employ once more an old religious formula with a new and deeper meaning – it is some 
fundamental certainty which a noble soul has about itself, something which is not to be 
sought, is not to be found, and perhaps, also, is not to be lost. – The noble soul has 
reverence for itself. –
111
   
It is neither one’s works nor one’s deeds, but nobleness is a matter of “self-reverence.”  
However, it must be noted that what Nietzsche means by self-reverence cannot be 
associated with the Levinasian idea of self-coincidence.  As elaborated above, Levinas 
articulates his conception of substitution by initially harshly criticizing the Cartesian ego 
which ventures out only to come back to where it started; and what at first sight naively 
seems like an opening or an exploration towards to the unknown ends up being an 
assimilation of the exterior into the self-same.  By coinciding with itself, the ego only 
consolidates its narcissistic image.   
Nietzsche is immune to this line of criticism because what he means by self-reverence 
does not aim to crystallize a rigid self.  Rather, as explained above, the Nietzschean 
notion of the self undergoes innumerable change and interpretation – and actually it is 
this constant renewal that constitutes the essence of the self.  Another example of this 
flexible account of the self is also visible in Nietzsche’s rejection of revenge and regret 
– to the point of life affirmation and amor fati.  Experiencing self-transformation by 
embracing the element of chance112 and the dice throw of innocent existence, the 
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Nietzschean notion of life affirmation illustrates that the exposition of the Nietzschean 
self does not aim for the consolidation of an ego via self-coincidence.  It is instead a 
flexible being that undergoes constant change by self-transformation. 
However, the self-reverence of the Nietzschean noble is open to misinterpretation 
because as already mentioned above, critics often take Nietzsche’s notion of the will to 
power as a representable phenomenon and consequently regard the noble from the 
perspective of the slave – as he sees the master.  For instance, Silvia Benso argues 
that when the master narcissistically affirms himself – and life –, what he is celebrating 
is his warrior nature and conquering his environment.  She claims that within the 
affirmation of the master lies a negation of the slave.  As if for self-definition, the master 
relies on the slave as well; she expresses this idea as she writes: “without the lamb, the 
bird of prey is only a hungry animal.”113   
The negation of the slave by the master is also suggested by Christopher Hamilton 
who notes the sarcasm in Nietzsche’s statement as he writes on behalf of the master: 
“We do not hate lambs, we love them, there is nothing tastier than a tender lamb!”  
Hamilton remarks that Nietzsche’s dismissive and ridiculing attitude does not touch the 
problem, but tends to escape the controversy rather than propose an answer.114  
However, I think that it is important to understand that in Nietzsche’s account, the 
master does not rely on the slave for self-definition.   
Even if Nietzsche’s notorious statement may look like an evasive strategy, Nietzsche 
nevertheless conveys that the relationship between the prey and the predator is quite 
distinct from the relationship between the master and the slave.  The prey does not 
take the predator’s attack personally; it is a moment of c’est la vie.  The predator, on 
the other hand, does not necessarily hate the prey or have any negative feelings about 
it.  The former does not negate the other; but nourishes itself by incorporating it into its 
body.  Yet nourishment is not negation because in nature, animals do not act on 
feelings of ressentiment.  So neither the prey nor the predator establishes their 
identities based on the other one.    
The master slave relationship, however, is entirely different.  First of all, the master 
lacks the sufficient self awareness to think that he is the master.  He does not see 
himself the way slave sees him; he is not self-conscious enough.  He does not feel the 
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need to establish and assert its superiority by comparing its power to the slave’s.  The 
main difference between the master and the slave is that the former does not compare 
or measure its power to the others the way the latter does.   The whole master-slave 
dialectic is an invention or interpretation of the slave, whose language and mentality we 
have inherited and currently use.  The dialectic is based on comparison and contrast of 
power, so the slave needs an illustration of power – spiritual, religious power or 
asceticism - to compensate for its incapacity to beat the master.  Nietzsche expresses 
this idea as he indicates:  
It is the slave who seeks to persuade us to have a good opinion of him; it is also the 
slave who then bends his knee before these opinions as if it was not him who produced 
them.  And I repeat: vanity is an atavism.
115
  
Deleuze notes that this is a “false image of the master,”116 yet nevertheless, this is still 
the image we have of the master, which we have appropriated from the perspective of 
the slave.  The slave mistakenly regards power as a representational phenomenon, 
however power is not to be represented, interpreted nor evaluated – as these are all 
passive actions.  Rather, power is an active concept by nature; it wills; it evaluates; it 
interprets.    
In order to overcome nihilism, Nietzsche proposes a transmutation of values, which 
requires a completely different way of thinking and feeling.117  Rather than offering 
mere escapism or indifferent absorption in abstract contemplation or adoring the so-
called genius or popular artist, Nietzsche considers art crucial for evoking new 
possibilities.  As explained before, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, art has the capacity to 
“evaluate;” even make us reconsider the concept of “evaluation” itself.  Different from 
the scientific or mechanical-technical measurements, and different from the spiritual 
mystification that pertains to religion or ritualistic morality, art has the possibility to 
signify a fresh beginning.  Artistic evaluation can enable the process of transformation 
of values in a both creative and destructive manner.  Thus Nietzsche observes a 
complementary continuity; an interdependence between the aesthetic and the ethical.  
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Keith Ansell Pearson notes that developing creativity can also help us find “new ways 
for being ethical”118 by enabling us to discover new perspectives and new sensibilities.   
This mode of thinking is quite different from Levinas who considers arts – or the 
aesthetic – and the ethical to be a troublesome, almost oppositional, combination.  
Levinas displays a doubtful attitude towards the significance and the value of arts 
mainly because he regards it as having a problematic relationship to ethics.  As 
elaborated above, in implicit agreement with Plato, he regards the artwork as unreliable 
in depicting truth, and he is cautious about the artwork’s tendency to suggest an easy 
escapism such as turning one away from one’s responsibilities.  Levinas is also worried 
that in their attempt to make something – a traumatic event for instance – aesthetic, 
artworks can banalize it by ripping it off from its original pain and placing it in a new 
aesthetic context for artistic contemplation and enjoyment.119      
Rather than the artwork, which is an exclusive context whose internal consistency has 
no reference to the outside (which is I think reminiscent of Levinas’s equivocal attitude 
towards erotic love120), Levinas values art criticism which signifies an opening of 
dialogue as critique invites the third party – together with justice and ethics.  However, 
in spite of his distant approach to arts and his criticism of the potential irresponsibility of 
the aesthetics, we can easily observe that Levinas himself has been hugely affected by 
literature. 
Levinas confesses that in his search for the “meaning of life” or necessarily the 
“philosophical problem of the meaning of being human,” he has been immensely 
influenced by the Russian classics; notably Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, Turgenev, 
Dostoevsky and Tolstoy.121  In addition he is also affected by Shakespeare and Vasily 
Grossman.  Moreover, the impression Grossman and Dostoevsky leave on Levinas is 
so great that, in his philosophical masterpieces, he frequently quotes the latter while 
formulating his conception of subjectivity.122     
We can infer that notwithstanding his worries, Levinas cannot remain indifferent to 
artworks; they affect him as a person, as a philosopher and as a writer.  Interestingly, it 
is not the art criticisms – the conversation-openers – or the literature reviews of the 
works of Dostoevsky or Grossman but necessarily the works themselves that speak to 
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Levinas and move him at his very core.  Rather than leading him to self-indulgence, 
these works of art contribute to both his character and his philosophy of ethics.  It 
seems to me that he proves Nietzsche right in the sense that ethics and aesthetics are 
interdependent.  Of course, it could be argued that those literary works mainly interest 
Levinas because of their substantial thematic contents which convey ethical insights 
about what it means to be a human being.  And obviously, literature as a genre can 
express such themes much more effectively.  However still, in spite of his Platonic 
reservations, we see that Levinas cannot be indifferent to works that invite ethical 
contemplation and evoke the power of transcendence and humanism.123     
However, as mentioned above, Nietzsche’s interest in arts and aesthetics is above 
mere artworks and their thematic contents or the aims of the artists.  He is mainly 
fascinated by the process of creativity in composing the human soul.  Nietzsche’s 
conception of art is closely related to his notion of the Overman which is the ultimate 
example of creativity and the transmutation of values; in which the character, ethics 
and aesthetics are united.  Even if it sounds like an unrealistic super-hero, in Nietzsche 
the Overman is the most sincere path an individual can possibly put oneself upon.  
Nietzsche evokes this feeling as he makes Zarathustra holler: 
Could you create a god? – So be silent about all gods!  But you could surely create the 
Superman.   
Perhaps not you yourselves, my brothers!  But you could transform yourselves into 
forefathers and ancestors of the Superman:  and let this be your finest creating!
124
  
In portraying the Overman, I am in agreement with John Richardson’s account 
according to which, the “master,” the “slave” and the “Overman” point at evolving types 
of persons.125  The master is not only the personification of the active type who 
organizes his creative drives for an overall purpose but also is the prerequisite of the 
slave.  By way of its vital animalistic primitiveness, the master ignites within the slave 
the feeling of reactivity accompanied by the sense of ressentiment and justice which 
constitute the richness of the latter’s inner drives.  The Overman is partially master and 
partially slave but superior to both types.  Nietzsche does not yet give an example of 
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 Even though Levinas attempts to “defend” his captivation by modern literature by suggesting 
that modern literature is exceptional as its self-reflexivity invalidates the artistic idolatry and 
hence invites criticism, I do not find this idea quite convincing.  Since self-reflexivity can be 
considered to be a characteristic of modern art in general (and it is not only limited to modern 
art but also affects postmodern and contemporary art), I do not see why a Dostoevsky novel 
should necessarily be more self-reflexive than a Picasso painting, for instance.  The latter can 
be regarded just as open to criticism through self-reflexivity.  Yet since this is a vast topic, 
treating it in justice would require writing another dissertation project.   
124
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to the same notion of the Übermensch; but I preferred the latter and used it throughout the 
dissertation.   
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 See page 31-31. 
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such a person as s/he does not yet exist.126  Nietzsche imagines that person to be “the 
Roman Caesar with Christ’s soul,”127 and regards man as a bridge128 rather than a goal 
and explicitly states that “the Overman is the meaning of the earth.”129 
Towards the end of this chapter, I would like to return to one last issue which is one of 
Nietzsche’s most provocative ideas.  Nietzsche suggests that any philosophy is the 
autobiography of its philosopher.  This idea seems to wrap up the universal versus 
perspectivist conflict and seems to offer a (Nietzschean) solution.  Below is the last 
lengthy quote from Nietzsche:   
Apart from the value of such assertions as “there is a categorical imperative in us”, one 
can always ask: What does such an assertion indicate about him who makes it?  There 
are systems of morals which are meant to justify their author in the eyes of other 
people; other systems of morals are meant to tranquillise him, and make him self-
satisfied; with other systems he wants to crucify and humble himself; with others he 
wishes to take revenge; with others to conceal himself; with others to glorify himself and 
gain superiority and distinction; -- this system of morals helps its author to forget, that 
system makes him, or something of him, forgotten; many a moralist would like to 
exercise power and creative arbitrariness over mankind; many other, perhaps, Kant 
especially, gives us to understand by his morals that “what is estimable in me, is that I 
know how to obey – and with you it shall not be otherwise that with me!” In short, 
systems of morals are only a sign-language of the emotions.
130
  
The relevance of Nietzsche’s ad hominem argument to Levinas can be construed as 
we imagine Nietzsche posing the curious question: “What does Levinas’s over-
emphasis on responsibility and his account of subjectivity manifesting itself in terms of 
‘hostage,’ ‘guilt’ and ‘persecution’ necessarily say about Levinas?”  Since Levinas’s 
Otherwise Than Being is a densely “emotional” book, it is tempting to claim that it is an 
emotional response to what he had to endure during the Holocaust era – as it is also 
made explicit by the dedication at the beginning of the book.  
We could think that terms such as “hostage,” “persecution” or “trauma” are not to be 
taken literally but metaphorically; and already constituting the self at a pre-rational and 
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 Nietzsche states: “... my concept ‘Dionysian’ here became the highest deed; all the rest of 
human activity looks poor and limited in comparison.  The fact that a Goethe, a Shakespeare, 
would not know how to breathe for a second in this incredible passion and height, that 
compared to Zarathustra, Dante is just another one of the faithful and not one who first creates 
truth, a world-governing spirit, a destiny-” (EH, “Why I Write Such Good Books,” TSZ, 6).   
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pre-conscious level (“older than the ego”131), not necessarily corresponding to one’s 
actual life experience.  However, to this assertion, Nietzsche could counter-attack by 
suggesting that the autobiography is done “involuntarily” or “unconsciously.”  So, even 
if Levinas consciously says that hostage and persecution are non-literal terms, from a 
Nietzschean view, they could be alluding to “an involuntary and unconscious 
autobiography.”132  Considering the socio-political circumstances Levinas had to 
undergo in his life – his victimization during the Holocaust era – and the literal hostage-
status and persecution he experienced as he was kept prisoner, Nietzsche’s 
proposition sounds much more striking and vivid.  As a matter of fact, Levinas never 
denies that the Holocaust affected and traumatized him permanently.  Yet he could 
resent the universality of his philosophy of ethics to be reduced to an “unconscious 
memoire.”133   
Of course, Levinas’s philosophy as the symptom of his character does not undermine 
his philosophy or make his arguments invalid.  On the contrary, Levinas seems to 
exemplify Nietzsche’s point perfectly.  But if what he philosophizes is merely the 
imagination or his “emotional response” to the world he lived in, then it is naive to 
attribute objectivity or universalism – and is universalism not the essential criterion of 
ethics? – to his “perspective.”  This is the big problem for ethics; and all accounts of 
ethics, apart from Nietzsche’s “individualistic” ethics of the will to power aspire to claim 
universality.   
As for Nietzsche, the naivety of every philosopher lies in that fact that each one 
necessarily tries to persuade the rest of the world that their perspective is the 
perspective; the objective or moral truth.  This is the case, Nietzsche thinks, with every 
philosopher, including even Nietzsche himself.134  The significant statement of 
Zarathustra must always be kept in mind: “This is my way, which one is yours?  For the 
way, does not exist.”135  It is my contention that this motto best summarizes both 
Nietzsche’s moral perspectivism and individualism.  
Conclusion 
Even though Nietzsche suggests that everyone can seek self-mastery by refining their 
perspectives; and even though Nietzsche addresses everyone in the dedication to 
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Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he is well aware that there will only be a very few individuals 
who can “get the message” – metaphorically of course, as is clear from Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, there is no message in the literal sense.  On the other hand, when Levinas 
addresses everyone, he means everyone; Levinas is convinced that the Bible speaks 
to the whole of humanity, and his philosophy is universal enough to be valid for the 
whole world.  His humble message is ambitiously universal.        
When compared with Levinas, in spite of his vehement and at times aggressive 
individualism, Nietzsche’s message seems much more modest.  Nietzsche’s modesty 
is also observed by Keith Ansell Pearson who notes that the way one cultivates oneself 
is analogous to the gardener stylizing nature; one purifies one’s drives and affects 
depending on one’s taste, in whichever style – French, Dutch, English, Chinese or 
whatever - one likes.136  
I would like to end this chapter with a final modest suggestion:  maybe not the 
Levinasian subject; not the subject of substitution, but Levinas himself could be an 
exemplar of a candidate for the Overman.  The human-all-too-human Levinas certainly 
refines his drive to seek the genuine meaning of ethics in his philosophy.  He unites his 
religious faith with rigorous philosophical argument, and in spite of his doubtful attitude 
towards works, he produces two artistic masterpieces.  Having given style to his 
character, one assumes that he publishes them not out of vanity but rather because he 
sincerely thinks that he has cultivated a message to convey to the world.     
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CONCLUSION 
Very broadly, Nietzsche and Levinas attempt to rethink the meaning of ethics in a world 
where neither religions nor current moral philosophies provide definite references any 
longer. For Nietzsche, consequent to the death of God, the conventional notion of the 
subject has to be redefined in order to refute the impending nihilism that comes with 
losing faith in the dogmatic. Noting Nietzsche's key insights, Levinas reinterprets 
religiosity1 by re-emphasising the significance of the Infinite and the Good beyond 
Being, in order to ascertain the essential orientation of the ethical as he realises that 
Western philosophy fails to acknowledge the Other. I believe there is a special 
relationship – not so loose and definitely not so direct – between Nietzsche and 
Levinas which is also observed by John Llewelyn, who remarks on the stimulating 
relationship between these utterly different philosophers, and suggests that Levinas is 
at the same time very close to and very distant from Nietzsche.2   
In their quest for the meaning of subjectivity both Levinas and Nietzsche offer us 
invaluable insights; partly in terms of highlighting the prerequisite of serving the Other 
and partly by seeking the possibility of creating values. Their search for the meaning of 
subjectivity undoubtedly coincides with the necessity to revisit ethics. It could be 
suggested that the special connection between the two philosophers reveals itself as 
they hint at certain common starting points which ramify in various directions in their 
projects. As the most notable aspect, both Nietzsche and Levinas regard subjectivity as 
a “disunity;” a platform hosting passivity, activity and reactivity. Rather than seeing the 
subject as a conatus essendi – a rational agent pursuing its determined, premeditated 
plans in life – they regard it essentially as an undergoing.3  In Nietzsche’s case, the 
subject is the animal forced to keep his promise, whereas for Levinas, the subject is 
exposed to the point of being hostage as it displays a primordial passivity before the 
Other. 
                                                             
1 Levinas: “In this work which does not seek to restore any ruined concept, the destitution and 
the desituating of the subject do not remain without signification: after the death of a certain god 
inhabiting the world behind the scenes, the substitution of the hostage discovers the trace, the 
unpronounceable inscription, of what, always already past, always ‘he,’ does not enter into any 
present, to which are suited not the nouns designating beings, or the verbs in which their 
essence resounds, but that which, as a pronoun, marks with its seal all that a noun can convey.” 
(OTB, 185). 
2
 John Llewelyn states this just before the Abbreviations section of his book, yet his reference to 
this connection is also visible in the title of his book on Levinas, The Genealogy of Ethics, 
London: Routledge, 1995.  
3
 Remarking on similarity between the two philosophers, Jill Stauffer notes that considering the 
diverse effects and drives, the Nietzschean self experiences its subjectivity essentially as a 
mode of passivity as well. She elaborates on these ideas in her essay “The Imperfect: Levinas, 
Nietzsche, and the Autonomous Subject,” in Bergo and Stauffer (eds.). 
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In addition, for both philosophers, memory and suffering are crucial themes constituting 
the identity of the subject. Judith Butler points out that in Nietzsche, man’s memory is a 
wounded memory, which is based on his wounded relationship with the other4 to keep 
his promise by paying his debt. Yet, Nietzsche associates memory with ressentiment 
and innocence with forgetfulness.5 For Levinas, on the other hand, memory is the 
crucial aspect constituting one’s identity by hosting painful memories. However, 
contrary to Nietzsche, Levinas associates forgetfulness with immorality and inhumanity. 
As he also implies in his dedication to OTB, innocence resides not in forgetfulness but 
in remembrance.   
The last remarkable parallel between the two philosophers is the theme of self-
overcoming, whose ramifications are utterly distinct for each thinker. Unlike Levinas’s 
account, which seeks transcendence by the constant effort towards moral self-coming 
via prioritising the Other before the self, in Nietzsche’s account self-overcoming 
signifies an individual striving for being on the ascending line of life in terms of creating 
values. For this reason, Llewelyn suggests that contrary to Levinas’s humanism, 
Nietzsche is an over-humanist,6 according to which view it is morally justified for the 
man to sacrifice himself on the way to the Overman, since after all, man is mainly a 
bridge; an undergoing for the Overman.  
Even though Nietzsche’s interpretation of the human subject is fundamentally 
naturalistic, it undeniably hints at the transcendent as well. On the one hand Nietzsche 
regards man as a part of nature, as an organism which acts according to the will to 
power. But on the other hand, he still anticipates a kind of rupture; the trace of some 
transcendental capacity in man. In spite of man’s origin as the wild beast, Nietzsche’s 
account also contains some pseudo (or beyond) naturalistic references. The Overman 
is a perfectionist ideal or fiction which alludes to a very special breed of mankind to 
come into being after man evolves himself over a significant course of time.   
As a very special case of a neurological, moral, cultural and individual self-
overcoming,7 Overman is the rupture of mankind, and the way to lead to the Overman 
is to cultivate the power of creativity and think beyond ressentiment or the binary 
opposition of good and evil. Thus, we see that Nietzsche tries to undo the separation 
between humanism and naturalism by exploring the human-all-too-human account in 
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6
 Ibid., 162. 
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 Dove, 103. 
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which man seeks to interpret the world through sciences, arts and morality by the 
beyond human and beyond natural urge: the will to power. It is the will to power that 
creates values and evaluates life in man’s image.   
However, all in all, Nietzsche and Levinas differ in so many diverse ways offering us a 
quite rich and productive space to examine and develop their stimulating ideas. As they 
prompt us to reconsider our notion of subjectivity, both philosophers at the same time 
try to overcome nihilism that is doomed to haunt the world. William Large suggests a 
key point of the main distinction between the two philosophers by noting that Nietzsche 
and Levinas exemplify the different approaches between genealogy and 
phenomenology; the former concept signifies the “use,” whereas the latter points at the 
“meaning” of what is disputed.   
For example, since the genealogist is interested in the use of the word “god,” he traces 
the norms of morality and observes the foundation of social practices, customs and 
traditions which propagate the notions of guilt and debt and links them to the subject. 
The connection between the creditor and god reveals the manipulation of power as the 
concept is a carbon copy disclosing the power relationships in a society, where 
interpreting the word of god grants the (ascetic) priest power. Thus, Nietzsche is 
interested in unravelling the use of god in socio-political manipulation of power 
relations. On the other side, the phenomenologist is interested in the meaning of the 
word “god,” and he conducts his work at the expense of isolating the meaning from the 
whole social context. So, in describing the phenomenology of the ethical relation, 
Levinas uses the word God;8 yet even from a religious disposition, Levinas rejects the 
theological god but not the ancient god of monotheism,9 which signifies human kinship 
and the commonness of a father; hence, sociality based on fraternity.   
As the distinction between genealogy and phenomenology seems quite applicable to 
subjectivity, I find this approach useful for clarifying both philosophers’ conceptions of 
ethics in their depiction of “good” and “evil,” and also the beyond of good and evil. The 
Nietzschean beyond good and evil appears to apply mainly to practical categories 
based on the social context of how power manipulates relations. Beyond means 
beyond (social) use, which is the manipulation of power contingent upon current 
moralities, traditions or customs. Although Nietzsche states that he wants to go beyond 
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 William Large, “The Difference Between Genealogy and Phenomenology:  The Example of 
Religion in Nietzsche and Levinas,” in Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 19 (Special Issue: 
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good and evil, he speculates with such ease and comfort only because his 
understanding of evil seems to be relatively limited. In the first chapter, I mentioned 
Foot’s worry regarding Nietzsche’s naivety about the wickedness of evil. This is an 
issue she raises in “Nietzsche’s Immoralism,” where she expresses her concern that 
Nietzsche’s writing has been sadly seductive in the past, so no one can promise that it 
will not be seductive in the future again.   
Starting with the easy part of the matter, I disagree with Foot’s worry about the 
possibility of his writing being employed in the future as seductive reference texts to 
justify fascism. Reading Nietzsche is always adventurous, but the provocative nature of 
his prose should not lead us to dismiss him. Indeed, there can never be full control over 
how people interpret Nietzsche, as huge discrepancies can always exist between what 
thinkers write and how people interpret or manipulate their writings. Yet, the fear over 
the seductive rhetoric of writing suggests the unacceptable idea of censorship which 
we should never give in to.   
As for the challenging part of determining Nietzsche’s naivety about evil, I must confess 
that being haunted by that burning question throughout this project I still cannot 
formulate an easy answer to it; so I will say yes and no. Viewed from a certain angle, 
when compared with Levinas’s elaborate phenomenology of suffering and victimization, 
Nietzsche on the surface appears naive about the wickedness of evil. Contrary to 
Nietzsche’s naivety, Levinas strikingly confronts the problem of evil and frankly 
conveys that evil is beyond our capacity of comprehension. Nietzsche hardly sees a 
problem about it because he considers it basically in terms of our anthropocentric 
preoccupation, which is solely interested in the interpretation of harm versus damage, 
without any access to seeing the big “picture” – such as attaining human greatness; 
justification of existence as an aesthetic phenomenon or a matter of conflicting 
interests (among individuals) as power manipulates relations. 
For Nietzsche, just as nature cannot be good or bad in itself, in his naturalistic account 
of evil, taking evil personally is the beginning of naivety and the sign of mental and 
spiritual corruption as it feeds on ressentiment. He notoriously claims that evil is the evil 
necessity of human flourishing, which is continuous with Nietzsche’s notion of there 
being no doer behind the deed. Even though he does not directly evoke the 
impersonality of evil, his ideas pertaining to agency are nonetheless ambiguous. He 
does not reject causality necessarily because he denies the existence of causes and 
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effects to be wrong but mainly emphasizes that causality gives us a very limited and 
often incomplete picture.   
Just as we cannot observe inner drives, we cannot determine the motives behind acts 
or predict the harm or benefit beforehand. The “use” causality provides us – such as 
distributing guilt and punishment from the creditor to the debtor – is misleading. Or 
perhaps it would be more accurate to suggest that pertaining to every single event, 
there are causalities rather than one causal explanation, as at the end of the day, they 
are only power relationships. A similar case pertains to the problem of evil as well; what 
we see is only the tip of the iceberg which is not an inaccurate, but fundamentally 
incomplete account.   
For this reason, I would nevertheless emphasize that in spite of his naive appearance, 
Nietzsche might be merely referring to the uncomfortable truth that civilizations only 
come forth at a great expense of wars and terror. By offering us his seemingly amoral 
perspective, Nietzsche reminds us that all the universal and humane values which we 
take for granted as inalienable birth rights came into being only as the outcome of 
unbearable bloodshed, humiliation, colonisation, slavery, massacres and so forth. The 
bare fact that Nietzsche is reminding us of the appalling agony our ancestors either 
caused or endured, as a consequence of which sophisticated theories of justice, 
freedom or human rights came about, does not mean that Nietzsche is completely 
apathetic about human suffering. In this respect, by referring to evil as the evil 
necessity for human flourishing, Nietzsche may not be naive but necessarily insightful 
and courageous enough to expose and demystify the “genealogy” of our supreme 
values. He may have a point in suggesting that we must study our being in all its 
immorality. 
The binary opposition between good and evil, and even more importantly, the beyond 
of good and evil, has been a central idea for this project as it has a significant 
relevance for Levinas too. Levinas bases his philosophy of ethics on the distinct 
separation between good and evil – the meaning of good and evil which arises from 
sociality. He alludes to the Platonic notion of the Good beyond Being as the eternal 
reference point for ethical orientation which can only manifest itself by responding to 
the Other. He associates the indifference to one’s neighbour’s suffering with the source 
of all immorality. However, in Levinas’s account, both Good and evil are beyond my 
capacities of cognition, as both already signify the “beyond;” namely, beyond meaning 
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or comprehension as in transcendence – by evoking highness, it is referred to as 
transascendence (Good) in contrast to transcendence (evil).   
In Levinas’s philosophy, evil manifests itself through the experience of suffering, 
causing the loss of one’s powers to interpret and reason through which one loses one’s 
agency. Since it has a demolishing effect upon one’s subjectivity, suffering is pure evil 
and hence cannot be justified. The problem with evil is that it cannot be simplistically 
refuted philosophically; because its articulation is already beyond one’s cognitive 
capacities. Even though there is no use for suffering, nor compensation; or symmetry 
or balance between good and evil (responding to the call of the Good beyond Being 
versus the evil of suffering), there is a “nevertheless;” which signifies a crucial 
difference between suffering in me versus the suffering in the Other. 
On the one hand, undergoing the private experience of suffering, the sufferer loses her 
singularity, even her ipseity. But on the other hand, by responding to the Other, she 
senses her ipseity being singled out. Perhaps this might be a reason even for the 
sufferer herself that suffering for the Other can be meaningful. Levinas makes it very 
clear that nothing in the world ever justifies the suffering of the Other. This is the major 
distinction between Nietzsche and Levinas; the determining factor is not the justification 
of my own suffering (even if I suffer for the Other), but on no condition does Levinas 
ever consider the possibility of justifying the suffering in the Other. For Levinas, the 
problem with theodicy is not necessarily the need to justify my own suffering but the 
hidden rationale for justifying the suffering of the Other.   
By mentioning suffering in general, Nietzsche does not make a distinction between my 
suffering and others’ suffering, which is also visible in his important theme of amor fati.  
From a Levinasian viewpoint, the Nietzschean notion of loving fate leads to the idea of 
the impossibility of critique; even more dangerously, the impossibility of self critique. 
Levinas calls the ethical moment the suspension of one’s spontaneity by the Other. 
The Nietzschean subject who loves her fate suspends herself to adore herself, which is 
similar to the narcissism of one taking one’s own photograph and loving it. 
Surrendering to the blind powers of the will to power, amor fati also suggests inactivity, 
surrender, fatalism. In this respect, Levinas criticizes Nietzsche’s attitude of treating 
one’s fate or life as one’s artwork; Nietzsche already elaborates on this idea as being 
the artists of our lives. The exclusivity of critique (of one’s fate) is reminiscent of 
Levinas’s critique of artworks regarding their being closed totalities.   
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Nietzsche’s (partial) naivety regarding the evil in suffering blinds him to the issue of 
overcoming theodicy. Although it is Nietzsche who rigorously exposes the hypocrisy of 
theodicy, he falls into its temptation, if indirectly. Nietzsche vehemently argues that 
what is pathetic about man is his inability to endure the solidity of suffering without 
ascribing meaning to it, such as by inventing morality, religion, the idea of an afterlife; 
anything associated with reward or punishment. As the calculating, measuring animal, 
man demands compensation. Although Nietzsche is highly accurate in observing this 
aspect of human nature, while criticizing it, he ends up being unable to resist that 
mindset. In his attempt to overcome nihilism, he falls prey to a different version of 
theodicy; in a celebratory mood, Nietzsche acclaims that in order to say yes to one 
single joy, one has to accept all the suffering that comes along with it.   
Even though this proposition sounds plausible at first sight, when we scrutinise it 
closely, we discover that Nietzsche’s idea still contains the condition of symmetry. It is 
Levinas who remarks on our fixation with symmetry, and suggests that in order to 
overcome theodicy, one has to get over the obsession with symmetry – because any 
mode of symmetrical thinking always seeks justification one way or another. It is the 
asymmetrical which welcomes the non-reciprocal. Thus, in spite of what Nietzsche 
suggests, one may have to endure a tremendous amount of suffering without the 
anticipation of a single joy. Or, one may seek a balance between joy and suffering in 
one’s life – as if from a bird’s eye view – but that would not be regarded as radically 
challenging the notion of theodicy or overcoming nihilism.   
On the other hand, we need to tie some loose ends regarding Levinas as well. An 
immediate issue that needs clarification is the role of choice in his ethics. As Fabio 
Ciaramelli asks, if I am always already chosen for my responsibilities before I even 
know it, can there still be ethics, without choice?10 Is this not a pre-ethical being making 
pre-ethical choices? Is this even a responsibility? As for Levinas, the choice to respond 
to the Other is up to me, yet in whichever way I respond, whether to fulfil or deny my 
responsibilities, there is no way I can feel the inhibition or obsession get any lighter. I 
will always feel burdened by my responsibilities regardless of my choice. My choice is 
crucial in terms of leading me to ethical relationships, but it is trivial in terms of affecting 
how I experience my subjectivity.      
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Levinas’s ethics attempts to point beyond the “is” versus “ought” dilemma; he would 
reject the “is” as long as “is” implies the ethical realism or naturalism because nature 
cannot provide us with ethical meanings. And Levinas would reject the “ought” as long 
as “ought” implies the rational justification of moral behaviours, which always comes 
with some philosophical reasons or compensations pertaining to damages or benefits. 
When the face says “Do not kill me!” it is the face that says it, not the mouth or the 
tongue. The ethical command is beyond “is” versus “ought” because I am not rewarded 
in a practical way, not in this world, and neither am I granted a promise for salvation in 
the afterlife. To the contrary, my responding to the Other prompts me to suffer for her 
suffering by substituting myself for her.   
What Levinas contributes to the dichotomy of the “is” versus “ought” is to unravel this 
binary opposition, which presumes a clear cut distinction without indicating anything 
about the primordial obsession by the Other. Presumably, the originality of Levinas’s 
phenomenology lies in the discovery of the wide grey space in between. The “infinity of 
responsibilities” defies this easy category because one is never good enough; neither 
while acknowledging and serving the Other, nor while ignoring the presence of the 
Other. Levinas’s conception of obsession is the key phenomenological insight to 
describe the ethical moment or the encounter with the face. The face haunts me even if 
out of my sight; one feels the inhibition and obsession even when ignoring the Other. 
The one who ignores the Other is not any less obsessed with the Other than the one 
who responds to the Other. Either way, I will always be obsessed with the Other. If I 
deny my responsibilities, I will nevertheless be still haunted by the Other, which is why I 
can never murder the Other in the ethical sense. 
Yet, if I accept my responsibilities, I will still be obsessed because I will never be 
certain whether what I do for the Other will ever be good enough since I cannot 
comprehend her; there will always be that essential separation between the same and 
the Other to secure her alterity. The notion of infinite responsibilities signifies that I will 
never feel the peace of mind and heart pertaining to the realm of the “ought,” which 
implies a sense of complacency; a feeling of satisfaction that deservedly accompanies 
“a task fulfilled.” The pomposity of obeying the moral command evoking a sense of 
reward is completely absent in Levinas’s account.  
There is nothing to comfort me or give me peace; no choice I make can ever release 
me from my discomfort, my obsession, my responsibilities. My neck will always feel stiff 
from supporting the universe. Yet, when Levinas regards substitution as a divine 
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discomfort that liberates, he implies that I am only liberated to see that I have even 
more responsibilities, because that is the condition of life, rather than a mere 
philosophical proposition.   
However, in spite of Levinas’s embracive and humanistic philosophy of the Other, there 
comes a moment when one pauses to question the validity of his conception of 
universalism. I believe Levinas’s humanistic philosophy is highly valid and valuable as 
long as he emphasizes humanity in general. But when he begins homogenizing 
humanity11 in terms of creating a universal family – around a common father and 
brotherhood –, notwithstanding its romantic allure, matters get complicated and 
question-begging. In Levinas, monotheism signifies human kinship and the 
commonness of a father, which I think is too optimistic a notion even as an analogy. 
Without taking his proposition on a literal level, I would nevertheless like to draw 
attention to the ambivalence of Levinas’s thought. It is important to note that 
monotheistic religions do not promote peace for most of the time, but rather endorse 
violence and discrimination; functioning just like a family, even if they maintain peace 
inside, they often wage war outside, towards the “enemies.”   
Building alliances based on kinship is not a radical idea in the ethical sense, because in 
theory, a family gains its significance based on its internal sufficiency. By nature, the 
solidarity of a family is maintained by and large at the expense of exclusion or even 
hostility towards other families. If all humanity is a family, then there is no family as the 
concept loses its meaning. Familial belonging always excludes outsiders at some level; 
typically, families are less sensitive to the plights of other families. For this reason, 
rather than contributing to further human bonding, ironically families intensify the 
feeling of being-for-one-another; at the cost of weakening the inclination of being-for-
the-Other. 
Thus, I think that in order to emphasize the humanism of the Other, it would be much 
more plausible to stress the more fundamental aspect, namely our shared humanity, 
without succumbing to an uncritical family discourse. It is possible to refer to the 
religiosity of the human soul without associating it with any specific religion because 
another monotheistic religion would point to a different common father – for a different 
family.   
                                                             
11
 I have already touched on the dubiety of Levinas’s notion of the “abstract man” because of its 
potentially homogenizing and suppressing effects upon the “concrete” singularities.      
200 
 
Likewise, it is not necessary to call the universal language of philosophy Greek. If the 
language of philosophy is supposed to be universal then it does not even have to 
remain Eurocentric. Rather than regarding multiculturalism as a threat to the integrity of 
the West, universality could evoke welcome, openness and hospitality without fearing 
disorientation. If Levinas rejects this possibility, his account will always be vulnerable to 
the criticism that his conception of the Other tends to resemble the same too much, or 
favours the neighbour with whom he happens to have literal kinship.12       
In this respect, compared with Levinas, Nietzsche’s non-universalist account seems 
much more respectful towards singularities. The Overman,13 the free spirit are neutral 
categories, free from any ontological burden of socio-historical connotations. It is 
important to remember that even Nietzsche’s figure of contempt, the cunning ascetic 
priest, is “universal;” in the sense that the term applies to anyone in every culture. The 
ascetic priest can be Jewish, Christian, Muslim, Buddhist or Platonist.14 As no specific 
continent, race or culture is privileged, in his emphasis on individuality Nietzsche hints 
that one can organize one’s drives just like a gardener cultivating her garden - in any 
style she pleases; Chinese, French, Dutch, Scottish etc.15 -; perhaps we can thereby 
infer that not just each individual drive; or subject; but even every different culture could 
signify a different perspective.  
I carried out this project without promising any negotiation between Nietzsche and 
Levinas, and towards the end of my research, I only feel more convinced of the 
impossible, yet fascinating relationship between the two philosophers. As phrased by 
Jean-Michel Longneaux, the “impossible relationship” between them makes itself 
mostly manifest when we imagine each philosopher regarding the other as 
exemplifying his own point: Levinas could say that without contributing anything to the 
meaning of ethics, Nietzsche only ever propagates the narcissism of the same, which 
is what Levinas attempts to unravel elaborately in TI, in order to refute it. This seems 
                                                             
12
 I make this comment also bearing in mind Levinas’s facile dismissal of the question posed at 
him during an interview with Solomon Malka, regarding recognizing the alterity of the 
Palestinian as the Jew’s Other. When encountering a concrete incident of this kind, without 
hesitation, Levinas responds that his “notion of alterity is completely different” and states that “in 
alterity one may find the enemy” (LR, 294). Nevertheless, I think this question could have been 
a perfect opportunity for Levinas to expose not only the radical dimension but also the 
universality of his thought, if he had right away acknowledged the alterity of the Palestinian, 
without reluctance.      
13
 Even though the Overman is obviously a sexist term, a feminist criticism of Nietzsche – and of 
course, Levinas – is well beyond the scope of this project. 
14
 For Nietzsche, it is Plato who invented the notion of other worldliness, yet his critique of Plato 
would be the topic of another dissertation. 
15
 Nietzsche, D, V, 560. 
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like a quite obvious point; a justified and reasonable criticism that can be posed at 
Nietzsche’s individualistic philosophy, in general.   
On the other hand, Nietzsche could suggest that even while rejecting the narcissism of 
the same, Levinas nevertheless acts in accordance with the will to power, the 
metaphysical conatus essendi inherent within everyone – and Levinas is no exception.  
Levinas’s arguments for human elevation, responding to the Good beyond Being 
through sociality could be interpreted as a desire for growth in power. Levinas could be 
regarded as exemplifying the will to power despite his reference to it in disgust – as he 
associates it with evil and egoism.  Nietzsche could point out that the essential 
orientation of ethics, the Good beyond Being, is eventually prompted by the non-
representational power directedness. As Nietzsche does not associate power with evil 
or anything representational, he would “amorally” proclaim that power is beyond good 
and evil. Thus, power applies to the Good as well.     
To conclude, without offering any compatibility between the two philosophers, we could 
nevertheless benefit from their intriguing incompatibility. I think that where Levinas 
arrives at an impasse, Nietzsche could help us reconsider and revise our perspectives. 
And where Nietzsche seems to get lost in his naturalistic cosmology devoid of ethical 
consideration, Levinas could call our spontaneity into question in order to revisit the 
meaning of being human. Studying a philosopher from the viewpoint of another 
enables us to see the contrasts and the unique differences in each of the two 
philosophers much more clearly; and hence appreciate the depth of their thoughts even 
more. This has been my main motive in exploring Nietzsche and Levinas within an 
imaginary agonistic contest, where what matters is not the declaration of who wins in 
the end, but the ongoing challenge itself, for its own sake. The contest only highlights 
their unique virtues more and hopefully inspires those of us who are in the amateur 
league to be better contestants.     
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